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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

GAYLEN CLAYSON,

)
)

Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Respondent, )
)
)
)

vs.

Supreme Court No.

38471-2011

)
)

DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, LAZE, LLC,
Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellant,

)
)
)
)

CLERK'S RECORD

Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of
Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock.
Before HONORABLE Stephen S. Dunn District Judge.

For Appellant:
Gary L. Cooper
COOPER&. LARSEN, CHARTERED
P.O. Box 4229
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-4229

For Respondent:
Blake S. Atkin
ATKIN LAW OFFICES
7579 North Westside Hwy
Clifton, Idaho 83228
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Case: CV-2009-0002212-0C Current Judge: Stephen S Dunn
Gaylen Clayson vs. Donald I Zebe, etal.

Gaylen Clayson vs. Donald I Zebe, Rick Lawson, LAZE, LLC
Date

Code

User

6/8/2009

NCOC

SHAREE

Clerk's

David C Nye

COMP

SHAREE

Complaint Filed by Blake S Atkin, Attorney for
Plaintiff

David C Nye

SHAREE

Filing: A - Civil Complaint for more than $1,000.00 David C Nye
Paid by: Atkin Law Office PC Receipt number:
0021684 Dated: 6/8/2009 Amount: $88.00
(Check) For:

ATTR

SHAREE

Plaintiff: Clayson, Gaylen Attorney Retained Blake David C Nye
S Atkin

SMIS

SHAREE

Summons Issued - Don Zebe, 465 Berrett Ave,
Pocatello, 1083201

David C Nye

SMIS

SHAREE

Summons Issued - Rick Lawson, 431
Chesapeake Ave, Pocatello, 1083202

David C Nye

SMIS

SHAREE

Summons Issued - LAZE LLC % Rick Lawson,
431 Chesapeake Ave, Chubbuck, 1083202

David C Nye

7/24/2009

MAR LEA

David C Nye
Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: bowers
law firm Receipt number: 0028119 Dated:
7/27/2009 Amount: $58.00 (Check) For: Lawson,
Rick (defendant), LAZE, LLC (defendant) and
Zebe, Donald I (defendant)

7/27/2009

CAMILLE

Answer, counterclaim and Demand for Jury;
John Bowers for def

ATTR

CAMILLE

Defendant: Zebe, Donald I Attorney Retained
John D. Bowers

ATTR

CAMILLE

Defendant: Lawson, Rick Attorney Retained John David C Nye
D. Bowers

ATTR

CAMILLE

Defendant: LAZE, LLC Attorney Retained John D. David C Nye
Bowers

CAMILLE

Answer to Counterclaim;
plntf/counterclaim def

AMYW

Returns of Service of Summons and Complaint to David C Nye
Don Zebe, Rick Lawson, and Laze, LLC; lsi Blake
Atkin, atty for plantiff/counterclaim def

8/12/2009

Judge

aty Blake Atkin for

aty David C Nye
David C Nye

David C Nye

8/25/2009

OR DR

AMYW

Order of Disqualification and Reference; lsi J Nye David C Nye

9/912009

ORDR

AMYW

Administrative Order of Reference; matter
reassigned to Judge Dunn; lsi J Nye

David C Nye

9/18/2009

ORDR

KARLA

Order for Submission of Information for
Scheduling Order; Is J Dunn 09/18/09

Stephen S Dunn

10/2/2009

KARLA

Stipulated Statement (Atkin forPlaintiff)

Stephen S Dunn

10/13/2009

CAMILLE

Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint;
Blake Atkin for plntf/counterclaim Def.

CAMILLE

Memorandum in support of Motin for Leave to
Amend Complaint; aty Blake Atkin for plntf

CAMILLE

Certificate of service of Plntfs First set of Interrog Stephen S Dunn
to Defs; aty Blake Atkin for defs

aty

Stephen S Dunn
Stephen S Dunn
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Case: CV-2009-0002212-0C Current Judge: Stephen S Dunn
Gaylen Clayson vs. Donald I Zebe, etal.

Gaylen Clayson
Date

VS.

Donald I Zebe, Rick Lawson, LAZE, LLC

Code

User

Judge

CAMILLE

Certificate of service of Plaintiffs first set of
Document requests to Defendants: aty Blake
Atkin for plntf/counterclaim def.

Stephen S Dunn

NOTC

KARLA

Notice of Hearing; Motion for Leave to Amend;
(Atkin for Def)

Stephen S Dunn

HRSC

KARLA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 11/23/200902:00
PM)

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Defendants Motion to Continue Hearing on
Motion to Amend; aty John Bowers for defs

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Defendants Response to Plntfs Motion to Amend Stephen S Dunn
Complaint; aty JohnBowers for def

CAMILLE

Certificate of service on Discovery Responses;
aty JohnBowers for def

12/112009

DCANO

Stephen S Dunn
First Amended Complaint; Blake S: Atkin,
Attorney for Plntf. Adding Don Zebe. Rick Lawson
and Laze, LLC as Counterclaim Plaintiffs, and
Gaylen Clayson as Counterclaim Defendant

12/14/2009

CAMILLE

Answer to First Amended Complaint; aty John
Bowers for Defslcounterclaim plntfs

Stephen S Dunn

KARLA

Hearing result for Motion held on 11/23/2009
02:00 PM: Hearing Held

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Order; Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint is Stephen S Dunn
Granted;
J Dunn 12-14-09

12/18/2009

CAMILLE

Stipulated Statement; atyBlake Atkin for
plntflcounterclaim def

12/21/2009

CAMILLE

Notice of Depo of Bill Hudson;
@9am:

ORDR

KARLA

Order Setting Jury Trial; Is J Dunn 12/23/09

HRSC

KARLA

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 03/23/201009:00 Stephen S Dunn
AM)

HRSC

KARLA

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 11/02/201009:00 Stephen S Dunn
AM)

12/24/2009

CAMILLE

Certificate of service - aty John Bowers for defs

Stephen S Dunn

12/28/2009

CAMILLE

Amended notice of Depo of Bill Hudson on
1-12-2010: aty Blake Atkin

Stephen S Dunn

12/31/2009

CAMILLE

Amended Notice of Depo of Bill Hudson on
1-12-2010 @ 9am: aty Blake Atkin for plntf

Stephen S Dunn

1/11/2010

CAMILLE

Subpoena Duces Tecum; aty Blake Atkin

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Notice of service of Subpoena Duces Tecum;
aty Blake Atkin for plnt/conterclaim def

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Return of service - srvd on (copy of Subpoena to
Becky Holzemer 12-29-09)

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Certificate of Service - aty John Bowers for defs

Stephen S Dunn

10/13/2009

10/23/2009

11/16/2009

12/17/2009

12/23/2009

1/13/2010

HRHD

Stephen S Dunn

Stephen S Dunn

set for 1-8-2010 Stephen S Dunn
Stephen S Dunn
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Case: CV-2009-0002212-0C Current Judge: Stephen S Dunn
Gaylen Clayson

Gaylen Clayson
Date

User: DCANO

VS.

VS.

Donald I Zebe, etal.

Donald I Zebe, Rick Lawson, LAZE, LLC

Code

User

Judge

CAMILLE

Amended Notice of Depo of Gaylen clayson and
Subpoena;
aty John Bowers for Def and
Counterclaim plntfs

Stephen S Dunn

MOTN

KARLA

Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice (Bowers for
Def)

Stephen S Dunn

MOTN

KARLA

Defendant's Motion to Modify Scheduling Order
(Bowers for Def)

Stephen S Dunn

1/20/2010

CAMILLE

Notice of Deposition of Jeff Randall; on
1-26-2010 @ 9am:
aty John Bowers for def

Stephen S Dunn

1/21/2010

CAMILLE

Order modifying deadlines in order setting Jury
Trial;
J Dunn 1-20-2010

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Order of Admission Pro Hac Vice;
1-20-2010

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Second Amended Notice of Depo of Gaylen
Clayson on 2-2-2010 @ 9am: aty John Bowers
for def and counterclaim plntf

CAMILLE

Stephen S Dunn
Amended Notice Depo of Jeff Randall on
2-3-2010 @ 9am: aty John Bowers for defs and
counterclaim plntf

2/112010

CAMILLE

Motion and Memorandum to Hold Citizen
Community Bank in contempt for nonobedience
of subpoena; aty Blake Atkin for
plntf/counterclaim def

2/3/2010

CAMILLE

Defs Motin to Dismiss and or Motion for summary Stephen S Dunn
Judgment; aty John Bowers

CAMILLE

Defs Memorandum in support of motion to
dismiss and or motion for sumary Judgment;
John Bowers for defs

1/14/2010

1/19/2010

1/25/2010

J Dunn

Stephen S Dunn

Stephen S Dunn

Stephen S Dunn
aty

CAMILLE

Certificate of service of plntfs Response to Defs
First request for Production of Documents; aty
Blake Atkin for plntf

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Stephen S Dunn
Third Amended Notice of Depo of T Gaylen
Clayson on 2-17-2010 @ 9am: aty John Bowers
for defs

CAMILLE

Amended Notice Depo of Jeff Randall on
2-15-2010 @ 10am: aty John Bowers for defs

Stephen S Dunn

2/8/2010

CAMILLE

Subpoena Duces Tecum; (Glanbia Foods)

Stephen S Dunn

2/10/2010

CAMILLE

Third Amended Notice of Depo of Jeff Randall;
set for 2-15-2010: aty John Bowers for def

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Fourth Amended Notice of Depo of Gaylen
Stephen S Dunn
Clayson on 2-17-2010 @ 9am: aty John Bowers
for defs

2/12/2010

CAMILLE

Subpoena Returned; left wI Jerry Femnger

2/18/2010

CAMILLE

Fifth Amended Notice of Deposition of Gaylen
Stephen S Dunn
Clayson on 2-25-2010 @ 9am: aty John Bowers
for def and counterclaim plntf

Stephen S Dunn
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Case: CV-2009-0002212-0C Current Judge: Stephen S Dunn
Gaylen Clayson vs. Donald I Zebe, etal.

Gaylen Clayson VS. Donald I Zebe, Rick Lawson, LAZE, LLC
Date

Code

User

Judge

CAMILLE

Defendants Designation of Fact Witnesses; aty Stephen S Dunn
John Bowers for the Def and Counterclaim Plntts

CAMILLE

Certificate of service of plntts response to
Defendants Second request for production of
documents; aty Blaker Atkin for
plntt/counterclaim def

Stephen S Dunn

NOTC

KARLA

Notice of Deposition of Rick Lawson (Atkin for
Plaintiff)

Stephen S Dunn

NOTC

KARLA

Notice of Deposition of Don Zebe (Atkin for
Plaintiff)

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Plaintiffs Designation of Fact Witnesses: aty
Blake Atkin for plntt

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Motion and Memorandum to be allowed to file late Stephen S Dunn
dSignation of Fact Witnesses: aty Blake Atkin for
plntf

CAMILLE

Defendants Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Witness
List;;
aty John Bowers for defs

Stephen S Dunn

3/1/2010

CAMILLE

Defendants Motion to Compel Discovery;
John Bowers for def

Stephen S Dunn

3/2/2010

CAMILLE

Notice of Hearing; set for Defs Motoin to
Dismiss/or Motion for Summary Judgment;
John Bowers for Def

2/22/2010

2/24/2010

2/26/2010

HRSC

3/4/2010

aty

Stephen S Dunn
aty

CAMILLE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 03/15/2010 02:00
PM)

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Amended Notice of Deposition of Rick Lawson
3-4-2010 @ gam: aty Blake Atkin for plntt

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Amended Notice of Deposition of Don Zebe on
3-3-2010 @ 9am: aty Blake Atkin for plntt

Stephen S Dunn

3/11/2010

MOTN

KARLA

Motion to Continue Hearing Date from March 15, Stephen S Dunn
2010 to March 23, 2010 (Bowers for Def)

3/12/2010

OR DR

KARLA

Order Vacating Hearing on March 15, 2010 and
rescheduling for March 23, 2010 /s J Dunn
03/12/10

Stephen S Dunn

CaNT

KARLA

Continued (Motion 03/23/2010 10:00 AM)

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Stipulation and understanding of parties
concerning Trial date Rescheduling; sl Don
Zebe and Rick Lawson

Stephen S Dunn

KARLA

Stipulation and Understanding of Parties
Concerning Trial Date Rescheduling (Don Zebe;
Rick Lawson)

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Certificate of service of Plaintiffs Third set of
Requests for Production of Documents to
Defendants: aty Blake Atkin for pint

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Certificate of Service of Plaintiffs Second set of
Interrog. to Defendants: aty Blake Atkin for
plntt/counterclaim Def.

Stephen S Dunn

3/18/2010

3/19/2010

3/22/2010

STIP

Sixt~
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Case: CV-2009-0002212-0C Current Judge: Stephen S Dunn
Gaylen Clayson vs. Donald I lebe, etal.

Gaylen Clayson
Date

VS.

Donald I lebe, Rick Lawson, LAZE, LLC

Code

User

3/22/2010

CAMILLE

Certificate of Service of Plaintiffs First set of
Requests for Admissions to Defendants:
aty
Blake Atkin for plntf/counterclaim def.

3/23/2010

CAMILLE

Memorandum in Opposition to Defs Motion to
Stephen S Dunn
Dismiss and or Motin for Summary Judgment;
Memorandum in support of Motion to Amend
Plntfs First Amended Complaint to Assert a Claim
for PUnitive Damages; and Motion to countinue
pursuant to IR
CP 56f:
aty Blake Atkin for p Intflcounterclaim
defendant

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Blake S Atkin in Support of Plaintiffs
Rule 56f Motion; aty Blake Atkin for plntf
counterclaim def

Stephen S Dunn

HRHD

KARLA

Hearing result for Motion held on 03/23/2010
10:00 AM: Hearing Held

Stephen S Dunn

MEOR

KARLA

Minute Entry and Order-hrg hid 03/23/10 on
Stephen S Dunn
Motion to dismiss; Court DENY Motion to
Dismiss; Plaintiff Rule 56f GRANTED; Def Motion
to Compel taken under advisement; set hrg for
Def Motion for Summ Judgment;

CAMILLE

Certificate of service of Plaintiff Supplemental
Stephen S Dunn
Response to Defs First Request for Production of
documents; aty Blake Atkin for
plnttlcounterclaim def

3/2912010

Stephen S Dunn

3/31/2010

HRVC

KARLA

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 03/23/2010
09:00AM: Hearing Vacated

4/1/2010

DEOP

KARLA

Memorandum Decision on Defendant's Motion to Stephen S Dunn
Compel Discovery; DENIED except as to Bank of
Star Valley records; Plaintiff ordered to produce
Bank of Star Valley records within 14 days of this
order; No costs or fees awarded to either party; /s
J Dunn 04/01/10

412/2010

HRSC

KARLA

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 07/07/201002:00 PM)

Stephen S Dunn

Notice of Deposition of Don lebe on 4-29-2010

Stephen S Dunn

4/19/2010

CAMILLE

Stephen S Dunn

@ 9am: atyBlake Atkin for plntt

4/22/2010

CAMILLE

Notice of DepOSition of Rick Lawson on
4-30-2010 @ 9am: aty Blake Atkin for plntt

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Certificate of Service of Defs Replies to Plaintiffs
First set of Req for Admissions to Defendants;
aty John Bowers for def/counterclaimants

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Motion for Protective ORder concerning
Deposition Scheduled for 4-29-2010 and April
30,2010:
aty John Bowers for defs and
counterclaim plntts

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Defendants Response to Plaintfs Motion to
Extend Deadline to produce Bank of Star Valley
Records;
aty John Bowers for defs

Stephen S Dunn

Date: 4/1/2011

Sixth ."Idicial District Court - Bannock County

Time: 03:26 PM
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User: DCANO

Case: CV-2009-0002212-0C Current Judge: Stephen S Dunn
Gaylen Clayson vs. Donald I Zebe, etal.

Gaylen Clayson vs. Donald I Zebe, Rick Lawson, LAZE, LLC
Date

Code

User

4/22/2010

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Rod Jensen;
defs

4/23/2010

CAMILLE

Defendants Motion for Contempt; aty John
Bowerss for Def. and counterclaim Plntfs

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Affidavit of John Bowers; aty John Bowers for
defs and counterclaim plntfs

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Defendants Response to Plaintiffs Motion to
Extend Deadline to Produce Bank of Star Valley
Records; aty John Bowers for Defs.
counterclaim plntf

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Rod Jensen;
aty John Bowers for
def and counterclaim pltfs

Stephen S Dunn

5/10/2010

CAMILLE

Certificate of Service - Counterclaim Plntfs served Stephen S Dunn
upon the plntf, their Responses to Plntfs Interrog
and req for production: aty John Bowers for
Defs and Counterclaim plntfs

5/17/2010

CAMILLE

Notice of Association of counsel; aty Gary
Cooper for def

KARLA

Memorandum Decision and Order re; Various
Stephen S Dunn
Motions; Motion for Protective Order and Motion
for Extension of Time to Produce are moot; Court
DENIES Motion for Contempt; Is J Dunn 05/19/10

CAMILLE

Motion to continue Trial;
Def.

CAMILLE

Notice of Hearing; on motion to continue set for
6-21-2010 @2pm: aty Gary Cooper for def

Stephen S Dunn

3/17/2010

CAMILLE

Notice of Deposition of Gay/en Clayson and
Subpoena ;
aty Gary Cooper

Stephen S Dunn

3/18/2010

CAMILLE

Amended Notice of Deposition of Gaylen Clayson Stephen S Dunn
and Subpoena; aty Gary Cooper for Def

3/21/2010

CAMILLE

Notice of Cancellation of the Depo of Don Zebe
and Rick Lawson;
aty Blake Atkin for
plntf/counterclaim def

Stephen S Dunn

)/25/2010

CAMILLE

Amended Notice of Heaering; set for Defs
Motion for Summary Judgment on 8-9-2010 @
2pm: aty Gary Cooper

Stephen S Dunn

Stephen S Dunn

4/26/2010

5/20/2010

DEOP

3/7/2010

aty John Bowers for

aty Gary Cooper for

Stephen S Dunn

Stephen S Dunn

Stephen S Dunn

;/29/2010

HRSC

CAMILLE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary
Judgment 08/09/2010 02:00 PM)

;/30/2010

MEOR

KARLA

Minute Entry and Order; hrg 06/21/10; Def Motion Stephen S Dunn
to Continue Trial; Court retained trial date; set
backup date; reset Motion for Summary
Judgment; /s J Dunn 06/24/10

HRSC

KARLA

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 01/11/2011 09:00 Stephen S Dunn
AM)

CAMILLE

Notice of service - Response to Plntfs Second set Stephen S Dunn
of requests for Admissions to Def: aty Gary
Cooper

'/13/2010

5

Date: 4/1/2011
Time: 03:26 PM

District Court· Bannock Cou
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Case: CV-2009-0002212-0C Current Judge: Stephen S Dunn
Gaylen Clayson vs. Donald I Zebe, etal.

Gaylen Clayson vs. Donald I Zebe, Rick Lawson, LAZE, LLC
Date

Code

User

Judge

7/15/2010

CAMILLE

Notice of Service - Discovery to Plaintiff and this
Notice: aty Gary Cooper for Defs

7/16/2010

CAMILLE

Notice of service - Response to Plntfs Thrid set of Stephen S Dunn
Document requests to defendants: aty Gary
Cooper for def

7/26/2010

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Gary Cooper;

CAMILLE

Defendants Lawson and Zebe Reply
Memorandum in support of Motion at
DismisslMotion for Summary Judgment: aty
Gary Cooper for Def.

Stephen S Dunn

8/6/2010

CAMILLE

Notice of Mediation; sl Judge Brown 8-3-2010

Stephen S Dunn

8/9/2010

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Blake S Atkin in Opposition to Defs
Stephen S Dunn
Motin to Dismiss or for summary Judgment; aty
Blake Atkin for plntf

KARLA

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Stephen S Dunn
held on 08/09/2010 02:00 PM: Motion Held

8/18/2010

CAMILLE

Certificate of Service of Plntfs RElsponse to Defs
Discovery to plntf: aty Blake Atkin for plntf

9/15/2010

CAMILLE

Memorandum Decision and Orderan Defendants Stephen S Dunn
Motion for Summary Judgment; (Court GRANTS
Defs Summary Judgment) Defs Motion for
Summary Judgment is DENIED; Plntfs Motion to
Amend Plntf First Amended Complaint to Assert a
Claim of Punitive Damages is DENIED) sl Judge
Dunn 9-14-2010

9/21/2010

CAMILLE

Second Amended Notice of Deposition of Gaylen Stephen S Dunn
Clayson and Subpoena; set for 9-30-2010: aty
Gary Cooper

10/1/2010

CAMILLE

Defendants Expert and Fact witness Disclosure;
aty Gary Cooper

10/4/2010

CAMILLE

Motion to reconsider damage aspects of decision Stephen S Dunn
dated september 15, 2010: aty Blake Atkin for
plntf

CAMILLE

Memorandum in Support of Defense Motion in
Limine;
aty Gary Cooper

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Second Affidavit of Gary Cooper; aty Gary
Cooper

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Defs Supplemental Expert and Fact Witness
Disclosure; aty Gary Cooper for def

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Defense Motion in Limine; aty Gary Cooper

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/25/2010 01 :30
PM)

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim;
Cooper for def.

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing; set for Motion to Dismiss on
10-25-2010 @ 1:30 pm;

HELD

HRSC
10/7/2010

aty Gary Cooper

aty Gary

Stephen S Dunn

Stephen S Dunn

Stephen S Dunn

Stephen S Dunn

Stephen S Dunn

Date: 4/1/2011

Sixti'l . -<Jicial District Court· Bannock County

Time: 03:26 PM
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User: DCANO

Case: CV-2009-0002212-0C Current Judge: Stephen S Dunn
Gaylen Clayson vs. Donald I Zebe, etal.

Gaylen Clayson vs. Donald I Zebe, Rick Lawson, LAZE, LLC
Date

Code

User

10/8/2010

NOTC

DCANO

Notice of Deposition of Jeff Randall to Preserve
Trial Testimony; Gary L. Cooper, Atty for Dfdts.

Stephen S Dunn

10/11/2010

MOTN

KARLA

Motion and Memorandum for Protective Order
Re; Deposition of Jeff Randall to Preserve Trial
Testimoney (Atkins for Plaintiff)

Stephen S Dunn

NOELIA

Miscellaneous Payment: For Certifying The Same Stephen S Dunn
Additional Fee For Certificate And Seal Paid by:
Atkin Law Office Receipt number: 0035333
Dated: 10/12/2010 Amount: $4.50 (Check)

CAMILLE

Joint Pre Trial Stipulation; aty Blake Atkin for
plntt

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing; set for 10-25-2010 @ 1:30
pm:
aty Blake Atkin for def

Stephen S Dunn

MOTN

KARLA

Motion to Reconsider damage aspects of decision Stephen S Dunn
dated September 15, 2010 (Atkin for Plaintiff)

10/15/2010

RESP

KARLA

Defs Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Protective Stephen S Dunn
Order

10/18/2010

MEMO

KARLA

Memorandum In Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion Stephen S Dunn
for Reconsideration Re Damage Aspects of
Decision Dated September 15, 2010 (Cooper for
Defs)

CAMILLE

Notice of hearing; set for Motion on 10-25-2010 Stephen S Dunn
@ 1:30pm: aty Gary Cooper

CAMILLE

Motion Eliminating Jury;

CAMILLE

Defendants Supplemental Expert and Fact
Witness Disclosure;
aty Gary Cooper for Def.

Stephen S Dunn

KARLA

Return of Service; subpoena of Jeff Randall

Stephen S Dunn

10/12/2010

10/19/2010

10/21/2010

aty Gary Cooper

Stephen S Dunn

10105/10

CAMILLE

Memorandum in Opposition to Defense Motion in Stephen S Dunn
Limine; aty Blake Atkin for plntt/counterclaim
def

DCHH

KARLA

Hearing result for Motion held on 10/25/2010
01 :30 PM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Sheila Fish
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less 100

ORDR

KARLA

Order; Counterclaim Dismissed; jury demand
Stephen S Dunn
dismissed; Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider
denied; Def Motion in Limine deferred until trial; Is
J Dunn 10/28/10

CONT

KARLA

Continued (Jury Trial 11/04/201009:30 AM)

Stephen S Dunn

11/112010

CAMILLE

Trial Brief;
aty Blake Atkin for
plnttlcounterclaim;

Stephen S Dunn

11/3/2010

CAMILLE

Designation of Testimony from the Deposition of
Morris A Farinella; on 9-30-2010: aty Gary
Cooper for Def.

Stephen S Dunn

10/29/2010

Stephen S Dunn

Sixtr ludicial District Court

Date: 4/1/2011
Time: 03:26 PM

M

Bannock County
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Case: CV-2009-0002212-0C Current Judge: Stephen S Dunn
Gaylen Clayson vs. Donald I Zebe, etal.

Gaylen Clayson VS. Donald I Zebe, Rick Lawson, LAZE, LLC
Date

Code

User

11/8/2010

HRSC

KARLA

Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference
11/08/201012:00 PM)

HRSC

KARLA

Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 11/10/201001:30 Stephen S Dunn
PM)

HRVC

KARLA

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 01/11/2011
09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated

Stephen S Dunn

DCHH

KARLA

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 11/04/2010
09:30 AM: District Court Hearing Held
Court Reporter: Sheila Fish
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: more than 500

Stephen S Dunn

HRHD

KARLA

Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 11/10/2010
01 :30 PM: Hearing Held

Stephen S Dunn

HRHD

KARLA

Hearing result for Status Conference held on
11/08/2010 12:00 PM: Hearing Held

Stephen S Dunn

MEOR

KARLA

Minute Entry and Order; Court Trial held; Parties
to submit findings of facts and conclusions by
11/24/10; matter will be taken under advisement
and written decsion to be issued; Is J Dunn
11/16/10

Stephen S Dunn

11/22/2010

KARLA

Plaintiff's DeSignation of Portions of the
Stephen S Dunn
Deposition of Morris Ferinella (Atkin for Plaintiffs)

11/24/2010

CAMILLE

Stephen S Dunn
DefenseObjection to plntts designation of
Deposition excerpts from the Deposition of Morris
Farinella: aty Gary Cooper

CAMILLE

Defense Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions Stephen S Dunn
of Law and Argument; aty Gary Cooper

KARLA

Plaintiff's Post Trial Brief (Atkin for Plaintiff)

Stephen S Dunn

11/29/2010

KARLA

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Atkin
for Plaintiff)(

Stephen S Dunn

12/6/2010

CAMILLE

Memorandum Decision, findings of Fact and
Conclusions of law; court finds in favor of Plntt
and awards damages totaling $97,310.94: sl
Judge Dunn 12-6-2010

Stephen S Dunn

JDMT

CAMILLE

Judgment; ag Don Zebe Rick Lawson and Laze, Stephen S Dunn
LLC in the total amount of $97,310.94; sl Judge
Dunn 12-6-2010

CSTS

CAMILLE

Case Status Changed: Closed

Stephen S Dunn

MEMO

KARLA

Defense Memorandum on Damage Claim
(Cooper for Defs)

Stephen S Dunn

MEMO

KARLA

Palintiff's Trial Memorandum Regarding the
Stephen S Dunn
Admissibility of Evidence that Defendants
Assumed or Ratified Clayson's Entire Bill to Dairy
Systems Company (Atkin for Palintiff)

MEMO

KARLA

Reply Memorandum in support of Motion to
Reconsider Damage As[ects of Decision Dated
September 15, 2010 (Atkin for Plaintiff)

11/16/2010

11/26/2010

12/7/2010

12/8/2010

BRFS

Judge
Stephen S Dunn

Stephen S Dunn

Date: 4/1/2011

isl District Court - Bannock County

Time: 03:26 PM
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Case: CV-2009-0002212-0C Current Judge: Stephen S Dunn
Gaylen Clayson vs. Donald I lebe, etal.

Gaylen Clayson vs. Donald I lebe, Rick Lawson, LAZE, LLC
Date

Code

User

Judge

CAMILLE

Memorandum of costs and Attorney Fees;
Gary Cooper for def

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Gary Cooper in support of
Memorandum of costs and attorney fees; aty
Gary Cooper for def

CAMILLE

Affidavit of John D Bowers for Attorney Fees and Stephen S Dunn
costs; aty John Bowers for defs

12/27/2010

CAMILLE

Memorandum of costs including attorney fees;
aty Blake Atkin for plntf

Stephen S Dunn

12/28/2010

CAMILLE

Memorandum in support of defs objection to
costs and attorney fees claimed by plntfs: aty
Gary Cooper

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Objection to Plaintiffs Memorandum of Costs and Stephen S Dunn
Attorney fees: aty Gary Cooper for def

12/29/2010

CAMILLE

Objection to Defendants Memorandum of Costs
including attorney fees; aty Blake Atkin

Stephen S Dunn

114/2011

CAMILLE

Affidavit of Blake Atkin in support of
Memorandum of costs including attorney fees;
aty Blake Atkin for plntf

Stephen S Dunn

CAMILLE

Memorandum Decision on motion for attorney
fees and costs;
(Based on the foregoing, the
court denies both motions for attorney fees and
costs: the judgment will not be amended: sl
Judge Dunn 1-4-2011

Stephen S Dunn

NOELIA

Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Stephen S Dunn
Supreme Court Paid by: Gary L.-Cooper
Receipt number: 0001682 Dated: 1114/2011
Amount: $101.00 (Check) For: Clayson, Gaylen
(plaintiff)

APSC

DCANO

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Stephen S Dunn

NOTC

DCANO

NOTICE OF APPEAL; Gary L. Cooper, Atty for
Dfdts.

Stephen S Dunn

MISC

DCANO

Paid $101.00 check # 25113 for Filing Fee and
Stephen S Dunn
Supreme court Fee. Paid $100.00 check # 25114
for deposit of Clerk's Record.

1/21/2011

MISC

DCANO

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL; Signed
and Mailed to Counsel and SC on 1-21-11.

1/28/2011

MISC

DCANO

Stephen S Dunn
IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Notice of Appeal
received in SC on 1-24-11. Docket Number
38471-2011. Clerk's Record and Reporter's
Transcript due in SC by 5-5-11. (3-31-11 5 weeks
prior to Counsel. The following transcript shall be
lodged: Court Trial 11-4-10, 11-5-10 and
11-10-10.

MISC

DCANO

CORRECTED CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF
APPEAL. Signed and Mailed to SC and Counsel
on 2-4-11.

12/20/2010

1/14/2011

aty Stephen S Dunn
Stephen S Dunn

Stephen S Dunn

Stephen S Dunn

I District Court ~ Bannock Cou
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Case: CV-2009-0002212-0C Current Judge: Stephen S Dunn
Gaylen Clayson vs. Donald I Zebe, etal.

Gaylen Clayson vs. Donald I Zebe, Rick Lawson, LAZE, LLC
Date

Code

User

2/8/2011

MISC

DCANO

IDAHO SUPREME COURT; Clerk's Corrected
Certificated received in SC on 2-7-11. All parties
are to review title and if any corrections please
contact the Dist. Clerk. If not the title on the
certificate must appear on all documents filed in
SC.

Stephen S Dunn

3/30/2011

MISC

DCANO

NOTICE OF LODGING FOR TRANSCRIPTS:
Sheila Fish on 3-30-11.

Stephen S Dunn

MISC

DCANO

Stephen S Dunn
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPTS RECEIVED IN
COURT RECORDS FROM SHEILA FISH ON
3-30-11 for the following: Court Trial held 11~4-10,
11-5-10, and 11-10-10.

MISC

DCANO

CLERK'S RECORD received in Court Records on Stephen S Dunn
4-1-11.

4/1/2011

Judge

COURT MINUTES
CV-2009-0002212-0C
Gaylen Clayson vs. Donald I Zebe, etal.
Hearing type: Court Trial
Hearing date: 11/04/2010
Time: 9:33 am
Judge: Stephen S Dunn
Courtroom: Room #301, Third Floor
Court reporter: Sheila Fish
Minutes Clerk: Karla Holm
Tape Number:
Party: Donald Zebe, Attorney: Gary Cooper
Party: Gaylen Clayson, Attorney: Blake Atkin

933

Begin; Blake Atkin associate sitting at table; Cooper no objection

934

Cooper Motion to Exclude Witnesses; Granted; witnesses excused

935

Plaintiff called sworn and testified; Gaylen W. Clayson

1046

Cooper-objection on record regarding issues requested during discovery that
was not provided

1047

Court-overruled objection

1050

Recess

1104

Reconvene; continue with Palintiff

1109

Plaintiff Exhibit F-document prepared by Plaintiff-summary of work completed
by Plaintiff; offered;

1110

Cooper objection

630

1111

Atkin argument

1113

Court;

1114

Atkin

1119

Court-deny Plaintiff Exhibit F

1126

Cooper objection

1127

Court-allow testimony regarding items marked by arrows on Exhibits Fla-u,
those supporting documents maybe admitted

1129

Cooper advise Court of items not provided or identified during deposition

1130

Atkin

1131

Cooper continue with identifying documents not provided or identified at
deposition

1139

Court will take under advisement this documents and will make decision at later
time;

1140

Atkin

1146

Cooper-Motion to strike; argument; Atkin

1147

Court objection overruled

1207

Cooper Motion to Strike; Sustained

1210

Cooper Motion to Strike; Court grant motion to Strike

1215

Cooper Motion to Strike; Court Grant Motion to Strike

1223

Cooper question in aid of objection; Motion to Strike; Court overruled

1225

Cooper Motion to Strike; Overruled

1227

Cooper-Motion to Strike; Overruled

1228

Exhibit L

1230

Motion to Strike; sustained

1230

Exhibit M

631

1231

Motion to Strike; Sustained

1231

Exhibit P

1234

Exhibit T

1237

Motion to Strike; sustained

1238

Cooper question in aid of objection; Objection; Overruled

1239

Exhibit U

1240

Atkin-move to remove striking of check to High Sierra for $9100; Court granted

1245

Motion to Strike-Sustained

1246

Cooper-question in aid of objection; Motion to Strike

1247

Court-motion granted

1251

Motion to Strike; Overruled

1255

Cooper-question; Objection-Grant to all charges except at Thayne True Valley
Hardware

1257

Motion to Strike-granted

1258

Atkin; Court Exhibit Fla-u admitted except as striken by Court and subject to
further ruling by Court on issue of timelyness

1259

Lunch recess until 2 pm

159

Reconvene

159

Cooper-correction of earlier statement regarding supplemental discovery
response; Exhibit FIf, Flu, Fit; not withdrawing objection

203

Motion to Publish Deposition Vol 1 and Vol 2 with attached exhibits; Court
GRANTED;

204

Continue testimony of Plaintiff

210

Cooper-Objection

211

Court-objection overruled

217

Exhibit G

632

223

Offered 1st 4 pages of Exhibit G; objection; Admitted as foundational

301

Exhibit F offered; Cooper objection;

301

Court-objection overruled; admitted for limited purpose only, not for proof of
what actual out of pocket expenses were -

324

Plaintiff Exhibit D; offered; admitted as stipulated

325

Plaintiff Exhibit N-offered as stipulated; no objection; admitted

326

Recess

340

Reconvene

340

Cooper cross examination

341

Court Publishing deposition Vol 1 and 2 ofMr Clayson with no objection

356

Def Exhibit 5A offered; Atkin objection; Admitted

419

Atkin-redirect examination

430

Witness excused

430

Plaintiff witness , Don Zebe, called sworn and testified

436

Plaintiff Exhibit J offered and admitted

440

Plaintiff Exhibit K, Annual Report from, Milk Market Management; offered

441

Cooper objection; Court admitted

445

Deposition of Don Zebe published without objection (photocopy in lieu of
original submitted to Court)

456

Plaintiff Exhibit I, Star Valley Cheese Business Plan, offered; Cooper objected

456

Atkin argument; Court admitted for limited purpose as Atkin stated on record

509

Plaintiff Exhibit Q, SVC Financials from Dec 31, 2008-June 30, 2009

520

Recess for night; begin 8:30 am Friday, November 5, 2010

633

634

COURT MINUTES
CV-2009-0002212-0C
Gaylen Clayson vs. Donald I Zebe, etal.
Hearing type: Court Trial
Hearing date: 11/05/2010
Time: 8:26 am
Judge: Stephen S Dunn
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Sheila Fish
Minutes Clerk: Karla Holm
Tape Number:
Party: Donald Zebe, Attorney: Gary Cooper
Party: Gaylen Clayson, Attorney: Blake Atkin

826

Ruling on timelyness of Plaintiffs Exhibits; (see log notes)

845

Continued testimony of Don Zebe

850

Plaintiff Exhibit S; Email Don Zebe to Val Pendleton, 1/14/09; offered and
admitted

857

Plaintiff Exhibit U, Email Don Zebe to Klark Gailey 1/31/09; offered; objection

858

Cooper argument; Court admitted for portion dealing with Dairy Systems in the
past

908

Ruling on testimony regarding Dairy Systems bill; case limited to $50,000 paid
by Clayson; Objection to last question sustained

913

Plaintiff Exhibit W, email from Don Zebe to Klark Gailey, 02/25/09, offered

914

Cooper-objection

635

915

Court-admitted

9123

Plaintiff Exhibit X, email from Don Zebe to Klark Gailey 03/07/09; offered

923

Cooper-objection; argument

924

Court-objection overruled; Exhibit X admitted

934

Recess

946

Reconvene; Court addresses party regarding additional research to be done;

947

Atkin comments

948

Cooper comments

948

Cooper direct examination of Don Zebe

1013

Def Exhibit l1-A, Offered

1014

Atkin-objection argument

1015

Cooper

1016

Atkin withdraw objection; Court admitted Def Exhibit ll-A

1030

Exhibit N, admitted by stipulation

1038

Atkin-re-cross examination

1043

Plaintiff Exhibit V, email Don Zebe to Klark Gailey, offered

1043

Cooper-objection

1044

Atkin

1044

Court-Admitted for purpose of challenging credibility

1051

Witness excused

1051

Atkin-identify witness and offer of testimony to be presented

1100

Cooper-objection to offer of testimony

1101

Court-testimony not admissible; ruling; Objection sustained

1102

Atkin

636

1102

Plaintiff rests subject to Court reconsideration of prior issue

1103

Recess

100

Reconvene; update of witnesses; tel conf 12 pm Monday; Court to instigate call;
no Court on Tuesday; Wednesday 1:30 pm; any submissions by Saturday at 12
pm by email;

104

Cooper-highlighted deposition of Morris Ferineli submitted to Court

106

Atkin

106

Defwitness-Ricky Layne Lawson called sworn and testified

125

Atkin-question in aid of objection; objection

126

Court-overruled

129

Def Exhibit 11, IRE 1006, summary of Clayson Invoices paid by SVC, offered; no
objection; admitted

139

Court questions witness

141

Atkin cross examination

143

Plaintiff Exhibit Q, SVC Financials from 12/31/08-06/30/09

145

Offered-pages 7 & 8-only; Cooper objections

146

Atkin; Court overruled objection; Admitted

204

Cooper-re-direct examination

205

Exhibit Q, last 2 pages, offered; Atkin objected

206

Court -admitted

209

Witness excused;

209

Recess; Court instructions to parties regarding submissions on pending issues;

212

end

637

638

COURT MINUTES
CV-2009-0002212-0C
Gaylen Clayson vs. Donald I Zebe, etal.
Hearing type: Status Conference
Hearing date: 11/08/2010
Time: 11:59 am
Judge: Stephen S Dunn
Courtroom: Room #301, Third Floor
Court reporter: Sheila Fish
Minutes Clerk: Karla Holm
Tape Number:
Party: Donald Zebe, Attorney: Gary Cooper
Party: Gaylen Clayson, Attorney: Blake Atkin

1200

Court's decision on pending issue

1201

Decision

1206

Resume trial 1:30 pm Wednesday;

1206

Atkin-rebuttal witnesses

639

COURT MINUTES
CV-2 009-000 2 212 -OC
Gayten Clayson

VS.

Donald I Zebe, eta!.

Hearing type: Jury Trial
Hearing date: 11/10/2010
Time: 1:54 pm
Judge: Stephen S Dunn
Courtroom: Room #301, Third Floor
Court reporter: Sheila Fish
Minutes Clerk: Karla Holm
Tape Number:
Party: Donald Zebe, Attorney: Gary Cooper
Party: Gaylen Clayson, Attorney: Blake Atkin

154

Court Trial Continued

155

Atkin regarding exclusion of witnesses

156

Defwitness Jeff Randall called sworn and testified

222

Court questions witness

223

Atkin cross examination

228

Plaintiff Exhibit CC, declaration of Jeff Randall, marked,

233

Exhibit CC, offered; Cooper objection; Court admitted

242

Cooper redirect

246

Witness excused; Defense rests

246

Plaintiff Rebuttal witness, Don Zebe, called and testified

640

251

Witness excused

251

Plaintiff Rebuttal witness, Gaylen Clayson

253

Cooper cross examination

253

Witness excused; Plaintiff rests; 5 minute recess

306

Reconvene; Cooper-no sur rebuttal

306

Court-Atkin;

307

Cooper;

308

Court-require proposed findings and conclusions from both parties; due
11/24/10; taken under advisement at that time; decision shall be issued by
12/24/10;

311

end
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IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRlCT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
Register No.CV-2009-02212-0C
GA YLEN CLAYSON,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
-vs)
)
DON ZEBE, RlCK LAWSON, AND LAZE, )

LLC.,

MINUTE ENTRY & ORDER

)
Defendants.

)
)
)

On November 4,2010, the above entitled matter came before the Court for the purpose of a
Court Trial. Blake Atkin, appeared on behalf of the Plaintiff and Gary Cooper, appeared for the
Defendants.
Sheila Fish performed as Court Reporter for this proceeding.
At the outset, counsel for the Defendants made an oral motion for the exclusion of
witnesses. Counsel for the Plaintiff had no objection. Court granted motion and witnesses were
excused.
The Plaintiff was called, sworn and testified.

Register CV -2009-01954-PI
MINUTE ENTRY & ORDER
Page 1
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Plaintiffs Exhibit F, and supplemental Exhibits F/a-u, were offered, objected to and
admitted into evidence, except as stricken by the Court, or admitted for a limited purpose as
outlined by the Court.
Plaintiff s Exhibits G, pages 1-4 Invoices and Statements of Dairy Systems, August 2008June 2009, D, Contract to buy real estate, and N, Addendum Al Assignment, were offered and
admitted.
Defendant's Exhibit 5A, Ferinella deposition, offered and admitted.
Plaintiff s witness, Don Zebe, called, sworn and testified.
Plaintiffs Exhibit J, Article of Organization DVC, LLC, Exhibit K, Annual Report from,
Milk Market Management, Exhibit I, Star Valley Cheese business plan, were offered and
admitted. Exhibit I being admitted for a limited purpose as stated by the Court.
Recess for night at 5: 21 p.m. Court instructed parties to reconvene Friday, November 5,
2010, at 8:30 a.m.
The Court reconvened at 8:26 a.m. on November 5,2010.
At the outset, the Court advised the parties of its ruling regarding the Defendant's objection
to the timeliness of Plaintiff s Exhibits.
Testimony of Plaintiffs witness, Don Zebe, continued.
Plaintiffs Exhibit S, email from Don Zebe to Val Pendleton dated January 14, 2009,
Plaintiff Exhibit W, email from Don Zebe to Klark Gailey, dated February 25, 2009, Plaintiff
Exhibit X, email from Don Zebe to Klark Gailey, dated march 7,2009, Plaintiff Exhibit V, email
from Don Zebe to Klark Gailey dated February 19,2009, were offered and admitted into evidence.

Register CV -2009-01954-PI
MINUTE ENTRY & ORDER
Page 2

643

Plaintiff Exhibit U, email from Don Zebe to Klark Gailey, January 31, 2009, offered and
objected to. The Court admitted Exhibit U limited to the portion regarding Dairy Systems dealings
in the past.
Defendant Exhibit II-A, bills paid through November 25, 2008, was offered and admitted
into evidence.
Plaintiff Exhibit N, Addendum Al Assignment Gaylen Clayson, November 4, 2008, was
admitted by stipulation of parties.
The witness was excused.
Plaintiffs counsel made an offer of proof of the proposed testimony of Klark Gailey.
Defendant objected. The Court sustained the objection.
The Plaintiff rests.
The Court recessed for lunch at 11 :03 a.m.
The Court reconvened at 1 p.m.
The Court reviewed the pending trial schedule with the parties.
Counsel for the Defendant submitted a highlighted copy of the deposition of Morris
Ferinella to the Court for review.
Defendant Ricky L. Lawson was called sworn and testified.
Defendant Exhibit 11, IRE 1006, Summary of Clayson Invoices paid by SVC, LLC, was
offered and admitted into evidence.
Plaintiffs Exhibit Q, SVC Financials from December 31, 2008 to June 30, 2009, pages 7
and 8, and last two pages, were offered and admitted into evidence.

Register CV-2009-0I954-PI
MINUTE ENTRY & ORDER
Page 3
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The Court recessed for the night at 2: 13 p.m. The Court instructed counsel for the parties as
to the submission of briefings to the Court regarding pending issues. The Court also instructed the
parties as to the pending trial schedule.
The Court held a telephonic hearing on Monday, November 8, 2010 at 12 p.m. At that time
the Court issued its ruling on the record on the pending issues.
The Court reconvened on Tuesday, November 10,2010 at the hour of 1:54 p.m.
Defendant's witness, Jeff Randall, was called sworn and testified.
Plaintiff's Exhibit CC, Affidavit of Jeff Randall, was marked, offered and admitted into
evidence as limited by the Court.
Defense rests.
Plaintiff's Rebuttal Witnesses, Don Zebe and Gaylen Clayson, were recalled and testified.
The Court required that proposed findings of facts and conclusions be submitted by both
parties no later than November 24,2010. At that time, this issue will be deemed under advisement
and a written decision shall be issued by the Court.

DATED November 16,2010.

s~

District Judge

Register CV-2009-01954-PI
MINUTE ENTRY & ORDER
Page 4
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

It

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the
!'
day of U('\',,/
,2010, I
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals
in the manner indicated.

(,lu.s. Mail

Blake S. Atkin
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, ID 83228

( ) Email
( ) Hand Deliver
( ) Facsimile

(A' U.S. Mail

Blake S. Atkin
Atkin Law Office
837 South 500 West, Ste 200
Bountiful, UT 84010

( ) Email
( ) Hand Deliver
( ) Facsimile

Gary L. Cooper
Cooper & Larsen
PO Box 4229
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229

( '" U.S. Mail
( ) Email
( ) Hand Deliver
( ) Facsimile

Deputy Clerk . .

Register CV-2009-01954-PI
MINUTE ENTRY & ORDER
Page 5
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Blake S. Atkin (lSB# 6903)
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, Idaho 83228
Telephone: (208) 747-3414

;

i... _'

~

,.,

ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.e.
837 South 500 West, Suite 200
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (80l) 533-0300
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380
Attorney for Defendants
---------

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
BANNOCK COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO
GAYLEN CLAYSON,
Plaintiff,

PLAINTIFF'S DESIGNATION OF
PORTIONS OF THE DEPOSITION OF
MORRIS FARINELLA

v.

DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, and LAZE,
LLC,

Case No: CV-2009-02212-0C
Judge: Dpnn
I

Defendants.
DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, and LAZE,
LLC,
Counterclaim Plaintiffs,
v.

GAYLEN CLAYSON,
Counterclaim Defendant.

647

The Plaintiff, Gaylen Clayson designates the following portions of the deposition
of Morris Farinella attached hereto as exhibit A

P. 14 lines 7 through 17.
P. 14 line 18 through P. 15 line 4.
P. 18 line 16 through P. 19 line 6.
P. 35 lines 13 through 20.
P. 40 lines 14 through 25.
P. 42 lines 4 through 15.

P. 43 lines 4 through 17.
P. 46 line 3 through P. 50 line17.
•
iinE'
P. 561~ne 2 throughf. 21.

P. 58 line 5 through line 13.
P. 61 line 19 through P. 62 line 13.
P. 63 line 7 through 14.

P. 65 line 9 through line 20.
Dated

this;~ay of November, 2010
Atkin Law Offices, P.e.

Attorneys for the Plaintiff

2
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Deposition of
MORRIS A~ FARINELLA
LAZE, LLC v" DAIRY SYSTEMS COMP~1\fY; INC,
Taken On
September 30,2010
Transcript provided by:

HUTCHINGSS~

COURT REPORTERS, LLC
C1Ul &49

GI.OBAL LEGAL SERVICES

800.697.3210

649

"

uE. LLC V. DAIRY SYSTEMS

INC. September 30, 2010

MORRIS A.

F~~INELLA

CERTIFIED COpy
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LINCOLN, STATE OF WYOMING

U\ZE, LLC, a Wyoming Limited Liability)
Company, DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON,
)
)

Petitioners,

)
)

vs.

}

No. 2009-89-DC

DAIRY SYSTEMS COMPANY, INC., a
Utah Corporation,
Respondent.
AND RELATED COUNTER-CLAIMS.

DEPOSITION OF MORRIS A. FARINELLl\, a defendant
herein, noticed by Bowers Law Firm, PC, taken at
6055 East Washington Boulevard, Los Angeles,

California, at 9:10 a.m., on Thursday,
September 30, 2010, before Lori S. Turner, CSB.
9102, CP, RPR.

Hutchings Number 279888

HUTCHINGS COURT REPORTERS, LLC - GLOBAL LEGAL SERVICES
800.697.3210

650

,~,

LLC V.

D.lURY SYSTEHS

J

INC. September 30, 2010

MORRIS A.

FARINELLA

Page 2

Page 4
EXHIBITS (Continued)

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL:

1

2

2.

3

:1

For LAZE, LLC; DON ZEBE and ruCK LAWSON:
BOWERS LAW FIRM, PC
BY JOHN D. BOWERS (Present telephonically)
685 South Washington Street
Afton, Wyoming 83110

4

5
6
7
8

9
10
11
12

5
6
7

9

COOPER & LARSEN
BY GARY L. COOPER (Present telephonica[/y)
151 North 3rd Avenue, Suite 210
Pocatello, Idaho 83205

ForMORRISA.FARlNELLk
ATKIN LAW OFF!CES, PC
BY BLAKE S. ATKIN (present telephonic-aiiy)
837 South 500 West, Sllite 200

20

BOUDtifu~

2
22

Also Present: MANNY Iv'lARIN

IDENTlFlED MARKED
40

41

23 through 26
[EXH-ij

-AND-

13
14
15
16
17
18
J9

EXHIBIT DESCRIPTION
'I Documents Bales stamped

10

8 Documents Bates stamped 27
thrQugll30
[EXff-S]
9 i-page docllment Bales stamped
31
[EXff-9]
10 Documents Bates stamped 32

42

42

43

43

44

44

through 39
!EXH·IO]

11

12
13
14
15
16

17
18

19
20

Utah 84010

21
22

23
24
25

23
24
25

Page 3

Page 5

INDEX
2

2

MORRIS A. FARINELLA,
a defendant herein, having been sworn. testifies as

3

fuUows:

1

WITNESS; MOKRlS A FARINElLA

EXAMINATION13Y:

PAGE

4
5
E
7

MR. BOWERS
MR. ATKlN

8
9

EXHIBITS
Exllibit identification within the ~! is !lagged
with "[EXH1" as an identifier.

7

EXHlBIT

8

10
11
12

13

5
68

DESCRIPTION
1 2-page document Bates smmped
I tltrough 2 entitled "Warranty
Deed"

4

5

IDENTIFIED MARKED
19

19

9

09:12

[EXH-IJ
15

I-page document Bates stamped
3 entitled "Bill of Sale"
[EXH-21

22

12

22

16
17

18
19
20

3 +page document Bates RIInped
4 !lm:lUgit 7 entitled "Bill of
Sale"

24

24

09:12

(EXH·3]

4 DocwnenLs Bates stamped 8 Ulroug]t 26
19 refcm:d to a "Offer to
Purchase"
[EXH-4J

26

5 2-page document Bates slll1l1pl:d
20 and 21

37

37

6

24

15

20
22

I-page document Bales sJamped
22
[EXH-6]

23

33

24
09~

20,

13

Would you please stale your fuil name for the
record.

A Moms A. Farinella, F·a-T-i-n-e·!-l-il_

[EXH-51
38

matter.

Q. Great.

21

23

Q. Mr. Farinella. My name is Jolm Bowers. 1
represent Rick Lawson. Don Zebe and1.aze, LLC in ihis

13

19

09:12

IBY MR. BOWERS:

14

16
17
16

21

22

10
11

14
2

-EXAMINATION·

6

2:'

And your curroot address?

MR- MARIN: 9323THE WITNESS: 9323 Tweedy lane, Downey, California
"90240,"
MR- BOWERS: Thank )'011_
Q. Mr. Farinella, have you ever bad your
deposition iak-en before?
A. Yes,

Q. SO you unde!St.and the procedure? l get to ask
the questions and you get to answer them; correct?
A. To the best of my ability, yes.

2 (Paqes 2 to 5)
HUTCHINGS COURT REPORTERS, LLC - GLOBAL LEGAL SERVICES
800.697.3210
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MORRIS A.

FARINELl~

Page 6,
2

9:13

9 : 13

9 : 14

3

we'll be more likely to answer questions verbally, but

4
6

sometimes in hu.ma."1 nature, we have a habit of shrugging
and shaking our heads, and our court reporter Lori won't
be ..ble to take thaI down. Sv we'll verbalize our

7

ans\.vers.

5

1

On the telephone, this will make it easier, because

3
9: 13

9: 13

9:15

Q. And just II <OQuple things.

9: 13

Page 8

8

The other things is we r...<Jve !J;J slow down. I have 11

9

habit of talking over people. So jf you have !hat same

10

babit, jllst wait until I finish my question before you

11
12

answer.
Okay?

9: 15

9 : 15

5

A. I believe so.

6

Q. Or under the directiQn of bankruptcy?

7
8
9

A. Wen, under a Chapter II and Chapter 7, [
think
Q. Okay.

1 0 --

And did there come a time when you sold the plant?

11
12

A.

13
14

13

A. Yes.

14

Q. Are you on any type of medication today, sir?

15

A No.

16

Q. How old are you?

16

17

A. 87.

17

18

Q. Any reason medically, or there's no medicatioo

1B

9; 15

19

that would prevent you from understanding and answering

20

my questions today truthfully?

9: 15

15

19
20

21

A. No.

21

22

The only thing I take is aspirin.

22

23
2q

Q. Great

23

25

Okay. Can you tell me what you did in preparation

24

9 : 16

for this depositiou?

A. Yes. Since i975.
Q. Thank you. '75.
And in 2008, thai plant was in bankruptcy; is that

25

No.

Q. WIle!! I refer to plant, rn whet.her it's
plant or Star Belly Cheese Factory or Star Belly Plant,
it's all the same thing.
A. Yes.
No, we haven't sold it
Q. Okay.

So can you tell me about -- Apparently there was a
time when you were allowed to sell the plant even though
it was in bankruptcy.
Can you tell me how that transpired?
A. You don't understand the procedure of a

bankruptcy.

Q. Yes, I do.
A. You say "bankruptcy" - a bankruptcy lawyer was

Page 7
1
2

7

estate broker, who had the authority to seU the plant

8

for the bankruptcy court.

A. No.

3

Q. Okay.

4

11

12
13

14
15

16
17

18
19
20
21
22

9: 15

6

there, and he mils the show. The Court runs the show;
noime.
So when it went in bankruptcy, we took bids to get
the money to pay the people. And the bids had to be
okayed by the court. I was appointed as president to
take the bids with the broker Dum Wyoming, the real

4

9
10

9: 14

1
2

A. Nothing.
Q. Did you talk to anybody?

3

5
6
7
8

9 : 14

Page 9

23
24
25

Did you talk to Gaylen Clayson?
A. No.
Q. When is the last time )'QU spoke with
wiT. Cla)ll!on?
A. A year, I guess, ago. Maybe a year, year and a
half. I don't know.
Q. Did you review any documents?
A. No.
Q. Have you ever spoken to Clark Gayley?
A. I don't know him.
Q. Jolm Gayley?

5

9;16

9 : 16

9
10
11

A. Okay.

12

Q. You would receive blds or offers to purchase

13
14
15

it. Then you would forward that information to the
bankruptcy trustee for his approval?

16

A. I don't know him.
Q. That would mean you haven't spoken to them?
A. If I don't know them, I don't think I talked to
lhem.
Q. That's right. Okay.
Mr. Farinella, you, through a company that I
understand lIlat you own, were the owners for a long
period of time of a business located in Thayne, Wyoming
that we refer to as Star Valley Cheese Plant; is that
true'!

17
18
19
9: 17

20
21
22
23
24

9 : 17

Q. Okay.
So just to make sure 1 understand this.

25

A. That's correct.
Q. And so, hypothetically, let's say, you wanted
to sell the plant to a friend or somebody else for a
lower price. Yau couldn't do that because you bad to
send the offer to the bankruptey trustee; correct?

A. Tthink that would be fraud.
Q. Fair enough.
A. I couldn't sell it to a friend ofmim::. I'm
sure it has to go to the bankruptcy court. TIley had to
approve everything.

Q. Fair enough.

3

(Pages 6 to 9)
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Page 10 i
1
2

Page 12

109: 19

So in 2008 -- just kind of shan circuit this -- my
understanding is you were receiving offers.
with you a little bit or, I guess, soliciting offers; is

5

Q. So it was just sit there, and then he could run
the restaurant oUI front and -- What was your

6

understanding of the terms of the agreement to allow him

7
8

to run the restaurant?

8

Q. Worked together.
And during that time period of time, did you

9

havc a - did you run into or did you know a Gaylen

9

knew what they were doing there. That's all.
Q. Okay.

6

10

9:20

Clayson?

11

: 18

Nobody had nothing to do with the plant. It's in
bankruptcy.

4

9:20

mat correct?
A. We worked togemer, yes.

7

9: 18

A. Nothing. Until he bought it.

2

3

Val D. Pendleton of Caldwell BankerS was working

3

1

A. I don't know what year that was, but he did

12

approach the broker, which was Pendleton, and said "l'd

13

jike to put a bid in to buy the plant."

14

Q. Okay,

1S

And when you say "a bid," if he puts a bid in, it's

10
11

How was he to be paid tbr that'?

12
13

A. He wasn't going to get paid anything. He was

doing me a favor.

14

9:20

got to go through the same process you've already

16

17
18

explained to me.
A. Yes.

17

19

And we had meetings at the pJant with op:m bids

20

21
22
23

with other people while Gayten was there.
Q. Am! what about - Let me back up just a little
bit
In 2008, did you ever allow him to operate the

24

re:,iaurant on the premises?

9:20

A. I don't know what yea. it was., but at the time

9:20

Q. He was doing you A. Not me. .He was doing the bank.-uptcy people a

15

16

2.s

A. Just to watch over it so those two little girls

fuvor.
Q. The bankruptcy court?

18

A. Yeah.

19

Q. Whennvas the money to go? You know, each day

20

you have tbe money that comes in from the sales.

21
22

we had for the restaurant.

A. It was supposed to go into a 'barLl.: ac(.'.(>urn that

23

Q. Okay.

24

A. I think it was Wells Fargo Bank.
THE WITNE!:;S: Wa-m't it?

?5

Page 11
9:20

4

the restaurant - during the bankruptcy, tbe lawyer says
let the restaurant operate in front of the plant so we
can have some revenue come in.
So we hired two little Mexican girls there to run

5

the planl for the bankruptcy court. Okay?

9; 20

1

2
3
: 18

9 : 19

MR..MARlN:Yeah.
THE WITNESS: Wells Fargo Bank in Star Valley.

3
4

Q. Was Mr. Clayson allowed to spend any of that

5

MR. BOWERS:
money on his personal needs?

But they were a little mixed up. And Gaylen was

6

A. He bad ttl pay the bills with the providers, the

7

there everyday. And I asked him to help to take care of

7

people who brought the food there for tbe restaurant to

8

the restaurant while I'm living in L A., and - [

8

9

couldn't do it You know, bere, Wyoming, hear, back and

9

10

operate. That's all he had to do. Make sure tile people
got paid.
Q_ For Jack of a better word, was he allowed to

11

convert any of that money to pay his own personal bills

12

not reiated to the restaurant?

10

fortlL I couldn't go. So I says, "Take care of tbat

11

restaurant with those two girls."

9 ; 21

And he says, "I will look after it," and that was

13
14
15
16

restaurant out in front and then the cheese plant, the

17

manufacturing plant in the back.

18
9; 19

1
2

6

12

9 : 19

Page 13

all.

Q. And when you said your agreement with GayJen -

and I separate the two. I separate in my mind the

9: 21

13

A. Not as •• that I know of, no.

14

Q. Was - did he have authority to lake any of

15

16
1(

A. Yes. They were separated.

19

In other words, the plant W!lS dosed, but tlJe

20
21

restaurant was open. And they kept it open to get
revenue to - for the banlr.xuptcy court to put it in

22
23
24

there.
Q. Okay.
And what \\.'as - What was Gaylen to do, ifanything,

25

with the plant in the back?

9:21

9 : 21

that money and put into his own personal account?

A. He had no authority to do that, 00.

18

rm going 10 call
it the trustee receivership account for the restaurant

19

Do you know where that account, which bank it was held

20
21

at:?

22

Fargo.

Q. Do )'OU remember where the "-

A. Receivership or the -- I think it was Wells

23

MR. MARIN: Wells Fargo.

24

THE WD'NESS: Wells Fargo.

25

MR. BOWERS:

4 (Pages 10 to 13)
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Page 14
9,21

1

2
3
4
5
6

9:22

1

Then with thai in mind, I proceeded to go 10 the

3

bankruptcy lawyer and give him the information that the
most we could have got with the broker, real estate
-broker, was 800,000. And he okayed it.
Q. Okay.

4

5

A. I don't have them anymore.

6

8

15

the offer to -- was accepted.
After he bought the - he made the offer to buy the
plant at the time. So with that in mind, 1 figured he
can be trusted to run the restaurant. That's the way
that happened. Just to run it so .. to keep it open.
Q. Because you assumed that at some point he would
be able to buy the whole thing?
A. It was already in process of him buying it

7
8

16

lhrough tbe bankruptcy court.

9
10

13
14

17

Q~

18
19

A. He made an initial bid for it

2Q

21

9
10

11

12

Oka-j.

After the - ·we had three different bids there when
it first started..

9:25

22
23
21]

was from another place. And me and the broker decided
that let's go -- we had the same two bids from two
different people. So me and the lawyer, myself and the

25

lawyer - 1 mean the lawyer - the real estate for the

9:25

A. Absolutely.

14
15
J6

17

conclusion.

3

18
19

THE WITNESS: Would you repeat that, please.
M"R. ATK1N: Calls for a legal conciusil:lll.

20

THE REPORTER: I can read it back to you.
(The ,ecom is read by the reporter.)

21
22

And one was from somebody out ofL A., !!!lother one

So it was the bankruptcy trustee or attorney as you
call itA. Right.
Q. - that approved the sale?
Q. Okay.
Let's see. During Ine time that tile plan!: was
under .- under the direction of the bankruptcy court,
did you have authority 10 sell equipment QUt of there?
MR. ATKIN: Objection. Calls for a legal

j

9:24

lower until it came down to 800,000.

2

Gaylen offered 10 run the restaurant after he made

12

9,22

Q. J know, Mr. Farinella, this is a dumb question,
but I'll ask it anyway.
YOli don't by chance have any documents with you
that would give us the account numbers for that, would
you?

7

11

9: 22

Page 16

23
24
25

THE WITNESS: No.

THE REPORTER: He answered "No."
MR.BOWERS;
Q. Did the bankruptcy trustee or the banknrptcy

Page 15
1

7

bankruptcy court, decided to go with Gaylen because he
was a local, he bad the milk, and it was good for the
environment there, and hire some people in that area to
run the plant.
TIle other people that were going to bid on it, they
were just guing to tear it apart and pull it out.
~. Did they - Do you remember what the numbers

B

were they bid?

2

3
4

S
6

9
10

09:25

3

A. No.

4

Nothing was to be touched tmtil escrow closed.

5

Q. "Escrow closed. " You mean tIle actual sale?

6

:25

Q. Yes.

A. Sale of the plant when escrow closed.

8

Q. I just want 10 make sure my defJIlition is the
same as yours.

9
10

That's the day the money transfers and there's a
deed issued?

7

A. The numbers what'! What was bid'i

court give Gaylen Clayson authority to sell equipment
out of the plant?

11

A. Yeah.

11

800,000.

12

13
14

Q. That was Gayler> Clayson',;; hid?

13

If .bere was any equipment that was sold, shoulrl

A. That was his bid and somebody else's too. I

14

tbat money have been returned back - if there was any

15

17

Q. OlL So the other two bids weren't higher, but
they were -A No.

19

Q. -- at ! east tile. smne?

20

A One was lower. One was less. 500,000.

21

Q. Okay.
So Mr. Clayson's was one of the highest bids?
A. Well, no.

23
2q
25

09: 25

forgetthe other guy.

18

22

9:23

1

2

12

16

9:23

Page 17
09:25

15

equipment said by Gaylen Clayson, should that money o;!'Je

16
17
18

been returned back to lhe bankruptcy eourt?
A. I don't know how \0 lIt1Swer that because 1 don't
know if he sold anything.
Q. Okay.

19
9:26

We -- actnally westllrted at 1.5,1.2, and nobody
bid. And you know how the bid.., go. And we go lower and

09 : 26

A_ Absolutely.
Q. Fairem:rugh.

20

So - We've got some documents here that I think

21

may help us as we walk through this.

22
23

ultimately who the plant was sold to?

24
25

TIle first one is - Well, dQ you remember,
A. At the velY end when il
Q. Yes.

W-dS

sold?
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1

9: 2 6

2

3

:27

5

bought the plant
Q. r know, and 1 apologize.
The reason for that is when I e-mailcd the
documents to you, two of them are out of order. So
we're going to have to jump ahead so it's going to mess
up the documents.
A Do yoo wanl me to sit here and teU it the way
it was?
Q. Yeah. Let's do that.

12

13
14

9: 27

1 think you're jumping in -- you're going ahead.
You're talking about Gaylen, and now you're going who

6
7
8
9
10

9 : 28

guy - wait a minute.

4

11

9: 2'7

A. Well, you know, really -- where is that - this

Page 20

9 : 29

15

Q. Perfect.
A. As far as I know, Gaylen made ine bid.

12

Is that your signature there?

7

8
9
9: 2 9

A Okay.

16

11

A. Look, I'm not a lawyer and rm not an
accountant., and I don't know where this come from.
Because once it was out., I was out of it.
It was taken - taken by the -THE WITNESS: Who is the one that did the closing
up there? The escrow company?
MR. MARIN: Alliance.
TIIE WITNESS: Alliance. Yeah. Alliance.
So where this came from, I have no idea.
MR. BOWERS:
Q. Why don'1 you look at page one on the bottom.

1
2
3
4
5
6

9: 29

10

13
14
15

MR. iVlARIN: This one (indicating).
THE WITNESS: Y cah, that's my signature.

). 6

MR. BOWERS:

'Warranty--

17
18

Everything was okay, and Ihe bankrUptcy la\>."ier agreed

). 7

Q. Do you remember signing this WlllTIluty deed?

and the real estate brokcr agreed and we backed off, and

18

A. Not really, but I guess I did.

19

that was it. It was gone into escrow. They had to come

19

20

up with tlle money.

What does it say there?
Yeah. 1 signed it.! guess.
THE wm.JESS: But who did I sign lhis for?

9 :29

21

At that lime, the second visit to WYOll'.mg, Gaylen

22

introduced me to these two ]:leOple that I do not know

23

'1ery we!!. One of \hem is Don Zebe. Don Zebe and Rick.

24

Rick "Larson."

25

20

21
22
23
24

9;29

I really don't know them at all - at all except

25

MR. MARIN: It was far the escrow company.
THE WITNESS: For the escrow compally, yeah.

MR. BOWERS:
Q. Right

Page 19

Page 21

1

from Gaylen telling me they got the money; they're going

2

10 buy it.

2

3
4
5
6
7

So I told Gaylen. "I don't care who comes up wilh
the money, but just buy it. to The bid was okay, and
everything's - "'buy it. n
And that's where it ended up with me.
Q. Okay. Fair enough.
So let's jump ahead then and then it wiU get back
in order here in a second, Mr. Farinella.

3

8

9
10
11

9: 30

1

4
5
6
1
8

9

9:30·

A. Okay.
MR. BOWERS:

9:29

in can have tile court reporter mark

10
11

12

Bates stamped 1 througb 2, wbich is a Wammty Deed, two

12

13

13

14

pages, as Exhibit 1. [EXH-l]
Q. I'll have you look at that Mr. Farinella when

15

she'sready.

16

17

9;3D

(Whereupon the document referred to is marked by
the reporter as E.-dlibit I for identification.)

14
15
16
17

18

MR. BOWERS:

18

19

Q. As you pointed out, Mr. Farinella, tbese are a

S ; 30

19
?0

9:30

21
22
2.3
24
25

20
:;> 1

22
23
24

25

little bit out of order.
This -- l'll represent to you what my undersllmmng
is -- is the warranty deed that was executed as -- you
call it the escrow, I call i1 the closing -- when the
cheese plant WIIS sold.
Is that what your understanding of Exhibit 1 is?

And this is what's been represented to me as !he
warranty deed that you signed to sell the cheese plant
at the close of escrow when the property was transferred
to my client.
A. After he put up the money I guess, yeah.
Q. Okay.

And that's an I'm asking you. I just need you to
validate, first of all, that that's your signature.
A. Yeab.
Q. You did sign the wamlJlly deed?
A. You know what? W'ny did I sign a W'dITantf deed?
I held !he mortgage on that property.
MR. .t>.'IARIN: You were representing Star Valley.
THE WITNESS: Okay.
I represent Star Valley Cheese Corporation. I
guess that's why 1 signed it.
Go ahead.
MR. BOWERS:
Q. Okay.

Mr. Farinella is this - is this a warranty deed
that YOIl signed?
A. ] guess I did, yes.
Q. All right. Thank you.
I know it's hard to go back and look at documents.
A. Yeah. We're talking eight years.
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Page 22
9:30

1
:1
3
11
5
6

9:31

9:31

:31

9 : 32

9:32

7
8
9
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

Q. Whatever time you need, just take it.
)')ow i'lj have you look at what I'U have the com't
repOrter -- Bates stamp 3, the 8iU of Sale, and ask
that Lori !l1..ark that as deposition Exhihit 2. [EXH-2}
When she gets done., I'll have you take a look at
that, Mr. Farinella.
(\Nbereupon the document referred to is marked by
the reporter as Exhibit 2 for identification.)
THE REPORTER: Okay.
MR. BOWERS:
Q. Mr. Farinella, I'll have you look at deposition
Exhibit 2 and it's Bates stamp 3.
First of all, is that your signature on the bottom
towards the bottom of the page?
A. Yes.
Q. And I understand that this was executed at the
same time as the warranty deed as part of the close of
the escrow or the sale. Is that your understanding?
A. My understanding says this is from the escrow
company that made me sign it., yes.

Page 24
9:33

:33

1

Q.Okay-

2

A. I didn't get a letter. I just got a "voice"

3
4
S
6
7

S
9
10
11
12
13

14
9 : 3 'I

15

16
17

A."1<l my understanding is this was in referent.'e to

1B

.9 ; 3'1

19
20

Q. Okay"

21

22

Was this part of the sale of the plant?

23
24

A. From the bankruptcy cour!, I guess, yes.
Can I talk to you one minute?
Q. Sm·e. Go ahead.

22
23
24
25

25

from my anomey telling me.
Q. Okay.
Well sometime if your attorney and you wani to talk
to me about it, we'll be glad to talk to you about it
outside of this setting.
A. No, I don't want to talk to nobody.
MR. SO\VERS: Now I'll ask the court reporter if
she'll mark as deposition Exlnbit 3 for identification
purposes, what's Bates stamped 4 through 7. [EXH-3]
(Whereupon the document referred to is marked by
the reporter as Exhibit 3 tOr identification.)
MR. BOWERS:
Q. I'm going to have you look at what's been
marked for identification purposes deposition Exhibit 3.
On top of it is "Bill of Sale."

t.'1e closing of the escrow, bul does that - is that your
signature about three-quarters of the way down on the
first page?
A_ Yes. 1 signed this.
Q. And was that part of the c[i)sing i'lD the plant
too?
A_ I guess, 'cause rm not familiar with -

Page 23

14

A. Why - 1 say why am I being sued? I'm nnt - I
want to know why I'm being sued.
Q. That's something I can probably lalk to you
about with you and your attorney when we're not in a
deposition.
How does that sound?
A. No, it doesn't sound right.
I'm .here to get a question from you. Why am \
getting sued?
Q. Mr. Farinella, unfortunately this is a
situation where 1don't bave to answer your questions_
A.. \'n rettaetthat.
Q. That's a legitimate question., and I'll answer
it when we're done with the - when we can talk

15

sometime.

09:32

2
3
4
09:32

5

6
7

S

09:32

9
10

11
12

13
09:32

16

17
1a
19
09:33

20

21

22
23

09:33

24
25

Page 25
1
2

THE Wfl'Nr:SS: I got this from the escrow company;
didn't!?

3

MR. MARIN: Yes.
THE WITNESS: Yeah. I guess it is a biU ohale.

4
5
6
7

a
9
:34

16

sent a letter - I don't know - asking ifl can talk to
you or talk to your persol1al attorney about this matter.
Have you received a copy oftlla.?
A_ Idon'tkoow.
MR.. MARIN: YOllrattomeycal\edTHE WITNESS: My attorney - my attorney in Wyoming
told me aboll!t it And I told him "No, I don't want to
talk to Don Zebe or anybody up there_"
MR. BOWERS:

17
18

:35

list of equipment.
A. Where is the list of equipment?

10

11
12
13
14
15

tn fac~ while I'm thinking of it, Mr. farinella, I

MR. BOWERS:
Q. And then would you mind looking at the second
page -- the second., third, fourth page on there. The I

19
20
21
22
23
2.4
25

MR. MARIN; That one.

TIfE WITNESS: Yes.
MR. BOWERS:
Q. Does that look like equipment that would have
been at Star Valley Cheese Plant that was sold pursuant

the sale'?
A. I guess..
THE WITNESS: Who took this here? This i«vent<.r.y,
who took it?
MR. MARIN: That was the list fromTHE WITNESS: That was the list from who'!
MR.. MAroN: That was from the list of Frank Dana.
THE WITNESS: Oh. 1 guess it is, yes.
It is a list from the plant manager.
MR. BOWERS:
Q. It sounded like Frank Dana?

to
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1

A. Yeah.

2

MR. MA1UN: Before he died.
THE WITNESS: Before he died.
1'.1R. BOWERS:

3
4

Q. Is this a fair and accurate representation of

A. Yes, I guess. Y cs.
Q. Okay. Perfect

10
11

12
13
14

9: 36

15
16

17
18

19
9: 36

20

21

9: 37

Page 28

i09: 313

the bill of sale that was signed at the time of closing
with my client?

9

? _ i

-bi

1

!!

6

7

2

9 : 38

3

A. TIlat's why I wanted to know why I'm being sued.

4
5

Q. Inere you go. There you go.

11
12
13

A. I've gone through this, which you should have
the broker here who handled the sale, not me. I'm not a
real estale broker.
All I was there for is to take the bids for the
bankruptcy lawyer and submit them to him. That's all.
Q. Okay.
A. And as president, J signed all - and the
escrow company. That's aliI know.
So I don't know why you don't have -- Go ahead.

14

"Excuse me. I'm sony.

15
16

Q. I (old you 1have it hahit of talking over.
apologize.
A. I apologize too.

6
7

S
9

MR. BOWERS: Now let's go - I'll have the court
reporter - this is a little longer. If you wouldn't
mind marking as deposition Exhibit 4 what's been marked
as Bates stamp 8 through 190 [EXH-4]
(Whereupon the doclIDlerU referred to is marked by
the reporter as Exhibit 4 for identification.)
MR.BOWERS:
Q. If you would lOOk, Wlr. Farinella, at deposition
Exhibit 4. Now we're maybe a little back on order
pursuant to our previous conversation.
1 believe this is the offer to purchase that you
made reference to initially - in fact it's dated

22

October 17th, 2008 ~ that you were talking about Gaylen

23
24

Clayton.
Would you mind taking a look at tbe front page and

25

see if that refi'esr,.es your memory that this looks like

9: 38

9: 38

10

17

18
19

9: 39

9 ; 39

Q. You know, I understand it's hard when you look
at these documents and -

2a
21
22
23
24
25

Q. SO to clarlfY. Your job was just to submit,
receive the bids, but it was the banlmlptcy trustee that
approved them; correct?
A. Absolutely.
Q. Do you know if -- and you rnay not because of
whatyoujust told m~, but on page one of deposition
Exhibit 4, Bates stamped 8, it says it was to be an
"Eamesl Money" paid at $lO,OOO, on paragraph ten there.

Page 27
9: 37

1

2
3
9: 37

4
5
6
7

8
9
9:37

10
11

9:37

1

2

Caldwell Banker's, the broker.
Q. You've never seen this document?
A. No, I've neVer seen this. Jt went to the
broker, Coldwell Banker.
MR. MARIN: I know, hut this refers to you.
THE WITNESS: He made me sign it
MR. BOWERS:
Q. Yeah, I think your signature .- or at least

9:39

13
14
15
16
17
18

MR. BOWERS:
Q. Is that your signature on Bates stamp 14 of
Exhibit 4?
A. That's not my signature. That's not my

19

signature.
MR. MARIN: That was a stamp.
THE WITNESS: Oh, that's a stamp. I signed it.
10/4/08 it says.

9:38

20

9:38

21
22
23
24
25

Page 29

the document that you were talking about that A. rve never seen this document. This is

somebody signed it.
if you look at Bates stamped 13.
THE WITNESS: r guess I've seen it, but 1 don't
remember it.

12

FARINELIJI.

!

:,

8

MORRIS A.

3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

THE WITNESS: It went to the broker.
If it did, it went to the broker. I never seen it;
1 never heard it.
This must bave been with the broker, the real

12

estate broker.

13
14

9:39

15
16

MR.BOWERS:
Q. Right
A. Is that correGt?

Do you see that?
A. J see it, yealL
Q. Do you know jf that was ever paid by
Mr. Clayson or Mr. Randall?
MR. MARIN: Whatever money THE WITNESS: r don't know if it was paid.
MR. MARIN: -- it went to the broker.

9:40

17
18
19
20
21
22
23

9: 40

25

24

Is it the deposit or what? Is that what it is?
MR. BOWERS:
Q. It speaks for itself; but that's what 1 would
understand it would he, a deposit
A. Why would I know about it?
Q. Well you were soliciting the bids. That's my
question. I didn't know jf you did or not.
A. No.
But the money, everything, transaction goes to the
real estate broker.
Like I said, I was not a real estate broker. I was
taking the bids and it went to the real estate broker
who in tum referred to I.he bankruptcy court to approve.
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9: 4 0

2

3
4

5
6
7

B
9
9: 40

10

9:4.1

1
:2

3

4
9 : .:I 2

6
7
6

idea.

But I don't know. The answer is I don't know.

9 ; 42

9
10

'}:42

MR. BO\VERS:

11

Q. You know, there's nothing wrong wim an "I

12
13
14
15

don't know.r.
A. You know, I really don't know.

15

Q. Okay.

16

Would you mind looking on deposition Exhibit 4.

16

17

Would you :mind looking Gn the Bates stamp Number 13 at

18

the lop of the page.

18

19
20
21
22
23
24

A. Just a minute.
Here! got it in front of me.
Q. And right down there,. there's a Roman XVI. Off
to the side there's a line -- is it 228 -- "Consents And
Acknowledgments."
It's about the middle - top of the middle of the
page.

19
20
21
22
23

25

17

9: 43

24

9: 43

your signalure on tins documerlt; correct?
A. There's a lot of si gnatures on here.
MR. MARIN: This one (indicating).
MR. BO\VERS:

5

11

14

9: 41

~ 9: 42

As far as that gres, that's all I know.
I didn't know he put up $10,000.
I don't know.
MR MA..'UN: It went to escrow.
THE WITNESS: It went to the Pendleton, I guess.
MR MARIN: It was escrow. Escrow company.
THE WITNESS: Escrow company.
Maybe it went to the escrow company. I have no

12
13
9:40

Page 32

2S

Q. RighL

A. 1 see my signature there.
Q. J know you - Do you normally sign legal
documents without reading tbem?
A. Like 1 toid you, I'm not a broker and f'm not a
lawyer. I trust the peopie who are giving me the
documents from either the broker or the escrow company.
Q. Okay.
Well, Mr. Farinella, let me just -A. You know what? You're going around and around
il' circles. \\Thy don't you get 10 the bottom of this
what you really want to know?
This is all builshit you pay time over here. Gel
to the point you really want to know. I know what
you're going around and around about because alJ Qf this
is

Q. Unfortunately, what ! want to ask, [ can't
A. Get to the point what you really want to know.
Q. rm an attorney. 1 have to do the round and
round.
A. I know you do.

Page 33

Page 31
9: 41

1
2

Do you see that?
A. Yeah.

3
4

Q. Okay.
It says nAil prior representations made in the

5
6

7
B

9

9 : Ii 3

negotiations of this sale have been incorporated herein,
and there are no oral agreements or representations
between Buyer, Seller or Brokers to modify the terms and
conditions of this Contract. n
Did yoo read that before you signed this document'?

9; Ii 3

1
2
3
4
5
6

7

8

11

Q. You didn't read that?

12
13
14

A. No.

9
10
11
12

Q. When you signed this agreement-THE WITNESS: ~'here did this paper come from?

14

9 ; 41

15

~ifR

I 6

THE WITNESS: It's what?

'} : 4 2

17
18
19
20
.7.1
22
23

9: 41

10

Au. No.

24
9: 4 2

25

9; 4 3

13

l'vtARIN: It's--

9 ; -'I 3

9: 44

9: 44

if I understand when I read this - just there may be To move this along. Star Valley - your company is the
seller, even though we know that it has to be approved
by the bankruptcy trustee; Caldwell .B3ni<er is the
broker, and then at least on this document it lists
Gaylen Clayson and Jeff Randall.
Do you know who Jeff Randall is?
A. No.
Q. Have you eVeJ met him before?
A. Henllo. No.

18
19
20
21
22

Q. Okay.
\Alben you signed this document, were there any other
agreements. oral or written. between yourself as the
seller of the property and Gaylen Clayson and Jeff
Randall about the sale of the property?
A. No, there was no oral agreement at aU,
Q. Okay.
So whatever - Basically the agreement was what was
in this offer which you signed, which is Exhibit 4;

23

correct?

3. 5

16
I?

MR. MARIN: -- part of the offer with !he THE WITNESS: Of the offer from?
MR MARIN: FromTHE WfINESS: To the real estate broker?
MR. MARIN: Yes.
THE WITNESS: No, I didn't even see this.
MR BOWERS:
Q. If you look to the next page. J just want to
clarify on Bates stamp 14, !he next page, that that's

Q. 1 don't like it allY more than you do.
A. I bope not
Q. SO on page - on the front page ofExbibit 4,

24

A. Yes.

25

You have to put it in - I live in Los Angeles and
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Page 34
9: q 4

1
2
3

4
9 : 44

5

9
10
11
12

completely out of it. I was out of it
I know I'm signing here, but Once a conlpany goes
into bankruptcy, it's handled by the bankruptcy court,
the realtor who is trying to sell it and the bankruptcy
lawyer.
All! was there was helping them out. Or I could
have walked away from it all But I helped them out

13

trying to get the bids.

6
7

8

9 : 44

14

9 : 45

15
16

1?

1a
19
g: '15

9 : 46

1
2
3

9 : 4: 6

5
6

4

7

8
9: 4 6

9
10

11
12
13
14

You do understand that?

Q. I do.
A. So if they send me a paper down here and say
"Si gil this because you've got to do it," I signed it.
I didn't go get a lawyer to look it over and see
iL I signed it because that's what I had to do.

9: 46

15
16
17

18
19

22

A. Yeah, I did.

2a
21
22

23

Q. Herels what I'm trying to get at.

23

24

A. I know. Let's get to it.

25

Q. I have a whole bunch of documents that I want

20

21

9 ; 4:)

this all took place in Wyoming.
And what was going on there is between the broker
and the bankruptcy court had to go between me. So when
they sent me papers up here and papers down there, it
was kind of confusing what they're doing because I was

Page 36

Q. Well. Mr. Farinella, you asked me to kind of

9 : 47

cut to the chase.

24

9 : 47

25

Mr. Farinella, here's what JIm going to do. I've
got some more dOCllml:nts I'm going to go through, and
J'Il tell you what rm going to do.
A All rigbt.
Q. It looks like a whole bunch of these documeots
are extensions. It looks likes there was a closing date
and it keeps getting extended, extended.
The only reason Pm going through with these is I'm
going to have them show you the document.
A. All right.
Q. I'm going to probably ask you two questions.
One is "Is your signature on the docwnent, " have you
look at thaL
A. Okay.
Q. There's some more -- I already alluded to this.
There's some more wording on the documents that says
there was 110 oral agreement.
So my second question will be to have you thin\(
back see if there were any other agreements other than
what's on the paper; okay? And we'll try to move
through as quick as pOSSIble.
How's that?
A. Thatls fme. Thanl< y()l.l.
Q. Youhet
lA's - the court repoctei' can look at -- or pull

Page 35
9 : q5

1
?
3
4
S

6
7

9 : 45

8
9
10
II

9: 46

12
13
14
15
16

17

18
19
9:4620

9: <l to

21
22
23
24
25

to go through with you, and I'll move along pretty
quick, but all the documents say there was no other oral
representations or agreement.
A. No.
Q. But your attorney has alJeged in SOJ1le pleadings
that there was some other agreements, full agreements.
And I don't understand them.
And so I want·- I'm just trying to find out - 1'm
confused because the documents say there are no other
agreements, and I just need to go througb these-A. I understand.
Q. - and find out if there was another agreement
A. I understand what you're going througb, but
there was no oral agreement other than what I told you
what he did. An.d once he bid for it, it was out. of my
hands. They agTeed to the bid, and 1 backed off after.
that.
Untill found out Ga}'len had a partner, and then I
said, "00 what you want to do, both of you," So J ca.'le

Page 37
9 : 47

1
2
3

9 : 47

5

4
6
7
8
9
9 : lj 8

Q. And it was out of your hands?
A. Naturally it's out of my hands. They already
bid it, it went into cscro1i'/, and what tiley did between

about, 1thinlc it was Exhibit <I.

But would you look at deposition Exlubit 5. Is
that your signature on the bottom?
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.
And then would you look at "OW in the rr.iddie of thl!

15
16

17

1B
19
20
21
22

23

24
25

tbe two of thcrn over there God only knows.
Q. Okay. That's a nice summary_

A. Yes.
Q. Exhibit 5 appears to me to be a -- a change of
deadline on this real estate contract that we talked

10

13
14

9 : 48

backtoL.A.

MR. BOWERS:
Q. Mr. Farinella?

11
12

9 : .; 8

up the next two pages, which is Bates stamped 20 and 21,
and mark that as deposition Exhibit 5. [EXH-5]
(Whereupon dte document referred to is marked by
the reporter as Exhibit 5 for identification.)

page.

A. DisQ. "All prior representations" -. Let me say,
quote, "All prior representations made in the
negotiations of this sale have been incorporated herein,
and there are no ora! agreements or representations
between Buyer, Seller or their agents to modify the
terms and conditions of this Contract."
Are you aware of any otber oral agreements other
than this real {".state - this extension and the real

10 (Pages 34 to 37)
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1

A. No.
There was no oral .. No, none of that None at

3
4

5
6
7
8

9
10
11
12

13
9: 49

Do you?

20
21
22

9:50

Exhibit 6. (EXH-6J
(Whereupon the document referred to is marked by
the reporter as Exhibit 6 for identification.)
MR. BOWERS:
Q. On deposition Exhibit "8," Mr. Farinella I
don'! sec your signature on there anywhere.

23
24
25

1

stamp number 23 through 26 and mark that as deposition

:2

Exhibit 7. (EXH.7j

3
4

A. John?
Q. Yes.
A. Gaylen submitted his offer and was accepted at
the time.
Then Gaylen suggested to run the plant and
restaurant MR. MARIN: (Indicating.)
THE \VITNESS; What the hell is this?

5

MR. BOWERS: Lori, if you wouldn't mind taking
Bates stamped number 22 and mark it as

THE REPORTER: You said "8."
THE WITNESS: You said "8."
MR.. BOWERS:

18

9; 51

Q. Allright.

14

19
9: q 9

all.

15
16
17

9:51

estate contract?

2

Page 40

6

7
8

9:52

9
10
1 .1

12
13
14

9:32

Q. Deposition Exhibit 6.
A. J don't see any signatw·c on hem.
1see Zebe's here. No, it's not Zebe.

15
16
17
18
19

9:52

'i\.'ho is this? Oil. JeffP..andaii and Gaylen. That's
on this page.
Q. Okay. This - have you seen -- Do )'0\1 remember
ever seeing this document before?
A. Never.

20
21
22
2 J24
25

MR. lVlARlN: Familiarize.

THE WITNESS: Towhat?
MR. MARIN: To familiarize on the ope<atiolL
THE WITNESS: -- to familiarize on the operation.
Gaylen then suggested --

What the hell is this?

MR. MARIN: To cle;;n.
THE WITNESS: - to clean the plant. Yeah. I
remember toot.
He says, urI! clean the plant and get it ready.
As soon as escrow doses, we {;'!Itl start opening and make
cheese at the time."
And I told him "Go ahead lllId do what you want as
long as it doesn't cost the bankruptcy or me or anybody
any mt)Uey to spend.'

Page 39
9:50

1
2
3
4

9: 50

5
6
7
8
9
10

11
12
13
14

9 ; 51

15
16

9: 51

17
18
19
20
21

9: 51

22
23
24
25

Page 41

Q. Okay. Then we'11 just move on.

1
2

Let me - and then I want to clari..fy.
When you talk. about, on my notes here - when you
talk about the escrow again, you're talking about the
closing when money is paid, deed's transferred and the
property is completed and sol~ correct?
A. Right.
Q. SO up to tbat point, I want to clarify that no
one had the authority to do anything on the property as
far as, I guess, unusual expenses witbout the authority

of the bankruptcy trustee; correct?
MR. ATKIN: Objection. Calls for a legal
conclusion.
Blake Atkins.
THE WITNESS: You want me to allSwer that?
MR. BOWERS:
Q. Yes, please.
A. That nobody had authority to do anything or to
spend any money at the plant while it was in prQCess of
eserow to close. Is t1'!at what you're trying to sa:y?
Q. Yes. Without the bankruptcy trustee's
permission; correct?
A. That's normal. Yes. That's righl
Q. Okay.

MR. BOWERS: Lori, if you would now take Bates

3
4

: 53

5
6

7
B
9
: 53

.1 0
11
12
13

14
15
16

17
18
19
20
21
22
23

24
25

TI18t's where we -- that's the thing that I - I
think that's where we're going in the first place,
aren't we?
MR. BOWERS: It sounds reasonable.
(Whereupon the document referred to is marked by
the reporter as ExIlibit 7 for identification.)
MR. BOWERS:
I
Q. Deposition Exhibit 7, when you look on the
second page - no, it's not the second .- yours isn't on
the second. There's so many pages to this.

Would you look ou the fourth page and see if lhat's
your signature.
A. Yes.
Q. Okay.

And then up above there, two paragraphs up, number
two Slates, • All representations made in the
negotiations of this sale have been inco1pQrated herein,
there are no verbal agreemerns between Buyer, Seiler
andlor any cr..her Brokers to modify terms and
conditions. n
Was that a fair statement at the time?
A. I think so, yes.
Q. Were you aware of any other oral or agreements
other than what was spelled out in these documents we've
discussed?
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3
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9: 54

6
7

8
9

9: 54

10
11

12
13
14
9: 54

15
16
11

IB
19
9: 55

20
21
22

23
24

9: 55

25

A. No.
Except what I read to you.
Q. Okay.
Basically that Gaylen could fumiliarize himself and
run tbe piant as long as it didn't cost anybody any

Page 44

P9:56

1

2
3
4

9:56

5

money?

6

A. Right
And it was agreed by him and his partners.
Q. Okay.
A. That he was going to get the plant ready to
operate as soon as escrow closed.
Q. Okay.
A. But GayJen slept there I think. He slept
there. He never went home.
Q. Okay.
MR. BOWERS: Lori, if you would look at
deposition - or Bates stamp 27 throng]) 30.
That is deposition Exhibit 8. [EXH·8J
(Whereupon the document referred 1.0 is marked hy
the reporter as Exhibit 8 fur identification.)

7
8
9

9;57

10
11

12
13
14

9:57

15

16
17
18
19

9:57

20
22-

MR. BOWERS:
Q. Okay.

22

Deposjtion Exhibit 8. W ou Id you Jook at the very

23

24

last page.
MR. A TKlN: Would you say the pages again,

?C
,,"

Lees go to Bates stamp ••

Lo~

if you1] pull

Bates stamp 32 through 39. Mark that as deposition
Exhibit Number 10. [EXH·lOj

(Whereupon the document referred to is marked by
the reporter as Exhibit 10 for identification.)
MR.BOWERS:
Q. And would you mind looking at Exhibit J0 Bates
stamp 39. That would be the very last page.
MR. MARIN: Last page.
MRBOWERS:
Q. And see ifthat's your signature,
Mr. Farinella?
A. Yes.
Q. See up above there, two paragraphs up, it
states "All representalions made in the negotiations of
this sale have been incorporated herein, there are no
verbal agl'c-ements betwcen BU"jer, Seller and/or Brokers
to modifY the tenns and conditions."

Other than what you explained to us, ',vhich really
doesn't have to do with the tenus of the sale, bUl
taking that into account, was there ::my other agreement
referenced in the sale that is not .. was not contained
in these real estate documents we've discussed?
MR. ATKIN: Object to the question as
argumentative.

Page 43
1
2
3

9:55

4
5

9: 55

6

7
8
9

9:55

9:55

10
11
12
13
14

15
16

17
18
9:55

19
20

21
?~

-"-

n
9:56

24
25

MR. BOWERS: It's Bates stamp 30.
TIlE WITNESS: That's my signature.
MR. BOWERS:
Q. Again, on paragraph two, it states there's no
other representations or oral agreemmt.
Do you agree with thatA. Yes.
Q. - that when you signed this there was no other
oral agreement?
A. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
That's the same as the other ones; right?
Q. Same as the other ones.
A. Okay.
Q. And 1'Il say except for what you explained to
me. How's that?
A. That's fine. nlat's exactly fine.
Q. Okay.
MR. BOWERS: Lori, if you wouldn't mind taking
Bates stamp 31. If you eouid mark that deposition
Exhibit 9. (EXH.9}
(Whereupon the doctlluent ref<,:ITed to·is marked by

the reporter as Exhibit 9 for identification.)
THE WITNESS: J got it.
MR. BOWERS: Actually, we've covered that. So
we'll skip that Qne.

Page 45
1
2

3
4

:58

5
6

7

8
9

Q. All right. Thank you.
A. Tms is all real estate stuff from the broker.

15
16
17

18
19

0:10

(The record is read by tbe reporter.)
THE WITNESS: No, there was no other agreement.
MRBOWERS:

11
12

14

10:10

please.

la-

13
9:58

You call go ahead and answer.
This is Blake Atkin.
THE WITNESS: I don't know bow to answer that
Can you repeat it again.
MR BOWERS: Lori, can you read tbat back to mm,

20
21
22
23
24
2S

MR BOWERS: You know, if we could take a .. about
a two-minute break. If everybody can stay on the line,
we've covered a lot of tile materials J have, and jf we
c,m take two to five minutes, we'll be able to move this
along.
(A recess is taken.)

MR.-BOWERS:
Q. Mr. Farinella, do you have documents in front
of you today that you brought or Manny brought?
A What kind of documents?
Q. Did you bring documents, any documents?
A. I got one ilere.
THE WITNESS: Is that what we MR. MARIN: (Nods head in the affirmative.)
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0: 10

1

MR. BOWERS:
Q. Tell me what it is.

0: 10

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

0:10

9
10

11

0: 10

0: 11

0: 11

0:12

MR. MARIN: Jt's an e-mail.
THE WITh!£SS: What the hell is it?
It's an e-mail
MR. BOWERS:
Q. Can you read it to me.
A. Well. it's a long one.
V\'hat do you want? You're supposed to ask me

3

7
8
9

0; 12

questions.
Q. I am asking you questions. Does it have

21

to them?

22

The writing is so little, r told you before about
myRead it for theflt It's an e-mail.
MR- BOWERS:

23
24
25

5
5

0: 12

20

13
14
15
16
17
18
19

1
2
4

refi:rence to this case?
A. Only ifhe asks me a question.
Q. Have you been referring to it during this
deposition?
A. Okay. f'Jl read 1t to you.
Tilis is iiil e-mail sent by Ze-tc.
MR. MARIN: Don Zebe.
THE WITNESS: Don Zebe.
1 can't read too much, Manny. You want to l\-"ad it

12

Page 48

0:12

0:12

0:13

10

11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
22
23
24
25

you or somebody -- what you did to prepare forthls.
It sounds to me, correct me jf I'm wrong, somebody
sent you an e-mail with a copy of an old e-mail from my
client to prep you and influence you for this
deposition.
A. No. No.

They sent me an e-mail to answer any questions that
you ask me.
Q. Oh, they sent you an e-mail to answer A. No. Nobod}1 sent -- I have an e-mail that was
sent to the the real estate MR.MAR1N: Yeah.

THE WITNESS: Was it sent to Pendleton?
MR. MARIN: Yeah, be sent i1 to Pendleton.
THE WITNESS; - to Pendleton that we had on file
here.

MR.BOWERS:
Q. But it was just sent to you in the last day or

so to prepare you for this deposition?
A. No. No.

llis w ...s sent - Do you Wlmt to read the date on
there? January 14th -MR. MARIN: 2009.
THE VvTINESS: - 2009.
MR..BOWERS:

Page 47

o: 11

o : 11

1

Q. Is it - WeU, let me ask yoo this.

2

Is it an e-mail from - is it an e-mail from Manny

3
4
5
6

7

S
9

o ; 11

10
11
12
13
14

0: 1 J

15
16
17

18
19

o : 11

20
21
22

23

o : 12

2 -1
25

Page 49

o : 13

1

2

reference the accounts?

3

A. No. From Donald Zebe.

o : 13

Q. Who gave you that e-mail today?
MR. MARIN: We have that
THE WITNESS: We bad it.

MR. MARIN: We have this on file.
MR. BOWERS:
Q. SO you just decided to bring that today?
A Yeah.
MR. MARIN: No. Because we - we have this file.
This was sent to YOll.
THE WITNESS: Yeah.
MR. MARIN: To my e-maii address.
THE WITNESS: It was sent to your e-mail?
MR..MARlN: Yeah.

o : 13

4
5
6
7
B
9
10

11
12

13
14

o: 1 3

15
16
17

MR. BOWERS:

18

Q. SO somebody sent you this ck'.cumentA. I don't understand why you're asking me this.
What dOCllffief1ts did 1 bring? What relevance -Q. Let me finish, Mr. Farinella
You're a business man?
A. I'm not a lawyer.
Q. I WOOlt to know if anybody tried to influence

o : 13

I9
20
21
22
23
24

0: 13

25

Q. So my question is why didn't you bring other
things from the file other than this?
A. You must think rm a stupid jerl< over here. I
know what you're getting at over here. J have to answer
your question.
MR. MARIN: We brought the listing agreement
THE WITNESS: We brought all tile listings from tile
C.aldweU "Banks" we've got here, and all the listings but I have an e-mail.
1 don't know why you're asking me about an e-mail.

Would you please expJain ibat.
MR. BOWERS:
Q. It sounded to me tike somebody had sent you an
e.mailA. It rounds like. It sounds like.
Is tbat the way a lawyer talks? It sounds like.
Q. Yes.
It sounds like they sent you -A. U don't sound like that
Q. In the last five days, did anybody e-mail you

material, either you or Manny, in reference to this
upcoming deposition?
A. No.

!I.1R. MARIN: I prepared it.
THE WITNESS: Manny prepared it
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0: 1 3

o : 14

o: 1 4

0: 1 4

He prepared it for this deposition, He prepared it

1

2

1

have authorization to have GayJen Clayton --

A. Only - only for the restaurant. Don't put
words in my mouth. Only for the restaurant
I had the right to keep it open as much as I could,
but the people there weren't running it right, and
Gaylen was staying there and living there. I told him

MR. BOWERS:

4
5

Q. Good,

3
4

Do you have - you can ask him. Does he have or do

5

6

you have in front of you the August 28, 2008

6

7
8

authorization which you signed in which you gave
Mr. Clayson permission to run the operations of the Star

7
8
9

9
10
11

Valley restaurant?
MR. MARIN: It was in that e-mail.

o: 16

Q. Since you weren't the owner, then you didn't

:2

3

10

to look after it, to take care of it, to keep it open.
Otherwise, Twould have had In close the
restaurant, and it WOUldn't look good for the courts.

TIIE WlTh"ESS: It was in that e-mail?

11

12

MR. MARIN: Yes.

12

to allow Gayien Clayson to sell equipment out of the

13

THE WITNESS: You got it with you'!

13

plan!?

14

MR. MARIN: So I don't have it, but I know it was

14

A. Hell no. No. Excuse me. No.

15

!vIR. ATKIN: This is Blake Atkin.

15

17
18
19

o : 16

in the file. That's the reason you signed this.

20
21

August 28,2008 leiter authorization?

17
18
19

o : 16

MR. MARIN: This is exactly what was in there. We

22

TIfE WITNESS: We didn't bring it with us, that part

0:17

of it.

Q. But you didn't have the authorization or power

Object to the question. Calls fur a Jegal
condusioll.
MR. BOWERS: Okay.
Q. lfMr. Clayton sold -- during the time prior to

20

the closing of the escrow, if Mr. Clayton sold equipment

21

out of the plant, then he did so without you. approval;

22

correct?
A.. If anything came Ollt of that plant it was
absolutely without roy approval.
As I said, again - I wtll read it again to YOIL

23

didn't bring that.

24
25

16

THE WITNESS: Yeah, this is why I signed this.

Yeah.
MR. BOWERS:
Q. Okay.
Do you have that? Call you review thaI, the

23
0: 14

: 16

for this deposition.

16

o: 1 4

Page 52

24
25

Page 51
10 : 14

MR. BOWERS:
2
3
4

o : 15

o : 15

0:17

how do you OWll it mymore?

5
6

That I didn't mind as long as it didn't cost any

money to the courts.
Q. Let me claritY .. While were on that subject,

7
f.l

Do you own anything after you're b~t? Do you

7

let me clarify tbeil.

still own it? As a lawyer, answer me. Do you stiU own

S

9
10

it after a place goes bankrupt?
Q. Let me ask you this: Did you believe you owned

9

II wasn't sold -- when there was money coming into
the restaurant, because you bave customers paying, did
Gaylen Clayton have any authority to withdraw or use any

11

it or you didn't when it went bankrupt?

13
15
16
17

0: 15

After Gaylen ~'llbtnilted and the offer was accepted, he

suggested to run the plant and restaurant and keep it
familiarized and to operations - keep it in operation.

4

Listeil, rUl lIot a lawyer, but when you go bankrupt,

0:17

10
11

A. No, tile coun owns it. The court takes it

12

over.
You might be a principal there, but you don't own

14

0: 15

1
2

3

A. October 8, the owner of Star Valley Cheese -You know, these words are _.

12

0:15

0: 17

Q. Okay.

5
6

Page 53

13

Neither did Don Zsbe.

14

Q. Neither did Don Zebe?
A. As far as I know, hotb of them were over there.

15

it.

of that money for his personal use?
A. No. Nobody.

Q. So--

16

A. So here it says -- it says lllat ~As I was tbe

17

Q. SO the money was to go back into either paying
for the suppliers -.
A. Right" exactly.

18

owner of Star Valley Oleese Plant in Thayne, Wyoming to

18

19

the company of Star Valley Cheese Corporation.

R

19

20

I was always working for the cOurts, not as 3D

20

stale of Wyoming.
THE WITNESS: What was that? The - the labor
department.
What was the name of this?

21

individual owner. So I want YOll tQ straighten that one

21

22
23

out.
J'm not going to get any deeper with this thing

22
23

2"
25

because I have nothing (0 do with any of you guys. I'm
getting a little-·

25

2"

And the help. Wbich we had

I got sued by the

1\1&. MARIN: For state tax.
THE WITNESS: For state tax.
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1

MR. MARIN: Sales tax.

2

THE WITNESS: Sales tax.

3

12

bankrupt taken out?
Q. WasitA. No. Never.

6
7

o: 1 8

8
9
10

11

o: 18

him until he paid it

Q. And, again, he didn't have any - it was
basically - the only authorization you gave him in
August 28th on the plant was to just mairuain the
cleanlinesS; correct?
A. Yeah. That's what be wanted to do.
He wanted - be suggested that himself after -

3

4

o: 20

5

6
7

o: 20

B
9
10
11
12

13
14

17

1 -;

18

Q. Let me tell you - You know, I have it in front

18

escrow closed.

24

25

of you, and l'U just read it to you what 1 have in
front of you.
It's an August 28, 2008. I t.l-tink you told me that
you reviewed this_
It says, ~To whom it nmy concern. Tlris will
authorize Mr. Gaylen Clayton to run the operations of
the Star Valley restaurant" --

0: 21

15

Q. Who told you that?
A. Don Zelle.

He - he became his partner. 'When he became his
partner he had it noted too that he was going 10 do the
cleani.i1g and fix tile plan!: so it could be running when

19
20
21
22

: 20

Here, I'll read it to you again.
Gaylen then suggested ro clean the plant and fix
the electrical and plmnbin~ And it was confirmed -- it
was confumed by John - Don Zebe. He authorized it
also that he should do that

16

23

o ; 19

1
2

Q. Ever?
A. Never.

16

0:19

Page S6

o: 20

13
14
15

4
5

19
20

Q. Who told you that Don Zebe was his partner?
MR. MARIN: Don Zebe.

21

THE WITNESS: Don Zelle himself told me.

22
23

o: 21

24
25

MR. BOWERS: Manny, I can hear you in the
background telling him the a!lSWe-l'S.

THE WITNESS; Wel~ tbars why] brought him here.
MR. BOWERS: Yeab, well, Pm not deposing him.

Page 55
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1
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4
5
6

7
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o: 19

9
10
11

0:19

13
14
15
16
17

12

18

0:19

0;20

FARINEI.LA

Sq

They weren't paying. l got sued.
And I called up Gaylen and the girls that worked
there and said, "You have to pay this." Between Don
Zebe and Gaylen, whoever, they paid it.
MR. BOWERS:
Q. And did there come a time before the sale of
the property that the bankruptcy was discharged and you
were what is referred to as a debtor in possession?
A. Did - Can you clarify thaI?
You mean in simple words was the -- was the

o: 18

MORRIS A.

19
20
21
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23
24
25

Page 57
0:21

A. Right.
Q. - "and he will also be responsible f()r
providing workers' compensation IDb-urance" A. Yeah.

Q. - "for the restaurant employees...

0:21

1
2

And I don't mind you giving documents and helping..
but I've gut to ask that you refrain from giving the

3
4

answers.

5
6
?

A. Correct

Q. And the next line, "In addition, Mr. Clayson
will also take care of the cleanliness of the plant.
Sincerely, Morris A. Farinella."
Is that the autilorization you reviaved you were
making reference to earlier?

8

0:21

9
10
11
12
1J

MR. MARIN: Yeo.

THE WITNESS: Yes.
MR. BOWERS:
Q_ SO he was to pay for workers' compensation
insurance for employees of the restaurant?
A. Correct
Q. Did be do that?
A. After we told him that it was being S\!ed by the
state, then he paid. I think. I believe he paid it.
Yes, he paid it.
Q. You thought he paid it after you got sued;

deposition.

.

THE WITNESS: No. No. Just get to the point here.
MR. BOWERS: Okay.
Q. SO he told -- you have an independent
recollection outside of what Manny just mId you -

16

A. 1 didn't even hearwliat Manny said, to teU you
the truth. I didn't bear wh!!t he said, O!<..ay?
Q. Okay.
When did Don Zebe teU you that he was partners

17

with Gaylen?

1B
1. 9

A. The last time I was at Wyoming when he made the
bid and it was accepted.
And I told Man- - told Gaylan, "You're going to

14
15

20
21
22
23
24
25

correct?
A. No. You know, the state sent him letters and
they're going to sue you this and that, and I kept on

Will you do tbat for me?

THE WITNESS: Okay.
MR. MARIN: Okay.
MR. BOWERS: Otherjwise, we'U set up another

have to come up with the money. It
He said, "No, Don Zebe has got the money. Both of
us are going to. He's my panner. II
P..nd I came back to L A., and that was the end of
that.
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Q. SO he said he was - did Gay\en tell yOll he was
going tn be his partner?
A. Yeah.
Q. He was going to be partners with Don Zebe?
A. Yeab. He introduced him to me at the time. I
didn't know Don Zebe.
Q. Did he introduce him as his partner?
A. He said he was going to be his partner,
Q. Okay. Okay.
So Gaylen told you that he was going to be Don
Zebe's partner; corrlOCt?
A. Don Zebe said it too.
Q. Okay.
So did you ever enter inio any agreement witb Don
Zebe?
A. Never.
Q. Okay.
A. He wanted to borrow money lTom me. After he
closed it, he says "Lend me" -- "Jend me 2- or 300,000,"
what it was. And] told him "No. I couldn't do it."
Q. All right.
So lei me just get back. We got off track..
So I just want to clarity because here's "- and I'm
just pardphrasing. My understanding now is that at
leas! 1"l some document Gaylen Clayson bas alleged that

Page 60
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0;24

they give permission to sell equipment out of a bankrupt

5
6
7

plant. I didn't do it. It's ilI1jlOssible.
Q. Do you remember ever -- ever remember in the
history of your relationship with Gayien Clayson giving
him permission to sell equipment out of that planf!
A. Never.
Q. All right
A. To cleanup -- he could have cleaned up - You
know, iftbcrcwasjunk in the- You know what I mean
by cleanup'?
Are you familiar with the cleanup ". what it means
cle-anup tbe plant o\!iside and in? So it will look
decem.
III fact, YOIl want me to tell you the truth. I told
him don't clean it too good because other bidders 2TC
coming. They're going to bid higher iban you.
But he cleaned the outside, wbich was ajob, the
garbage around the plant. That's what 1 thought he was
cleaning. And he cleaned inside.
And I said, ·Okay. As long as it don't cost tne
bankruptcy lawyer."
Q. SO at one point you assumed there was going to

9
10

11
12
13
0:24
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0:25

0;25

A. I don't have the right in the bankruptcy court

4

8

0;24

remember giving him permission to sell any equipment;
correct?
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Page 61

o: 25

he had the right to withdraw money out afthe restaurant
and use it for his personal use.
1bat's not true; com:ct?

1
2

3
4

A. No.

o : 25

Q. You never gave him authority to do that?

A No.

5
6

Q. 1also understand that Gayle!! Oayton sold SOIDe

7

equipment

8

9

One, 1 think somebody's aIlegt:d that he sold a
dryer for over - was it $10,000 or j 2,000, some -

o : 25

10

A. Where did you gel that inrormaUQD from?

11

Q. 'That's what we--

12

13

A Don Zebe.

13

14

Q. I'm trying to --

14

17

THE REPORTER: Wail. You guys are talking at the
same time. I couldn't hear.
THE WITNESS: Where clid you gct information thllt he

18

sold equipment?

15
16

19
20

'Thall don't know about.
MR. BOWERS:

21

Q. Actually, Mr. Clayson admitted that he sold the

22
23
24

equipment, but be claims you gave bim pennission.
A. Nobody gave him permission. I haven't got the
right to give him pennission.

25

Q. SO ifhesold any equipment out - you dQYI~

FARINELLA

15

: 26
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o; 2 6

25

be higher bidders than Gaylen Claytol1; correct?
A. fU back off..
Before he wanled tl) clean the plant, 1said, ''No. n
When he WlUlted to fl.lC the plant I said, "No.·
The bids were not in at that time_ So I'll read it
back to you what 1 did.
After he - after he submitted the offer and was
accepted is when I told him you can go and clean it and
get ready fur it, as long as it dml't cost no moneY.
until this escrow closes, to the bankruptcy oourt.
Q. Okay.
A. And Gaylen - he suggested he clean the plant
and fix the electrical, p.lumbing.
Why would 1tell him that without - Yeah, they're
not going pay for all of this. The bankruptcy court is
not going to pay fot that. It's in bankruptcy.
So be was doing it for his purpose and Don Zebe's
purpose. And John, whatever his name is, knew it too.
Q_ Did you ever give Gaylen permission to have a
couple hundred thousand dollars worth of electrical work
done on the plant?
A. No, I didn't know anything about it. That
was - that was the two partnet's idea, both Don and
GayJen.
Q. And who told you that?
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A. Gaylen and Don. Don Zebe too.
Q. He told you that he was - that he wanted to
spend a couple hundred thousand dollars to get
electrical work A. Yeah. That's what he told me.
Q. Okay.
When was that?
A. That was on January 14th. 2009 at 2:36 p.m.
Q. Okay.
And what are you loolcing at?
A. At an e-mail thal he sent to the real
"estater," and he sent one here -- he sent me one too.
Q. Okay.
Other than that, do you have any - did you have
any independent TccolIection of that without loot-Jog at
that document?
A. Recollection about what'! That Don Zebc was a
partner?
Q. Here's how it's supposed to work, and it's hard
from tbe telephone.
A. 1 know it's hard.
Q. I'm supposed to ask you a question.
A. Go ahead.
Q. If you don't know, you don't know.
If you need to look at a document, you're supposed

Page 64
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1

A. J don't remember.

2

Q. Well, let's look.
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A. You are going to get me to the point where I'm
going to say I don't remember anything and forget ahout
it because you haven't answered me.
Q. No, no, 00.
You got to understand the rules. I get to ask you
the questions.
A. I know the rules.
You're asking the questions, but I'm asking them of
}'ffiInow.
This is the point that we came here for in the
frrst place.
Q. That's right. We call go all day and I won't
answer your questions. We call get through a lot quicker
if yoo just answer the questions.

A. Go ahead.
Q. Would you look at deposition Exhibit 4. That's

the 1'e31 estate contract.
A. Why don't you tell it to the real estate guy?
I 1le',1eT read it.
Q. Well you signed it; correct?
A. Well he sent it to me..
That's not my signature.
Q. That's not your signature?

Page 63
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o : 28

o: 2 8

0: 2 9

6
7

Q. That's okay.
Let's see here.
A. I got to get new glasses. J can hardly read
the little writing.
You didn't ask me if you wanted to hear what the

8

e-mail says.

4

o : 27

to say "1 need to look at a document."
A. Okay. fm sorry.

5

9
Q. I've seen the e-mail.
l O A . Did you see the paragraph where Zebe says he's
11
going to do it for $200,000. And be's going to take
12
full responsibility and prepared to pay for it himself?
13
Did you read that part of it?
14
Q. ! did.
15
A. Actually were on the same page.
16
Q. No. No, we're no(.
17
A. WJ1Y not? You've got this e-mail.
18
Q. No, we';e not on because19
A. Doesn't it say that he's prepared to pay?

0: 28

20

Q. No, it doesn't

A. No?
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MR. BOWERS:

4
5

Q. After'IHE REPORTER: Wait. Wait. Wait.
Let us get the exhibit.
Okay. Ready.

6

7

: 30
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Q. SO Mr. Farinella, Jet me ask you thisA. Yeah.
Q. - the offer was accepted on October 17th;

17
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o ; 30

correct? The date that -

A. It's a thousand miles away.
THE REPORTER: Let us get the exhibit

25

MR. BOWERS:
Q. When you talked about once the offer was
accepted from Gaylen and you allowed Irim to go in and
take care of the restaurant; correct?
A. Well, I allowed him. J asked him to.
As long as he's going buy tbe place and I'm having
pl'Oblem.s with the help over there in the restaurant,
rather than closing it, to keep it open ""bile escrow
closed to run it and take care of it.
Q. I'm trying to figure these dates out.
So then that would be sometime after October 17th,

20081
A. I don't remember.
Q. Wen you said that once the offer was

accepted - Your exact testimony was something aloog
that line -A. Yeah.

Q. - after the offer was accepted, I told him he
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could do this and this.
A. Yeah.
Q. Okay.
So then prior to October 17th, 2008, he didn't have
permission; correct?
A. No.
Neither did Don Zebe either. Because he was in
that restaurant too, you know, taking money out too.
Q. So Don Zelle was taking money out too'?
A. Yea1L Absolutely.
As far as I know, they were both fighting over
there and you guys got me involved up there.
That's a circus going on up there. You know that.
Excuse me, off the record. That is II circus going em
between the two of them.
Q. Well, we're ilOt off Ihe record. Everythi.,g is
on the record.

~

2

:3
~

10:36

S

MR MARiN: You CI.lll arrange it with Blak-e as fur as
that schedule.

Morris he wanted to talk to you and me so that's

o

fine.

7

THE WITNESS: Who wanted La talk to me?
MR. ATKlN: I do have a couple questions iflhat's
okay, Morris.
THEWlTNESS: Yeah.

8

10: 36

THE WITNESS: You want to settle? How do \ve settle
tills case?

9
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11
12

-EXAMINATION-

13

BY MR. ATKJN:
0:36

1
e
_..I

10:36

17
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16

A. Okay.

Q. Did you -- Did you ever tell Gaylen Clayson or
authorize him as your agent to do whatever he needed to
get the plant running?
A. No. He's not my agent.
Q. Did you - would Y<l1-l ever authorize him to do
anything to get the plant running?
A. ~ wouldn't authorize him or Don Zebe without

21

22

23
24

0:36

25

Q. Do you recall, yOll know, youMR. BOWERS: Wait II minute. Wait a minute. Are we

dcp!lsing Morris? rm SOlT'j. 1 tllougiI! you said Manny.
MR. ATKlN: I said "Moms."
THEWITNESS: Moms.
MR. BOWER.'): You did.
MR.ATtaN:

Q. You were asked some questions by Mr. Bowers
about tllis document that we've marked, the offer that
was accepted in October of2008.
Do yOU recall that Gaylen bad made an offer earlier

Page
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signing a piece of paper in front of a lawyer. I don't
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trust either one of them.
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Page 69
o : 36

Q. Fair enough. Fair enough.
A. They're a bunch of crooks up tbere.
MR. MARJN: (Indicating).

o: 37

THE Wl1NESS: I know.
MR. BOWERS: Okay.! Let's take another 30 seconds
to 2-minute break and we may be wrapping up.
(A recess is taken.)
MR. BOWERS: Mr. Farinella, 1 don't have anymore
questions.
Mr. Atkins will have the right
I just wanted to throw this (lut one more time.
THE WITNESS: ClO ahead.
MR. BOVIERS: And Manny, I'm sorry, 1 don't know
your last name. I don't mean any disrespect for calling
you that
MR. MARIN: Marin, M-a-r-i-n.
MR. BOWERS: The only thing is - apparently you
got it, but Twt)uld still throw out there that I would
like to talk to Mr. Farinella and Manny and their
personal attorney about settling this case between us
When there's the lime convenient for you.
THE WTINESS: Settle the case.
MR. BOWERS: I don't have any more questions.

o : 37

1
2

in the year ill 2008, sometime back in February 20081
A. Yes.

3

12

Q. And so some of those conversations that you
talked about with GayJen about running the restaurant
and doing whatever was necessary to make the plant
operational, those conversations, didn't tbey occur
before October of 2008 as to that first offer in
February?
A. Well, he made an offer and it was not accepted.
Gaylen made lhe first offer. i don't know. I think it
was February •• J think it was THE WITNESS: Was it February 7th that he made his

13

offer? February 7. That's 2008.

14

MR. MARIN: Yes.
THE 'WITNESS: 2008, Februmy 7, and he offered
500,000. And it was not accepted. It was turned down.
MR. ATK1N:

4
5
6
7
B
9
10
11

o: 37

15
16
17

1a
19
20

21
22
23

24
25

Q. In any event, he started running the restaurant
at about that time, didn't he, February 200S?
A. It was much later than 'February though. It was
after -- after the 500,000 was rejected, he offered
$800,000 with another offer of 800-, and we accepted
his. Al1d that's when I found out Don Zebe was a
partner. He made·- he acr,eptOO the offer of 800,000 -we accepted that

18

(Pages 66 to 69)

HUTCHINGS COURT REPORTERS, LLC - GLOBAL LEGAL SERVICES
800.697.3210

667

~E,

LLC V. DAIRY SYSTEMS C

Y, INC. September 30, 2010

MORRIS A.

F~~INELJ~

Page 70
1

0:38

2

3
4

0:38

5
6

7

0:38

8
9
10
11

12
13
14

O::Hl

IS
16
17
18
19

0:39

20
21
22

0:39

23
24
25

So when we accepted that. that means that the thing
was dosed. Like I said, I read it to you again.
After the accepting of the offer, Gaylen asked me
ifhe can clean it up and get it ready to run.
Which I said go ahead, as long as it don't cost the
court any money.
Q. All right.
A. And they said, "Okay."
Because I got an e-mail from Don Zebe that says
they're willing to pay anything -- that they -- you
know, that the'j -- Gaylen -- Gaylen and Don Zebe will
accept up to 200 something thousand - $245,000 to
cleanup the plant They will pay for it and nnt charge
us or the courts or anybody.
I got an c-mail to that it effect.
Q. And tbat's the e-mail that you talked aboD!
earlier that you received in Jalll,lary of 20097
A. Right.

Q. Okay.
AndA. The plant was closed for a couple of years.
T1mt's why it got so dirty and crumby and every!hing.
That's ,I\fby it wasn't cleaned. It was closed for two
years.
Any piece of property that has been closed -

1
2

MR. BOWERS: We're off the record.
(The proceedings concluded at 10:40 a.m.)
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***
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"
6

Tdeclare under penalty of ptlljury under the laws
of ihe Slate of California tha1 the foregoing js true

7

and correct.
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'3

Executed at _ _ _ _ _ _ __

,California,
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MORRIS A. FARINELLA
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Q. Wasn't there junk on the property that had been
used that was no longer usable? Xt was considered junk
on the property?
A.

1

3
4

Yes.

And in fact, we had what we calla junkyard. We
used to throw the equipment that was not good or didn't
work no more out in the back.
Q. And wasn't that weigh dryer part of that junk?
A. I believe so. I believe we had and old weigh
dryer - Well, it was a pan. They call it a pan. It
W'dS tlu-own in the back. It couldn't be used at all. It
wasn't worth anything. It was scrap.
Q. And you authorized Gaylen to get rid of that?
A. I didn't authorize him to get rid of that or
any particular itenl. Only to clean it up.
If that meant to get rid of that, 1 guess he did

it. But not to cost any money to court - not to cost
me or the bankruptcy coll11. Because they would have
come - I had no authority to tell him anything anyway.
He might as well ask a monkey on a tree what he
could do. I had no lutthority,
MR. ATKfN: That's all I have.
THE WITNESS: Okay.
MR. BOWERS: 'l1lat's all. I have nothing else.
THE REPORTER: So we're off the record.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA) ss

2

1, Lori S. Turner, CSR 9102, Cr>, RPR, do hereby

declare:

5
6

7
8
9

That, prior to being examined, the witness named in
the foregoin~ deposition was by me duly sworn pUJSUant
to Section 2093(b) and 2094 of the Code of CiVIl
Procedure;

10
11

12
13

11tat said deposition was taken down by me in
shorthand at the time and place therein named and
thereafter reduced to text under my direction.

H

15
16

1 further declare that I bave no interest in the
event of the action.

17

16
19
20
21
22
23
24
2S

1 declare under penalty of peJju.ry under the laws
of the State of California iliat the foregoing is true
and correct.
W1TNESS my hand this _ _ _ _ _ day of

Lori S. Turner, CSR 9102, CP, RPR
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Counsel for Defendants

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
GA YLEN CLAYSON,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
vs.
DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, AND
LAZE, LLC.,
Defendants.

CASE NO. CV-2009-0002212-0C

DEFENSE
OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S
DESIGNATION OF DEPOSITION
EXCERPTS FROM THE DEPOSITION
OF MORRIS FARINELLA

COME NOW the Defendants and object to the Plaintiff's designation of excerpts from the
deposition of Morris Farinella as follows:
DESIGNATION

OBJECTION

Page 14, lines 7 - 17

No objection

Page 14, line 18 - Page 15, line 4

No objection

Page 18, line 16 - Page 19, line 6

No objection (pmi of the Defense designation)

Page 35, lines 13 - 20

No question designated. Answer was non-responsive
and the answer to the-extent it seeks to raise the issue of
"partnership" is not relevant to the claims and defenses
at issue in this trial

ORIG
DEFENSE OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFF'S DESIGNATION OF EXCERPTS FROM DEPOSITION OF
FARINELLA - PAGE I

669

Page 40, lines 14 - 25

No objection

Page 42, lines 4 - 15

To the extent the answer raises the issue of
"partnership" it was not responsive and is not relevant
to the claims and defenses at issue in this trial

Page 43, lines 4 - 17

Answer makes no sense because the exhibit is not
identified

Page 46 line 3 - Page 50, line 17

relevance

Page 56, lines 2 - 21

To the extent the answer raises the issue of
"partnership" it was not responsive and is not relevant
to the claims and defenses at issue in this trial

Page 58, lines 5 - 13

To the extent the answer raises the issue of
"partnership" it was not responsive and is not relevant
to the claims and defenses at issue in this trial

Page 61, line 19 - Page 62, line 13

To the extent the answer raises the issue of
"partnership" it was not responsive and is not relevant
to the claims and defenses at issue in this trial

Page 63, lines 7 - 14

No question designated. Answer was non-responsive
and the answer to the extent it seeks to raise the issue of
"partnership" is not relevant to the claims and defenses
at issue in this trial

Page 65, lines 9 - 20

relevance

DATED this 24th day of November, 2010.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certifY that on the 24th day of November, 2010, I served a true and correct copy of
the foregoing to:

[~~.s.mail

Blake S. Atkin
7579 North Westside Hwy
Clifton, ID 83228

[V"f
[]
[]

Email: bJake(a\atkinlawoffices.net
Hand delivery
Fax: 801-533-0380
c

[~~.s.mail

Atkins Law Offices
837 South 500 West, Ste 200
Bountiful, UT 84010

[~ Email:
[]
[]

blake{(Qatkinlawoftices.net
Hand delivery
Fax: 801-533-0380

John D. Bowers
Bowers Law Firm
PO Box 1550
Afton, WY 83110

[]
[]

Honorable Stephen S. Dunn
District Judge
624 E Center, Room 220
Pocatello, ID 83201
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IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRleT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
GA YLEN CLAYSON,
Plaintiff,
VS.

DON ZEBE, RlCK LAWSON, AND
LAZE, LLC.,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV -2009-0002212-0C
DEFENSE
PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ARGUMENT

PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Gaylen Clayson is a dairy farmer with approximately 38 years experience as a dairy
fanner.

2.

Don Zebe is a real estate agent with a 25 year business background and 6 year
commercial real estate sales and development background.

3.

Rick Lawson is an accountant with 25 years experience as a CPA who is now
managing the Star Valley restaurant located on the property at issue in this litigation.

4.

Jeff Randall is a milk hauler who has a long-standing business relationship with
Gaylen Clayson hauling his milk and commodities. About 25% to 40% of his revenue
is attributable to hauling milk and commodities for Gaylen Clayson.

5.

Gaylen Clayson used Dairy Systems to service his dairy equipment and to update and
install new milking equipment in his dairies prior to 2008.

Rl
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1.

6.

Gaylen Clayson had a close working relationship with Dairy Systems before 2008
during which times he had engaged it on time and materials contracts and worked out
billing disputes directly with the owners of Dairy Systems.

7.

Gaylen Clayson had experience prior to 2008 operating and renovating cheese plants.

8.

Gaylen Clayson had a relationship with Star Valley Cheese and its owner, Morris
Farinella, prior to 2008, which included both selling his milk to Star Valley Cheese
in the 1970's and again in the 1990's as well as operating the cheese plant as a part of
a receivership in the 1980's.

9.

In June of2008, Gaylen Clayson met with Morris Farinella who was then about 85.
The cheese plant had been shut down for about 2 Y2 years and was in bankruptcy. The
restaurant was open. Morris Farinella was trying to sell the cheese plant and restaurant
with the help of a Wyoming real estate agent through the bankruptcy court. Clayson
had expressed an interest in purchasing the cheese plant and restaurant. Morris
Farinella asked Clayson to help operate the restaurant. Clayson was not to be paid
because he was doing it as a favor to Farinella. On July 1, 2008, Gaylen Clayson
took over operation of the restaurant. The money from operating the restaurant was
supposed to go into an account which had been established for the restaurant and was
supposed to be used to pay the bills to the food vendors and help.

10.

Gaylen Clayson had no ownership interest in the restaurant or the cheese plant on July
1, 2008 and never thereafter had an ownership interest in the restaurant or cheese
plant. Gaylen Clayson believed he would be able to put something together to buy the
restaurant and cheese plant so that he would have a place to sell his milk.

11.

It was not until August 28, 2008, that Gaylen Clayson had anything in writing

authorizing him to operate the restaurant and it only authorized him to run the
restaurant, take care of the worker's compensation insurance for the restaurant
employees and take care of the cleanliness ofthe plant. (Exhibit 5A to deposition of
Gaylen Clayson)
12.

Gaylen Clayson told Morris Farinella that if the cheese plant was not up and running
by October 2008 he could not be a part of it.

13.

Gaylen Clayson spent time from July 1, 2008 to October 8, 2008, at the restaurant and
cheese plant. He managed the restaurant, opened and closed the restaurant, worked
around the plant and supervised others in working around the plant. Gaylen Clayson
did not keep track of the time he spent. He testified his time was worth $lS/hour but
provided no evidence to corroborate his opinion ..
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14.

After July l~ 2008, paint and floor work was accomplished on the inside and outside
of the cheese plant.

15.

Gaylen Clayson opened a bank account at the Bank of Star Valley on approximately
July 1, 2008~ which was funded primarily with receipts from the restaurant. By
October of 2008 it was depleted and closed.

16.

Gaylen Clayson stipulated that all the expenses documented in Exhibit F were not
approved in advance by Defendants and further that his claim is entirely based on
implied agreement by Defendants after the fact to reimburse him. This stipulation
does not include the debt to Dairy Systems.

17.

In July of2008~ Gaylen Clayson paid Johnson Plumbing $1,872 from the Bank of Star
Valley account for plumbing work in the restrooms of the restaurants. The
Defendants did not request or encourage him to incur this indebtedness. (Exhibit
F(A»

18.

.T eff Randall

introduced Gaylen Clayson to Don Zebe. Randall was acquainted with
and had a personal relationship with both Gaylen Clayson and Don Zebe. This
introduction took place in late July or early August, 2008. This is consistent with the
recollection of Don Zebe. Rick Lawson, however, was not introduced until the last
week in August, 2008. Gaylen Clayson, Don Zebe and Rick Lawson all agree that the
initial introduction was for the purpose of having Don Zebe write a business plan for
Gaylen Clayson, not finance the acquisition of the plant and restaurant. Gaylen
Clayson testified that almost immediately the relationship changed and by midAugust, 2008, Don Zebe and Rick Lawson became interested in acquiring the plant
and restaurant. Don Zebe and Rick Lawson disagree and testified that they did not
become interested in acquiring the plant and restaurant until the end of September
2008. On October 2,2008, Rick Lawson prepared paperwork to form SVC, LLC
which included Clayson, Lawson and Zebe as members. (Exhibit J) On the same
date Rick Lawson made some changes to the annual report fonn for an existing
company called Milk Market Management, LLC, which included the names of
Clayson, Lawson and Zebe as well as Jeff Randall. (Exhibit K) The disputed
evidence is most consistent with Zebe and Lawson not becoming interested in
acquiring the plant and restaurant until the end of September, 2008, just before the
paperwork on the two LLC's was generated.

19.

In the latter part of July, Gaylen Clayson contacted Dairy Systems regarding some
work at the cheese plant. Sometime near the first of August, 2008, Clayson initially
hired Dairy Systems to get power on in the cheese plant. After Dairy Systems started
Gaylen Clayson was advised that it was more involved and could cost as much as
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$200,000 to get the cheese plant operational. Gaylen Clayson felt this was cheap
because it would cost as much as $2 Million to build a new plant so he instructed
Dairy Systems to proceed. Dairy Systems agreed to bill monthly for time and
materials and they did. Defendants Don Zebe and Rick Lawson did not request
Gaylen Clayson to hire Dairy Systems. According to Clayson, it was Morris Farinella,
the owner of the cheese plant and restaurant, who authorized Gaylen Clayson to get
this work done. Morris Farinella testified that he did not authorize Gaylen Clayson
or anybody else to "get the plant running." Don Zebe and Rick Lawson deny they
requested Dairy Systems to perform any work at the cheese plant. Don Zebe
specifically told Dairy Systems to stop work at the plant shortly after October 8,2008,
when SVC, LLC took over operation of the restaurant from Clayson. This disputed
evidence does not support the formation of an express or implied agreement on the
part of the Defendants to reimburse Clayson for the payment he made to Dairy
Systems.
20.

On September 30,2008, Gaylen Clayson paid plumber, Casey Monson, $10,772.41
for work in the cheese plant. This was paid from the Bank of Star Valley account.
The Defendants did not request or encourage him to incur this indebtedness. (Exhibit
F(B))

21.

On August 14, 2008, Gaylen Clayson attended an Idaho Milk Producers Association
meeting in Sun Valley and charged $644.01 as expenses for attending that meeting
to his personal Bank of America credit card. (Exhibit F(D)) Although Clayson
testified that he talked this over with Zebe and Lawson before attending, Clayson
stipulated that this expense was not approved in advance by the Defendants. Clayson
had not even met Lawson at the time of this meeting. There is no evidence that this
expenditure improved the plant or restaurant.

22.

On August 13,2008, Gaylen Clayson paid Golden Ram Painting $2,000 for a down
payment on painting from the Bank of Star Valley account. On August 25, 2008,
Gaylen Clayson paid Golden Ram Painting $8,621 from his personal checking
account for payment in full on painting. (Exhibit F(F)) The Defendants did not
request Clayson to incur this indebtedness.

23.

On August 21, 2008, Gaylen Clayson charged $379.14 at Columbia Paint on his
personal Bank of America credit card. (Exhibit F(G)) The Defendants did not
request Clayson to incur this indebtedness.

24.

Between September 3,2008 and October 3,2008, Gaylen Clayson paid Joshua Flud
$3,917.02 from the Bank of Star Valley account for working on refurbishing the
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cheese plant. (Exhibit F(l»
indebtedness.

The Defendants did not request Clayson to incur this

25.

Between August 15, 2008 and September 26, 2008, Gaylen Clayson paid April
McMurdo $5,100.06 from the Bank of Star Valley account for secretarial work and
answering phones. (Exhibit F(J» There is no evidence that this work improved the
plant or restaurant. The Defendants did not request Clayson to incur this
indebtedness.

26.

Between August 1, 2008 and September 10,2008 Gaylen Clayson paid Mark Pittman
$3,532 from the Bank of Star Valley account for clean up work and work in the
There was no evidence
restaurant cooked and waited tables. (Exhibit F (K»
regarding how much of Pitttman 's time was spent cleaning up or what he cleaned.
The Defendants did not request Clayson to incur this indebtedness.

27.

On August 13, 2008, Gaylen Clayson charged $1,778 in travel expenses on his
personal Bank of America credit card for two repairmen from Viking to travel to
Thayne Wyoming to get some equipment running. (Exhibit F(P» The Defendants
did not request Clayson to incur this indebtedness.

28.

On September 25, 2008, Gaylen Clayson paid $9,100 to High Sierra for work
expanding the restaurant. (Exhibit F(T» Defendants did not request him to incur this
indebtedness and, in fact counseled him against incurring the expense.

29.

Gaylen Clayson charged $308.61 for some unidentified items at Thayne True Value
Hardware on his personal Bank of America charge card in August of2008. (Exhibit
F(U» The Defendants did not request Clayson to incur this indebtedness.

30.

Dairy Systems sent four invoices/statements before Clayson turned over operation of
the restaurant to SVC, LLC on October 8, 2008. The last statement was dated
September 30,2008 and shows a $50,000 payment. (Exhibit G (first 4 pages» The
statements and invoices were all directed to Star Valley Cheese. Gaylen Clayson paid
the $50,000 payment by a check drawn on his personal account at US Bank dated
September 16, 2008. (Exhibit F(U» At the time the payment was made Morris
Farinella (or his company) owned the cheese factory and restaurant.

31.

Gaylen Clayson also gave Dairy Systems two other checks drawn on the Bank of Star
Valley account, each for $50,000, which were never funded and never cashed by
Dairy Systems. The account was closed shortly after October 8, 2008, by Clayson.
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32.

Gaylen Clayson testified that he asked Defendants Zebe and Lawson to fund the
checks. According to him, both indicated they would work on getting the money to
fund the checks, but they never did fund the checks. Defendants Zebe and Lawson
deny they ever discussed the checks with Clayson or Dairy Systems and deny they
were even aware of the two unfunded checks until litigation was commenced in
Wyoming and Idaho. This disputed evidence does not support an agreement that
Defendants agreed to reimburse Clayson for the $50,000 check he used to pay Dairy
Systems.

33.

Gaylen Clayson stipulated that Dairy Systems is not presently making a legal claim
against him to recover its bills for time and materials at the Star Valley Cheese Plant.

34.

Gaylen Clayson did not have the money to make the October payroll at the restaurant
and called Rick Lawson on October 8, 2008, to inform him of that fact. Rick Lawson
advised him that if they were going to take over the restaurant they wanted him out
of there. Gaylen Clayson quit the restaurant at that time and turned it over to
Defendants Zebe and Lawson. The Defendant's version of this event is relatively
consistent with that of Clayson, except that Defendants testified that Clayson told
them he was "done" and if they were "interested they could take it over." Jeff
Randall testified that Gaylen Clayson told him he was out of money and if "those
guys" (i.e. Don Zebe and Rick Lawson) wanted to take over they could. Even if one
accepts Clayson's version of events, the evidence does not support an express or
implied agreement on the part of the Defendants to reimburse Clayson for expenses
he had paid prior to October 8, 2008.

35.

Although Gaylen Clayson was briefly a member ofSVC, LLC his name was removed
from the LLC shortly after he turned the restaurant over to Don Zebe and Rick
Lawson on October 8, 2008.

36.

Gaylen Clayson testified that there was a meeting inRick Lawson's office which was
attended by Clayson, Zebe, Lawson and Jeff Randall when he asked and Zebe and
Lawson agreed to reimburse him the expenses he had incurred of about $130,000, but
Gaylen Clayson has not provided proof that such an amount was actually paid by him.
He was unsure of the date except that he recalled it occurred before November 4,
2008. All of these expenses were incurred by Gaylen Clayson before he quit the
restaurant and turned it over to Defendants Zebe and Lawson on October 8, 2008.
Both Zebe and Lawson deny that such a meeting took place before November 4,2008,
and deny that they agreed to pay his expenses. Jeff Randall does not recall such a
meeting prior to November 4, 2008. The disputed evidence does not support
Clayson's testimony.
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37.

Gaylen Clayson has paid no debts since he turned over operation of the restaurant to
SVC, LLC on October 8, 2008. He did, however, receive a $20,000 refund from the
power company according to Rick Lawson. Clayson claims he did not receive the
$20,000 refund ..

38.

Gaylen Clayson testified that Rick Lawson and Don Zebe agreed to pay the bills that
came in October. Zebe and Lawson deny they agreed to pay any of Clayson's bills
except the payroll which was upcoming after October 8, 2008. However, Zebe and
Lawson did pay $25,986.01 in bills Clayson incurred prior to October 8, 2008 in the
first month after SVC, LLC started operating the restaurant. (Exhibit l1A) These
bills included payroll, payroll taxes, food vendors, utilities and back sales tax. Zebe
and Lawson testified that if they had not paid these bills they would not have been
able to operate the restaurant because the utilities would have been turned off and the
vendors would not have supplied food for the restaurant. Additional bills were paid
thereafter, primarily after SVC, LLC closed the transaction to purchase the plant and
restaurant. Bills paid by SVC, LLC which were incurred prior to October 8, 2008,
while Clayson was operating the restaurant totaled $78,237.79. (Exhibit 11) The
disputed evidence does not support an implied or express agreement by the
Defendants to reimburse expenses paid by Clayson before October 8, 2008.

39.

Gaylen Clayson and Jeff Randall signed a Purchase and Sale Agreement on October
17, 2008 in which they agreed to buy the Star Valley Cheese Plant from its owner,
Morris Farinella, in its "present condition" for $800,000 (Exhibit D). The testimony
about the circumstances surrounding the execution of that agreement are disputed.
Clayson testified that he signed the agreement because he had the relationship with
Farinella and because Don Zebe and Rick Lawson said they were not going to spend
any money until they got ownership and they were making no effort to purchase the
cheese plant and restaurant. Don Zebe testified that he decided to make an offer at
the prompting of Jeff Randall in a phone conversation on October 16, 2008. Jeff
Randall testified that he made the decision on October 16, 2008 to make an offer of
$800,000 to "get the ball rolling" because ifthe cheese plant opened he felt he would
benefit from revenue earned from trucking milk to the plant. The following day,
October 17, 2008, Jeff Randall drove with Gaylen Clayson to the Star Valley
restaurant and met with Don Zebe. Both Jeff Randall and Don Zebe recalled that
Zebe called the realtor to tell him he was going to make and offer, but the realtor and
Zebe got into an argument and Zebe told Randall he had changed his mind and was
not going to make the offer. Randall persisted and Zebe agreed to have Randall make
the offer of $800,000 for him but instructed him to have the words "and/or assigns"
included so that Randall could assign the PSA to Zebe. Randall stated that he did not
know where the realtor lived and Clayson offered to show him. Randall testified that
neither he nor Clayson had the money to perfonn and Randall's intent was to make
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the offer on behalf of Zebe and assign it to Zebe. The disputed evidence is most
consistent with Clayson and Randall executing the PSA on behalf of Zebe with the
anticipation that Clayson and Randall would then assign it to Zebe.
40.

Later that day Randall and Clayson returned to the Star Valley restaurant and
presented Zebe with the PSA which had been executed. Zebe was upset because he
did not see the "and/or assigns" language in the document and because Clayson's
name was on the document. The PSA did, in fact, have the "and/or assigns" language,
but it was on the third page at line 117. (Exhibit D) Randall agreed that Zebe was
upset when he saw Clayson's name on the document and when he could not see the
"and/or assigns" language. Randall called the realtor who told him the "and/or
assigns" language was in the PSA. Randall told Zebe that it did not make any
difference whether Clayson's name was on the PSA because they were going to
assign it to Zebe anyway. Randall's and Zebe's version is most consistent with
Clayson and Randall executing the PSA on behalf of Zebe with the anticipation that
Clayson and Randall would then assign it to Zebe.

41.

The PSA provided that the buyer was purchasing the "cheese plant, equipment,
restaurant
with all improvements thereon, easements and other
appurtenances and all fixtures of a pennanent nature currently on the premises except
as hereinafter provided, in their present condition, ordinary wear and tear excepted
. . ." (Exhibit D)

42.

Gaylen Clayson admits he did not have the $800,000 to close the transaction when he
signed the PSA on October 17, 2008. Gaylen Clayson testified that he was not
worried because he had talked to the Department of Agriculture and Morris Farinella.
Randall testified that Clayson told him he did not have the money to perform.

43.

SVC, LLC paid the $10,000 earnest money called for in the PSA which was executed
by Randall and Clayson on October 17, 2008.

44.

Don Zebe and Rick Lawson testified that on November 4, 2008, they attended a
meeting at Rick Lawson's accounting office with Gaylen Clayson and Jeff Randall
to obtain Clayson's and Randall's signature on a written assignment of the PSA
which Don Zebe prepared. Gaylen Clayson presented them with a handwritten list of
bills he wanted them to pay. Zebe and Lawson refused to pay any bills and presented
Clayson with a list of bills they had already paid and told him that because of the mess
he had left them with they wanted him to pay these bills. Zebe and Lawson testified
that the list they showed Clayson was the general ledger for SVC, LLC which
included the bills they had paid through November 4,2008. (See Exhibit llA) Jeff
Randall testified that the meeting got heated and he backed out to let them resolve it.
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He only recalls Zebe and Lawson agreeing to pay some bills associated with operating
the restaurant, specifically the payroll and payroll taxes. Zebe testified that Clayson
claimed he had paid some ofthe bills Zebe and Lawson paid and Zebe responded that
if he could prove it with invoices and checks they would reimburse him. Zebe and
Lawson testified that Clayson grumbled but backed down and agreed to sign the
assignment. The disputed evidence does not support an implied or express agreement
by the Defendants to reimburse expenses paid by Clayson before October 8, 2008.
45.

Both Jeff Randall and Gaylen Clayson admit that on November 4, 2008, they
assigned all their right title and interest in the October 17,2008 PSA to SVC, LLC
whose members were Don Zebe and Rick Lawson. (Exhibit N) Gaylen Clayson
knew he was not a member of SVC, LLC when he signed the assignment.

46.

After the Assignment was signed by Clayson and Randall, Don Zebe and Rick
Lawson sought financing to close the transaction. In the course of doing so they
presented a business plan they prepared. The business plan contained representations
that the plant had been undergoing cosmetic and physical renovations, including
electrical, resurfacing of the floors, plastering of walls, cleaning, removal of old
equipment, maintenance, repairs and painting. They also represented that the
principals of SVC, LLC had paid for the electrical retrofit at a cost of $225,000,
which Don Zebe admitted was a misrepresentation. The business plan also
represented the restaurant was profitable. Both Zebe and Lawson admitted that it was
questionable whether the restaurant was profitaBle, but stated that it had been
represented to them that it was. Zebe and Lawson were eventually able to secure $2
Million in loans.

47.

On January 14, 2009, Don Zebe wrote an email to the realtor and two of Morris
Farinella's representatives seeking $3,000 to pay some ofthe expenses SVC, LLC had
incurred in operating the restaurant before closing. The email was not directed to or
copied to Clayson or Dairy Systems. In that email Don Zebe stated that "we are
prepared to absorb what we have paid in and most of what was done while Gaylen
was in charge, i.e. electrical, plumbing, to the tune of$245k." There is no evidence
to indicate that Gaylen Clayson received this email.

48.

The transaction to purchase the restaurant and plant from Morris Farinella (or his
company) closed on February 24, 2009 for $800,000. Laze, LLC owns the real
property and bUildings. SVC, LLC operates the restaurant.

49.

After closing, Gaylen Clayson approached Rick Lawson in March of 2009 again
requesting that Zebe and Lawson pay some of his bills. Lawson refused. Clayson
claimed SVC, LLC was using meat he had supplied at the restaurant and had not paid
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for it. The following week Lawson and Clayson met at the restaurant and Clayson
retrieved what was left of the meat he supplied. Lawson paid him $3,700 for the meat
which Clayson claimed had been used by the restaurant. Clayson agrees that Rick
Lawson paid him for the meat which had been used in the restaurant.
50.

Don Zebe used the $50,000 payment Clayson made on September 16, 2008, in
negotiations with Dairy Systems over its bill. (Exhibit Wand Exhibit X) The
negotiations were not successful. The Defendants have been sued by Dairy Systems
in Wyoming where Dairy Systems seeks to recover for the labor and materials it put
into the cheese plant.

51 .

Rick Lawson testified that he feels no obligation to reimburse Gaylen Clayson for any
of his expenses, including the $50,000, because SVC, LLC was required to pay over
$78,000 of Clayson's bills after Clayson turned over operation of the restaurant to
SVC, LLC on October 8, 2008.
DISCUSSION OF LAW AND ARGUMENT
The issues to be resolved are as follows: (1) Is there an implied-in-fact contract which

would support the remedy of quantum meruit requiring the Defendants to reimburse any of
the admitted Exhibit F debts claimed by Plaintiff?; and/or (2) Is there an implied-in-Iaw
contract suppOliing an unjust enrichment or restitution recovery in favor of Plaintiff and
against the Defendants? Defendants submit that the answer to both questions is "'No" for the
following reasons.

A.

IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT/QUANTUM MERUIT
Plaintiff s stipulation concerning the Exhibit F expenses is inconsistent with the

concept of an implied-in-fact contract. Plaintiff stipulated that all the expenses documented
in Exhibit F which the Court admitted for purposes of evaluating Clayson's claim were not
approved in advance by Defendants and that his claim is entirely based on agreement by
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Defendants after the fact to reimburse him 1. Dairy Systems was engaged by Clayson before
he even met Zebe and Lawson so there can be no claim that the Defendants approved
incurring the indebtedness before Dairy Systems started its work. "The general rule is that
where the conduct of the parties allows the dual inferences that one perfonned at the other's
request and that the requesting party promised payment, then the court may find a contract
implied in fact." Gray v. Tri-Way Constr. Servs., 147 Idaho 378, 387 (Idaho 2009)2
Plaintiff's stipulation establishes that Clayson did not perfonn at the request of the
Defendants.

Therefore, no "implied-in-fact contract" was created based on the dual

inferences that Clayson perfonned at the Defendant's request and that the Defendant's
promised payment. Even Clayson's September 16,2008 $50,000 check to Dairy Systems
fails this analysis. According to Clayson his payment was not conditioned upon an "inadvance" implied promise by Zebe and Lawson to reimburse him for the check. He paid
Dairy Systems and expected Zebe and Lawson to each fund two other $50,000 checks.
Setting aside the fact that Zebe and Lawson deny Clayson's version of the events, even

IThe stipulation did not cover the $50,000 payment to Dairy Systems.
2While there are earlier Idaho cases which make reference to quantum meruit and/or
implied contracts, the earliest Idaho case explaining the "implied-in-fact contract" theory of
recovery used almost identical language in its explanation: "An implied contract is one, the
existence and terms of which are manifested by the conduct of the parties, with the request of
one party, and peiformance by the other party often being inferred from the circumstances
attending the performance." Clements v. Jungert, 90 Idaho 143, 153 (Idaho 1965) All subsequent
"implied-in-fact contract" decisions suggest that the factual basis requires performance at the
request of the party to be held responsible as the necessary requirement.
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assuming Clayson's version to be accurate, the fact that Zebe and Lawson did not fund the
other two $50,000 checks does not transform these circumstances into an implied promise
to reimburse Clayson.
Before an "after the fact" agreement can provide a basis for Clayson to recover against
the Defendants for an "implied-in-fact" contract, Clayson must carry the burden of proving
that "the conduct of the parties implies an agreement from which an obligation in contract
exists." Continental Forest Prods. v. Chandler Supply Co., 95 Idaho 739, 743 (Idaho 1974)
See also Willnerdv. Sybase, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114544 (D. Idaho Oct. 26, 2010)
(In order to assert breach of an implied-in-fact contract, a plaintiff must demonstrate that
both parties to the contract are aware of the contract's existence) To prevail Clayson has the
burden of proving all the elements of a contract. As explained in GEM Indus. v. Sun Trust
Bank, 700 F. Supp. 2d 915, 922 (N.D. Ohio 20lO):
The existence of an implied-in-fact contract, as with an express
contract, "hinge[ s] upon proof of all the elements of a contract." Stepp v.
Freeman, 119 Ohio App. 3d 68, 74, 694 N.E.2d 5lO (1992). The difference is
that mutual assent to the essential elements of an implied-in-fact contract is
shown not by an express offer and acceptance,_but by the "surrounding
circumstances, including the conduct and declarations of the parties [ .]" Id.
Those circumstances must "make it inferable that the contract exists as a
matter of tacit understanding." Id.
The basic elements of a contract are subject matter, consideration, mutual assent by
all the parties to all the terms, and an agreement that is expressed plainly and explicitly
enough to show what the parties have agreed. State v. Korn, 224 P.3d 480, 482 (Idaho 2009)
Clayson's own testimony proves that there was no plain or explicit understanding about what
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was agreed.

Clayson claims Zebe and Lawson3 agreed to reimburse him approximately

$130,000 for bills he paid.

The bills listed on the first page of Exhibit "F" do not total

anything close to $130,0004 • The bills Clayson could actually substantiate with a check or
credit card is a different amount, i.e. $98,023.98 which includes the $50,000 check to Dairy
Systems. What was the "after the fact" contract? Was it $130,000? Was it $98,023.98?
Was it $48,023.98? Was it $69,600.

Gaylen Clayson himself does not know what the

agreement was. Zebe and Lawson deny the existence of any-such agreement. Zebe' s January
14, 2009 email does not save this claim because it contains a different number, "24Sk",
which Don Zebe testified was a reference to the Dairy Systems bill, not the bills which
Clayson is now seeking to recover under a theory of implied-in-fact contract. While that email may be significant in Dairy System's lawsuit in Wyoming, it does not support an
implied-in-fact agreement between any of the Defendants and Clayson.
Gaylen Clayson has failed to carry his burden of proving an implied-in-fact contract.
The conduct of the parties and the circumstances do not support an inference that a contract
to reimburse Gaylen Clayson exists. Clayson did not prove that he incurred the debts because
Zebe and Lawson encouraged him to or asked him to incur the debts such that an inference
was created that the Defendants intended to reimburse Clayson. Clayson has not proven

3There was a clear failure of proof against Laze, LLC on the implied-in-fact contract.
There was simply no testimony that Zebe and Lawson were acting on behalf of Laze, LLC at any
time when an alleged implied-in-fact contract came into existence.
4The total is $69,600
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what the agreement was. Clayson has not proven that both parties were even aware of the
existence of the implied-in-fact contract. The claim of an implied-in-fact contract is not
supported by the facts and circumstances, is speculative and must fail because Clayson failed
to cany his burden of proving it.

B.

IMPLIED-IN-LA W CONTRACTIUNJUST ENRICHMENT
To prevail, Clayson must present evidence of the amount by which the Defendants

were unjustly enriched, not just the value of the services rendered. Clayson made no attempt
to present and presented no evidence of the amount he claims the Defendants were unjustly
enriched. His implied-in-law/unjust enrichment claim must fail.
In Blaser v. Cameron, the Court of Appeals indicated that a party
seeking recovery under an unjust enrichment theory must present evidence not
only ofthe value ofthe services it rendered, but also "the amount of the benefit
which, if retained by the [defendant], would result in their unjust enrichment."
121 Idaho 1012, 1017,829 P.2d 1361,1366 (Ct. App. 1991). The Court of
Appeals affirmed the district court's finding that the plaintiff fai led to establish
a claim for unjust enrichment because it did not present evidence of the
amount by which the defendant was unjustly enriched. Id.

Barry v. Pac. West Constr., Inc., 140 Idaho 827,834 (Idaho 2004)
The proper measure of recovery on an unjust enrichment claim is not
the actual amount of the enrichment, but the amount of enrichment which, as
between the two parties, it would be unjust for one party to retain. Beco
CansO'. Co., Inc. v. Bannock Paving Co., Inc., 118 Idaho 463,466, 797 P.2d
863,866 (1990)(citingHixon v. Allphin, 76 Idaho 327, 281 P.2d 1042 (1955)).
Blaser had the burden of proving that the Camerons received a benefit and of
proving the amount of the benefit which the Camerons unjustly retained.
Gillette v. Storm Circle Ranch, 101 Idaho 663, 667, 619 P.2d 1116, 1120
(1980); Hartwell Corp. v. Smith, 107 Idaho 134, 139-40,686 P.2d 79,84-5
(Ct.App.1984). Damages need not be proven with mathematical precision, but
the value of any benefit unjustly received must be proven to a reasonable
certainty. Gillette, 101 Idaho at 667, 619 P .2d at 1120.
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B laser presented evidence as to the value ofthe services he performed
for the Camerons. n4 The value of services rendered can be used as evidence
of the value of the benefit bestowed under the theory of unjust enrichment,
Hartwell Corp., 107 Idaho at 141,686 P.2d at 86, but Blaser also had to prove
the amount of the benefit which, if retained by the Camerons, would result in
their unjust enrichment. Mere proof of Blaser's costs was inadequate to
establish the value of any benefit the Camerons may have unjustly retained.
Gillette, 101 Idaho at 667,619 P.2d at 1120.
Blaser v. Cameron, 121 Idaho 1012, 1017 (Idaho Ct. App. 1991)

The district court, however, instructed the jury on the theory of unjust
enrichment. The measure of recovery under this theory is that part of the
benefit bestowed by Smith upon the Corporation which, if retained by the
Corporation, would result in its unjust enrichment. Gillette v. Storm Circle
Ranch, supra. This is to be contrasted with the measure of damages under the
theory of quantum meruit, which is the reasonable value of the services
rendered. There seems to be a continuing confusion of these two theories of
recovery. See e.g., Intel10rm Co. v. Mitchell, 575 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir.1978),
and the dissents in Gillette, supra. Suffice it to say that Interform and the
dissents in Gillette merely point out that the result under both theories is often
the same. The method of measuring damages, on the other hand, is quite
different, as indicated earlier. We see no need, however, to blur the distinction
between the theories and use the terms interchangeably simply because in
some cases it does not change the result. See Peavey v. Pellandini, 97 Idaho
655, 551 P.2d 610 (1976). Such shortcuts cause more harm than good in
leading to the confusion noted among the members of the bar and the jUdiciary.
The fact ofthe matter is that the results are not always the same under the two
methods of measuring damages, as we show later.
This is not to say that there is no overlap between the two theories.
While unjust enrichment is measured in terms of the value ofthe benefit to, in
this case, the Corporation, the value of Smith's services can be used as
evidence of the value of that benefit, as we have shown. D. DOBBS,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.5 at 261 (1973). However,
the jury needs to take this one step further and determine the amount of the
benefit which, if retained by the Corporation, would result in its unjust
enrichment.
Hartwell Corp. v. Smith, 107 Idaho 134, 141 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984)
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Clayson seeks recovery of three different classes of benefit he claims enriched the
property which is owned by Laze, LLC 5 • The three classes of benefits are: (1) Clayson's
own efforts; (2) The Exhibit F(A) - (T) expenses including the True Value Hardware
expenditures; and (3) the$50,OOO payment on the Dairy Systems account.
1.

Clayson's own efforts
Clayson's testimony was that he was present at the cheese factory and restaurant six

days a week from July 1, 2008 until approximately October 10, 2008. He further testified
that his time was worth $15/hour. He made no effort to identifY the total number of hours
he is claiming and has made no effort to break down his time between the restaurant and the
cheese factory improvements. A review of the credit card charges he submitted in support
of his claims for reimbursement show that in the month of August he was somewhere other
than Thayne, Wyoming on August 9, 14, 15, 16, 18,20,21,22,23,25 and 26 6 • It would be
pure speculation to try to determine the number of hours Gaylen Clayson spent perfonning
services which benefitted the property.

While damages need not be proven with

mathematical precision, the value of any benefit unjustly received must be proven to a
reasonable celiainty. Grayv. Tri-WayConstr. Servs., 147 Idaho 378,389 (Idaho 2009)(value

There is a clear failure of proof against Don Zebe or Rick Lawson on the implied-in-Iaw
contract/unjust enrichment claim because Zebe and Lawson do not personally own the property
on which the improvements were made.
5

6Clayson did not submit credit card charges for July or September so a similar
comparison cannot be made in those months.
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of any benefit unjustly received by the defendant in an action based upon unjust enrichment,
must be proven to a reasonable certainty)
Even ifone accepts the proposition that Clayson's services had a value of$15/hour,
it would require pure speculation to determine the number of hours Clayson spent benefitting
the property. Peavey v. Pellandini, 97 Idaho 655, 661 (Idaho 1976) provides some guidance
about the type of proof which is required to support a claim for services:
As noted in 66 AmJur.2d, Restitution and Implied Contracts, § 89 at 1031:
"Generally, in order to be entitled to recover the value of his
services, the plaintiff must prove such value. Thus, evidence of
the value of work or materials is ordinarily essential to a
recovery under the COImnon counts. In an action to recover the
value of services rendered, any competent evidence which
reasonably tends to establish such value is, of course,
admissible. Evidence of what others received for like services
may properly be considered. Proof of the value of services may
also be shown by the opinion of witnesses who are familiar with
the value of such services, including, it is generally held, the
opinion of the person who performed the services."
Clayson offered no evidence of what others received for like services. Clayson
offered no opinion evidence about the value of his services. Although Clayson may have
been able to offer an opinion of the value of his services, he did not and only offered an
opinion about the hourly value of his services without offering testimony about the number
of hours or the overall benefit he provided. In fact, Clayson never kept track of the number
of hours he spent and offered no reasoned estimate. The claim for the value of Clayson's
services and the value unjustly retained by Laze, LLC fails for lack of proof and speculation.
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2.

The Exhibit F(A) - (T) expenses including the True Value Hardware expenditures
Most of the expenses in this category were paid from the checking account Gaylen

Clayson opened at the Bank of Star Valley on approximately July 1,2008, which was funded
primarily with receipts from the restaurant.

(Exhibit F(A) Johnson Plumbing $1,872;

Exhibit F(B) Casey Monson $10,772.41; Exhibit F(F) Golden Ram Painting $2,000; Exhibit
F(I) Joshua Flud $3,917.02; Exhibit F(J) April McMurdo $5,100.06; Exhibit F(K) Mark
Pittman $3,532) According to the owner, Morris Farinella, the money from the operation of
the restaurant was supposed to go into the account to be used to pay the expenses associated
with keeping the restaurant operating. (See Farinella deposition, p. 10, line 1 to page 13, line
9) Instead Clayson used some of these funds to make improvements to the cheese plant and
the restaurant despite having no authorization to do so from the owner, Morris Farinella.
(See Farinella deposition, p. 66, line 19 to page 67, line 2) The consequence of using these
funds for improvements instead of operations was that Clayson ran out of money and turned
the restaurant over to Zebe and Lawson who had to pay operating expenses which Clayson
failed to pay while he was operating the restaurant. (Exhibits 11 and IlA)
Mere proof of payment of these expenses from the restaurant checking account is
inadequate to establish the value of any benefit Laze, LLC may have unjustly retained. As
between Clayson and Laze, LLC why is it unjust for Laze, LLC to retain whatever benefit
these expenses created? SVC, LLC had to pay payroll, payroll taxes, utilities and suppliers
which could have been paid from this account if Clayson had used the account for the
purposes it was created. It was not Clayson's money, it was the restaurant's money.
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No

equity is created by allowing Clayson to benefit personally. Finally, SVC, LLC paid for all
of these improvements when it paid the owner $800,000 to buy the property. The October
17, 2008 PSA provided that the buyer was purchasing the "cheese plant, equipment,
restaurant . .

. with all improvements thereon, easements and other appurtenances and

all fixtures of a pennanent nature currently on the premises except as hereinafter provided,
in their present condition, ordinary wear and tear excepted . . ." Clayson made no attempt
to present and presented no evidence of the amount he claims Laze, LLC was unjustly
enriched. Clayson has failed to can)' his burden of proof.
The expenses which were not paid from the Star Valley restaurant account include
(Exhibit F(D) $644.01 for attending the Idaho Milk Producers Association meeting in Sun
Valley charged to Clayson's Bank of America credit card; Exhibit F(F)

$8,621 for Golden

Ram Painting paid from Clayson's personal checking account; Exhibit F(G) - $379.14 for
Columbia Paint charged on Clayson's personal Bank of America credit card; Exhibit F(P)
- $1,778 in travel expenses for two repainnen from Viking to travel to Thayne Wyoming to
get some equipment running charged on Clayson's personal Bank of America credit card;
Exhibit F(T)

$9,100 to High Sierra for work expanding the restaurant paid by Clayson's

personal check; (Exhibit F(U) for $308.61 to Thayne True Value Hardware charged on
Clayson's personal Bank of America charge card. Mere proof of payment of these expenses
is inadequate to establish the value of any benefit Laze, LLC may have unjustly retained.
SVC, LLC paid for all of these improvements when it paid the owner $800,000 to buy the
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property. It was Morris F m'inella, not Laze, LLC that benefitted from whatever improvement
these expenses caused because the October 17, 2008 PSA provided that the buyer was
purchasing the "cheese plant, equipment, restaurant . . . with all improvements thereon,
easements and other appurtenances and all fixtures of a pennanent nature currently on the
premises except as hereinafter provided, in their present condition, ordinary wear and tear
excepted

. . ." Clayson made no attempt to present and presented no evidence of the

amount he claims Laze, LLC was unjustly enriched by these expenditures. Clayson has
failed to carry his burden of proof.

3.

TheS50,OOO payment on the Daily Systems account
The same arguments presented above apply to this payment. Mere proof of payment

to Dairy Systems is inadequate to establish the value of any benefit Laze, LLC may have
unjustly retained. SVC, LLC paid for any improvements when it paid the owner $800,000
to buy the property. It was Morris Farinella, not Laze, LLC, that benefitted from whatever
improvement these expenses caused because the October 17, 2008 PSA provided that the
buyer was purchasing the "cheese plant, equipment, restaurant

with all

improvements thereon, easements and other appurtenances and all fixtures of a pennanent
nature currently on the premises except as hereinafter provided, in their present condition,
ordinary wear and tear excepted

. . ." Clayson made no attempt to present and presented

no evidence of the amount he claims Laze, LLC was unjustly enriched by paying Dairy
Systems $50,000 for the work it did at the request of Clayson. Great Plains Equip. v.
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Northwest Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho 754, 767 (Idaho 1999) (Unjust enrichment, as a

fictional promise or obligation implied by law, allows recovery where the defendant has
received a benefit from the plaintiff that would be inequitable for the defendant to retain
without compensating the plaintiff for the value of the benefit) Although Zebe attempted
to use Clayson's $50,000 payment to negotiate the Dairy Systems' bill, no agreement was
reached and Defendants realized no benefit from the negotiation. Clayson has failed to carry
his burden of proving the value 0 fthe benefit which it would be inequitable for Laze, LLC
to retain.
PROPOSED CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The conduct of the parties does not permit the dual inference that Clayson performed
at the request of the Defendants and that Defendants promised payment because
Clayson admits that he did not perform at the request of the Defendants.

2.

The conduct of the parties does not imply an agreement from which an obligation in
contract exists. Clayson has the burden of proving all the elements of a contract,
because even in the case of an implied-in-fact contract its existence hinges upon proof
of all the elements. While Clayson claims the Defendants agreed to reimburse him
for $130,000 in expenses he incurred, he did not prove that he incurred $130,000 in
expenses nor did he identifY what specific expenses he claims the Defendants agreed
to reimburse him. The document he claimed identified the expenses the Defendants
agreed to pay only totals $69,600, but the amount Clayson could substantiate was yet
a different amount. The disparity between the amounts is too great to imply an
agreement to pay a reasonably certain amount. Thus, the conduct of Clayson himself
does not imply an agreement by the Defendants to pay a reasonably certain amount.
Clayson failed to carry his burden of proving an implied-in-fact agreement on the part
of the Defendants to reimburse him for expenses he incurred.

3.

Under an unjust enrichment theory Clayson has the burden of presenting evidence not
only of the value of the services he rendered, but also "the amount of the benefit
which, if retained by the [Defendants], would result in their unjust enrichment." In
the case of his own services Clayson failed to prove the value of his services and
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offered no evidence by which to detennine the amount of the benefit
retained by the Defendants, would result in their unjust enrichment.

which~

if

4.

Under an unjust enrichment theory Clayson has the burden ofpresenting evidence not
only of the value of the services or property he paid for~ but also "the amount of the
benefit which~ if retained by the [Defendants]~ would result in their unjust
enrichment." In the case of the Exhibit F expenses which were paid from the Bank
of Star Valley restaurant account the Defendants were not unjustly enriched at the
expense of Clayson because the services and property were paid from the restaurant
account and because the Defendants paid other restaurant expenses which would have
been paid from the restaurant account if Clayson had not diverted the funds in the
restaurant account to pay for cheese plant improvements. Clayson offered no
evidence by which to detennine the amount of the benefit which, if retained by the
Defendants, would result in their unjust enrichment. Clayson failed to carry his
burden of proof.

5.

Under an unjust enrichment theory Clayson has the burden ofpresenting evidence not
only of the value of the services or property he paid for, but also "the amount of the
benefit which, if retained by the [Defendants], would result in their unjust
enrichment." In the case of the Exhibit F expenses which were paid from Clayson's
personal checking account or his personal credit card mere proof of payment is
insufficient to establish the value of any benefit Defendants may have unjustly
retained. Clayson offered no evidence by which to determine the amount of the
benefit which, if retained by the Defendants, would result in their unjust enrichment.
In any event Defendants paid for any improvements when SVC~ LLC purchased the
property in its "then condition" after the improvements were made for $800,000.
Clayson failed to prove Defendants were unjustly enriched by the Exhibit F expenses
which were paid from Clayson's personal checking account or his personal credit
card.

6.

Under an unjust enrichmenttheory Clayson has the burden of presenting evidence not
only of the value of the services or property he paid for, but also "the amount of the
benefit which, if retained by the [Defendants], would result in their unjust
enrichment." In the case of Clayson's $50,000 payment to Dairy Systems, the Dairy
Systems work was perfonned while Morris Farinella (or his company) owned the
property, not Clayson and not the Defendants. Defendants paid for any improvements
when SVC, LLC purchased the property in its "then condition" after the
improvements were made for $800,000. Although Zebe attempted to negotiate the
Dairy Systems bill using the $50,000 Clayson paid he was not successful and
Defendants did not benefit from the negotiation. Clayson failed to prove Defendants
were unjustly enriched by Clayson's $50,000 payment to Dairy Systems.
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CONCLUSION
Gaylen Clayson decided before he met Don Zebe and Rick Lawson that he wanted to
purchase and operate the Star Valley Cheese plant and restaurant. He knew the cheese plant
had to be operational by the fall of2008 or he could not participate and he testified that this
is what he told rVlorris Farinella. As fall approached the plant was not operational and
Clayson was running short on funds. He turned over the operation of the restaurant to Don
Zebe and Rick Lawson. He assigned any interest he had in the PSA to SVC, LLC. His
mistake was that he invested some of his own funds into fixing up the cheese plant before
he had a clear understanding or agreement with the owner, Morris Farinella, or with the
Defendants who eventually purchased the property from Farinella.
Gaylen Clayson took a risk. Because of his prior relationship with Morris Farinella
and the lack of any agreement with him, he did not pursue recovery of his unwise investment
from Farinella. Because of his prior relationship with Dairy Systems he advanced money for
work he had requested before he had any authority to do so. With no legal basis to recover
this unwise investment, Clayson is left to seek some recov~ry through the equitable remedies
of implied-in-fact contract and implied-in-law contract. Clayson's record keeping and his
recollection of events is spotty and inconsistent. Clayson admits he never performed any
work and never paid for any services or materials at the request of the Defendants. He is
unable to verifY or quantifY the time he allegedly spent improving the cheese plant. His
records of expenditures do not match his claim and his memory of events do not match that
of the Defendants in many critical respects. More significantly, his memory does not match
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that of the non-part witness, leffRandall, in many critical respects. This inconsistent and
contradictory evidentiary record makes it clear that no implied contract can be concocted
because to do so would involve pure speculation. Clayson failed to prove an implied-in-fact
contract.
Gaylen Clayson has the burden ofproving unjust enrichment. Clayson used restaurant
money that should have been used to operate the restaurant to make improvements resulting
in the Defendants paying many of Clayson 's restaurant expenses that went unpaid due to lack
of funds. Most of his evidence was devoted to trying to establish how unfairly Clayson had
been treated and little of his evidence was devoted to how much he paid for the
improvements he claimed he made. Again what he paid for and what he received for what
he paid is largely left to speculation. None of his evidence answered the critical question
about the extent, if any, to which his efforts and expenditures actually enriched the
Defendants who bought the property "as is" with all the improvements for $800,000 from the
owner. If Clayson is to be believed, he is the one that negotiated the price of$800,000 so he
can hardly complain now that $800,000 was not fair value. Because the Defendants bought
the property after the improvements were made it is illogical to now claim the Defendants
were unjustly enriched by Clayson's efforts. Clayson failed to prove the Defendants were
unjustly enriched.
Defendants request this Court to deny Clayson's claims for implied-in-fact and
implied-in-Iaw contracts, enter judgment in favor of the Defendants dismissing Clayson's
claims with prejudice and award costs and attorney fees in favor of the Defendants.
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Plaintiff submits this Post-Trial Brief with the attached proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and a proposed Judgment pursuant to the direction of the Court at the end of
trial. Plaintiff has not attempted to reproduce here the analysis set out in the proposed Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law themselves, but only matters that may not be necessary to
decision, but which may be helpful to the Court as he analyzes the evidence introduced at the
trial.
To the extent practicable, Plaintiff has attempted to organize the information by
paragraph numbers corresponding to the paragraph numbers in the Findings of Fact.

Paragraph 7.
There is no dispute that Mr. Farinella told the Plaintiff to do whatever he wanted to get
the Cheese Plant ready to open and make cheese as soon as the escrow closes, as long as it didn't
cost Mr. Farinella or the bankruptcy court anything. Mr. Clayson testified that was his
understanding.

Mr. Farinella, although a bit confused as to the timing of events essentially

agreed. Farinella deposition at 40,42. 1 Defendants may try to argue that there is an issue of fact
about when that authorization came about. But logically there is not. Mr. Clayson testified that
Mr. Farinella gave him that authorization when he moved into the Cheese Plant in July 2008.
Mr. Farinella testified that it came in conjunction with Mr. Clayson's having made an offer to
I Defendants may try to argue that Mr. Farinella admitted in his deposition that there were no oral agreements
relating to the Cheese Plant. However, that is not how he testified. After Mr. Farinella had set out this agreement he
had with Gaylen that he could do whatever he wanted so long as it did not cost Mr. Farinella any money, then Mr.
Bowers, who was conducting the deposition, prefaced the "no oral agreements questions" with "except for what you
explained to me, how's that?" Farinella deposition at 43. Mr. Farinella made it clear that there were no other
agreements "other than what I told you what he did." Farinella deposition at 35. Referring to the fact that GayJen
was living at the plant while he operated the restaurant to get the plant ready to reopen upon close of escrow.
Farinella deposition at 42.
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buy the Cheese Plant, Farinella deposition at 60-61, but he also connected the timing of that
authorization with Mr. Clayson taking over the running of the restaurant.
Gaylen offered to run the restaurant after he made the offer to-was accepted.
After he bought the-he made the offer to buy the plant at the time. So with that
in mind, I figured he can be trusted to run the restaurant. That's the way that
happened. Just to run it to keep it open.
Q. Because you assumed that at some point he would be able to buy the whole
thing?
A. It was already in process of him buying it through the bankruptcy court.
Q. Okay.
Farinella deposition at 14.
We know that Gaylen began running the restaurant on July 1,2008, so the understanding
to which Gaylen testified, that Morris Farinella told him "the Cheese Plant is yours," to go ahead
and get the plant operational and he would work out the title problems and authorization to do
whatever you want to get the Cheese Plant operational by the time of closing, must have been
given in the July time frame as testified by Mr. Clayson. Moreover, it would not make any sense
to argue that the authorization came after the October 17, 2008, formal offer because by that time
Gaylen was no longer running the restaurant and Defendants had taken control of the Cheese
Plant. Mr. Zebe testified that it would be illogical for a person to do all the work that Mr.
Clayson was doing unless he had the assurance he would someday own the property.
indeed, it would be.

And

Mr. Farinella must have assured Mr. Clayson that he would own the plant

and given the authorization to "do what you want to get the Plant ready to operate upon the
closing," at the time of the oral agreement in late June or early July.

3
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Paragraph 8.
While there is some slight dispute in the record over the facts set out in paragraph 8,
paragraph 8 is the most logical interpretation of the disputed facts. While Mr. Farinella testified
in his deposition that Gaylen did not have the authority to apply the proceeds of the restaurant to
his personal account, and that he was running the restaurant as a favor to the bankruptcy court,
that testimony can be discounted because there has never been any request by the bankruptcy
court, Mr. Farinella, or anyone else for an accounting, even though Mr. Zebe attempted to
foment a call for such an accounting in his email dated January 14,2009. Exhibit S. Moreover,
Mr. Clayson's actions are not those of a mere manager who was not entitled to the fruit of his
labors. Defendants complained about Mr. Clayson incurring about $18,000 in debt to move a
wall in the restaurant just before turning over the operations of the restaurant to the Defendants.
Not the work of an hireling. In any event, Mr. Farinella testified that he authorized Mr. Clayson
to do whatever he wanted to get the Cheese Plant ready to reopen upon close of escrow, as long
as it didn't cost Mr. Farinella or the bankruptcy court any money. Farinella deposition at 40.
Given this record, Mr. Clayson had the right to use the money in the Star Valley Cheese account
to pay himself or to refurbish the Cheese Plant, and any argument that he had a duty to account
to Mr. Farinella or to the bankruptcy court for that money is irrelevant to Defendant's duty to
reimburse him for the expenditure of that money to refurbish the Cheese Plant. 2

Any duty Mr. Clayson might have to account to Mr. Farinella or the Bankruptcy Court in addition to being
irrelevant between these parties is as least as remote as Mr. Clayson's duty to pay Dairy Systems for their remaining
unpaid debt in the event the Defendants do not pay it.

2
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Paragraph 9.
The facts set out in this paragraph are undisputed. Each witness who testified on the
issue observed the fact that Gay len Clayson was so dedicated to the reopening of the Cheese
Plant that he lived and worked full time on site. The significance of these facts is not only in the
facts themselves, but in the logical inferences that should be drawn from them.

Mr. Zebe

testified that it would be illogical for a person to. do all the work that Mr. Clayson was doing
unless he had the assurance he would someday own the property. Mr. Zebe is correct in that
observation. That observation makes illogical defendants assumption, based on no evidence, that
Me Clayson was anxious to avoid having to close the purchase for $800,000 and that is the
reason he assigned his rights to the defendants. The logical inference to draw is that Mr. Clayson
was doing the work because Me Farinella, whom he had known for years, with whom he had
done business in the past, and who had financed his associated business ventures would keep his
promise that "the plant is yours", especially when he and his son Joe looked to profit from the
brokering of the cheese from the plant.

At it turns out that reliance was justified as was

demonstrated when Me Farinella accepted the offer and closed on the agreement with parties
whom he had been told were Mr. Clayson's partners.

Paragraphs 16 through 19.
Defendants try to downplay the significance of Gaylen Clayson's role in helping them
obtain the right to buy the Cheese Plant, but there is little doubt in the record that Gaylen played
a significant role in securing the right to buy the plant. Defendants try to argue that Gaylen was
out of the picture when he and Mr. Randall went to Wyoming to make the offer on the Plant.
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But the Court will recall that when Mr. Randall decided to make that offer he called Gaylen
Clayson, not Don Zebe, to announce his intention because at that time the four of them were
going to put together a deal "to buy the plant, refurbish it, and reopen it together." And while
both he and Mr. Clayson were looking to Don and Rick to bring the money to the table to put the
financing together, it would not be the first time that the people with the brains needed someone
with the financial muscle to put together their dream.
Mr. Farinella also testified to the importance of Mr. Clayson's involvement in the mix.
He testified that there had been other offers on the plant but that they had decided to go with Mr.
Clayson because he was a local and had the milk supply.

Farinella deposition at 14-15.

Farinella further testified that that he did not care that Don Zebe was paying the money because
he had been introduced to Don Zebe as Gaylen's partner. Farinella Depositon at 35,57.
Paragraphs 26 through 28.
At first it appeared that Mr. Zebe and Mr. Lawson contradicted one another about their
promise to pay Gaylen for his out of pocket expenses and the debts he incurred to contractors
working on the plant.

Mr. Zebe stipulated and stipulated that they would pay what was

documented and what they could use, and, with regard to the Dairy Systems debt, represented
that they had paid it, Exhibit I at p. 6, and specifically and repeatedly stated and indicated they
would pay upon closing. Exhibit S, Exhibit V.
Mr. Lawson, on the other hand, stated categorically that there was no agreement to pay
any of Mr. Claysons bills.

Mr. Zebe cleared up the confusion when he testified that the

discussion referred to by Mr. Lawson related solely to the restaurant debts. Mr. Randall, who
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"sang to himself' so as not to know what was going on during that discussion apparently did not
catch that the "heated discussion" related only to the restaurant debt and not the refurbishment
debt the Defendants had stipulated and stipulated they would pay upon the closing.
Thus, at most, even if Defendants' version of the facts were believed, they have proven
only a compromise between Clayson and themselves with regard to the restaurant debt. Having
thus compromised the restaurant debt for the restaurant bills they paid, it would not be equitable
to allow them to double dip and claim an offset against Mr. Clayson's out of pocket
refurbishment expenses or the $50,000 he paid to Dairy Systems.
Defendants may try to argue that any obligation they have to pay Gaylen Clayson for his
out of pocket expenses or for the $50,000 he paid to Dairy Systems is offset by the many
thousands of dollars they paid "on Gaylen's behalf' when they took over operations of the
restaurant. Defendants failed to establish any right to setoff. First, there was a complete lack of
evidence whether the restaurant bills being disputed had been incurred by Mr. Clayson during his
three month management of the restaurant or had been incurred during the occupancy of Mr.
Farinella's other managers.

Mr. Lawson's statement that he and Mr. Zebe expected to be

reimbursed those costs upon the closing, suggests that the bills originated with Mr. Farinella
before Mr. Clayson's appearance on the scene.
Another difficulty in trying to calculate any offset is the failure by Defendants to
document the value of the inventory they received from Mr. Clayson. Mr. Lawson testified that
when they took over the restaurant, they not only inherited the bills, but they also inherited a
substantial inventory.

When asked whether they had kept a record of the inventory or had
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attempted to value the inventory, Mr. Lawson candidly answered "no."

If they inherited

$100,000 worth of inventory but paid only $70,000 for it, then Defendants owe Plaintiff on
account of the restaurant in addition to what they owe for refurbishment of the Cheese Plant.
Without putting a value on the inventory, it is not fair for Defendants to ask for credit for paying
the bills of the restaurant. For example, $36,335.74 of the bills Defendants claim to have paid
was for propane in a 10,000 gallon tank that was still there and full when they took over the
restaurant. Similarly $7,797.00 was paid to Sysco Foods, the supplier of the ice cream served in
cones at the restaurant. Defendants surely do not expect to be paid for the propane they used, or
the ice cream they served. Without an inventory, there is no way to determine if Defendants are
entitled to any setoff.
Finally, Defendants testified that they paid the restaurant debts, not because of any
agreement with Mr. Clayson, but because they needed those suppliers in order to continue to
operate the restaurant. the law does not allow a party who, without legal obligation to do so,
voluntarily pays a debt to seek to recover the debt from the originally debtor. It is well settled
that a person cannot-by way of set-off, counterclaim or direct action-recover money which he or
she has voluntarily paid with full knowledge of all the facts but with no obligation to make such
payment. Chinchurreta v. Evergreen Management, Inc., 790 P.2d 372, 374 (Idaho Ct. App.
1989).

Credibility of Witnesses
While many of the facts are not in serious dispute, and even fewer of the disputes make
any logical sense, there are a few facts that are in dispute and for which the Court may need to
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judge the credibility of witnesses. In that regard, when judging the credibility of the Defendants
the Court might note that Defendants were willing to misrepresent to the banks that they had paid
Dairy Systems for 90 percent of the electrical retrofit in the amount of $225,000. Since this is
one of the very debts at issue in this case, a court of justice might well choose not to believe
testimony of the Defendants tending to negate their duty to reimburse Plaintiff for that portion of
the debt they claimed to have paid and that he actually paid.
Jeff Randall's testimony, for the most part, corroborates the position of the Plaintiff that
he continued to be involved with the group in their attempt to purchase, refurbish, and reopen the
Cheese Plant even after his name was removed from the LLC documents on October 8, 2008.
His attempts to minimize the importance of Mr. Clayson's role in purchasing the Cheese
Plant came about because of defendant's attempts to influence his testimony.

Defendants,

particularly Mr. Zebe, with whom Mr. Randall felt some particular kinship because of their
shared tragedies, got to Mr. Randall, told him he had "thrown them under the bus" with his
statement that he and Clayson "sold" them the plant in November 2008, and obviously
influenced his testimony on that issue. The reality is that Clayson and Randall did "sell" the
plant to Defendants in November 2008. Just as the contract purchaser of a home is the owner of
the home, Walker v. Nunnenkamp, 84 Id. 485, 373 P. 2d 559 (1962), so Clayson and Randall
were the owners of the Cheese Plant under their contract to purchase dated October 17, 2008.
Their November assignment of that contract to Defendants was a "sale" of the Cheese Plant.
The purchase price was Defendants' agreement to give Mr. Randall the work shipping the milk
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and the purchase price to Clayson was the promise to reimburse his out of pocket expenses, take
his milk, and assume the debts he had incurred. Exhibit CC
Dated this 24th day of November, 2010.

ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.C.

Blake S. Atkin
Attorney for the Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
BANNOCK COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO
GA YLEN CLAYSON,
Plaintiff,

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

v.

DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, and LAZE,
LLC.

Case No: CV-2009-02212-0C

Defendants,

Judge: Stephen S. Dunn

DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, and LAZE,
LLC,

Counterclaim Plaintiffs,
v.

GA YLEN CLA YSON,
Counterclaim Defendant.

FINDINGS OF FACT
I.

The Plaintiff Gaylen Clayson has known Morris Farinella, the former owner of

the Star Valley Cheese Plant ("Cheese Plant") for many years.
2.

Mr. Clayson supplied milk to the Cheese Plant over the years while it was being

run by Mr. Farinella. He helped Mr. Farinella recruit other dairy farmers to supply milk to the
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Cheese Plant and, at one point, Mr. Farinella loaned him money to purchase and operate a dairy
in Wyoming that supplied milk to the Cheese Plant.
3.

The Cheese Plant has not been able to remain profitable over recent years in part

because of emerging environmental concerns over the disposal of whey, a byproduct of cheese
production. The expense of whey disposal has resulted in recent years in the bankruptcy of
several cheese plants in the area, including the plant in Blackfoot, Idaho, and resulted in a second
bankruptcy of the Star Valley Cheese Plant in about 2005.
4.

In 2007, Mr. Clayson was contacted by Morris Farinella who wanted him to

reopen the Cheese Plant. Mr. Farinella knew that Mr. Clayson had the ability to supply the milk,
Mr. Farinella and his son Joe Farinella assured Plaintiff they could market the cheese, and Mr.
Farinella assured Mr. Clayson that he could clear up the title to the property so that Mr. Clayson
could purchase the Cheese Plant.
5.

At the time of this contact, Mr. Clayson was in southern California on a mission

and informed Mr. Farinella that he would not be back until the next summer. Mr. Farinella
indicated that would give him time to work out the title problems with the Cheese Plant.
6.

Mr. Clayson was interested in reopening the Cheese Plant because he had a

business plan to ship the whey back to the farmer who supplied the milk. The farmer could use
the whey in feeding his cattle, and the value of the whey would offset the cost of shipping. In
this fashion, both the environmental hazard connected with the whey and the cost of shipping
milk to the remote location of the Cheese Plant could be offset.
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7.

In late June 2008, Mr. Clayson met Mr. Farinella at the Cheese Plant. At that

meeting, Mr. Farinella promised Mr. Clayson that "the Cheese Plant is yours," that he should do
whatever was necessary to get the Cheese Plant ready to reopen, and that Mr. Farinella would
work things out so that he could buy the Cheese Plant. He even offered to finance the purchase
of the Cheese Plant by Mr. Clayson.
8.

During that meeting, it was also agreed that Mr. Clayson would take over the

operations of the restaurant located on the premises. Mr. Farinella told him that he had to "cash
flow" the restaurant and that it was his operation and he should run it as his own.
9.

On July 1, 2008, Mr. Clayson physically moved into the Cheese Plant. He lived

on site, managed the restaurant, and worked and supervised the work of others whom he hired to
help him refurbish the Cheese Plant and make it ready for reopening. He also interfaced with
potential lenders, notably the United States Department of Agriculture, and other people in the
milk industry who would be instrumental in the successful operation of a cheese plant in
Wyoming. Mr. Clayson spent 10 to 12 hours a day, 6 days a week from July 1,2008, through
October 8, 2008, hiring and supervising workers on the Cheese Plant, working on cleaning and
refurbishing the Cheese Plant, resurfacing the floors, plastering and painting walls, cleaning out
unnecessary and scrap equipment, and cleaning and painting the plant, lining up contacts to
supply milk to the Cheese Plant and to take excess milk when needed, discussing financing with
the United States Department of Agriculture, giving tours of the Cheese Plant to interested
parties and working toward reopening the Cheese Plant.
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10.

In mid-August 2008, Mr. Clayson hired Dairy Systems Company, Inc. ("Dairy

Systems"), a company with whom he had dealt for over 20 years, to upgrade the electrical work
at the Cheese Plant.
11.

Over the years, as Dairy Systems has performed work for Mr. Clayson they have

billed him monthly. Mr. Clayson would review the bills and if he had concerns or questions he
and Dairy Systems would discuss the bill and either he would be convinced that the charges were
appropriate or the bill would be modified. He expected to be billed by Dairy Systems in the
same manner for the work they performed on the Cheese Plant.
12.

In early September 2008, Mr. Clayson received a bill from Dairy Systems for the

work they had performed in August. Mr. Clayson had been onsite watching the work being
performed by Dairy Systems during the month of August. Upon receiving the bill, Mr. Clayson
reviewed that bill and had no concerns and voiced no objections to the Dairy Systems billings.
13.

In early October 2008, Mr. Clayson received the bill for the work done in

September. Again, Mr. Clayson had been on site watching the work being performed by Dairy
Systems during the month of September.

Upon a review of the bill, Mr. Clayson had no

concerns about the September billing and voiced no objections. On September 16, 2008 he paid
Dairy Systems $50,000 toward their bill. I

I At about the same time Mr. Clayson delivered two additional $50,000 checks to Dairy Systems to be applied
toward the bill and to purchase a MCC, a large ticket item that needed to be ordered several weeks in advance of
when it would be needed. Mr. Clayson told Dairy Systems that the two additional $50,000 checks would be funded
by Mr. Lawson and Mr. Zebe. The checks were never funded.
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14.

On October 2, 2008, Mr. Clayson, Mr. Zebe and Mr. Lawson formed a limited

liability company, SVC, LLC, to purchase, refurbish and operate the Cheese Plant. That LLC is
the entity that operates the Cheese Plant for Mr. Zebe and Mr. Lawson to this day. On that same
day, Mssrs. Lawson and Zebe had their names added as members of an LLC in Idaho known as
Milk Marketing Management, LLC.

Before their joining the company, Milk Marketing

Management, LLC, had been owned by Gaylen Clayson and Jeff Randall. After entry of Mr.
Lawson and Mr. Zebe into the company, the parties planned to use Milk Marketing
Management, LLC, to secure the milk supply for the Cheese Plant.
15.

Mr. Zebe does not lightly enter into business with others, and did not enter into

this business relationship with Mr. Clayson without first thoroughly checking out the cheese
industry and Mr. Clayson. Logically then, even though the paperwork for SVC, LLC and Milk
Market Management, LLC, was not filed until October 2, 2008, the agreement of the parties to,
as Mr. Randall put it, work together to purchase, refurbish and reopen the Cheese Plant, occurred
sometime before October 2, 2008.
16.

On October 8,2008, Mr. Clayson's name was voluntarily removed from the SVC,

LLC, records, but Mr. Clayson remained involved as is evidenced by the fact that when it came
time to make an offer on the Cheese Plant, Mr. Randall talked first to Mr. Clayson, and only
called Mr. Zebe on the phone as he and Mr. Clayson were on the way to Wyoming to make the
offer.
17.

On October 17, 2008, Mr. Clayson and Jeff Randall went to Wyoming to the

home of the broker, Val Pendleton, and made an offer to purchase the Cheese Plant for $800,000.
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On their way to Wyoming to make that offer they called Don Zebe to tell him what they were
doing and he agreed that it was a good move.
18.

True to the promise he had made to Gaylen Clayson in July that "the Cheese Plant

is yours," and that he would work out the paperwork so Mr. Clayson could buy it, Mr. Farinella
accepted the offer.
19.

On November 4, 2008, Gaylen Clayson and Jeff Randall assigned the contract to

purchase the Cheese Plant to Don Zebe and Rick Lawson and the company of which they were
the principles, SVC, LLC.

Mr. Zebe and Mr. Lawson borrowed $2 million from Citizens

Community Bank of Idaho, backed by the United States Department of Agriculture to purchase
and operate the Cheese Plant. They closed the purchase on February 24, 2009, once they had
obtained that funding.
20.

In addition to being supplied to Mr. Clayson, the Dairy Systems bills were

delivered to Mr. Zcbe and Mr. Lawson. Neither voiced any

o~jection

to the bills until after they

had obtained their financing from Citizens Community Bank on February 24, 2009.
21.

During the several months that they had the Dairy Systems bills in hand, Mr. Zebe

and Mr. Lawson had complete control and access to the Cheese Plant. They employed experts,
Bill Sulzer of Statco, and J.P. Electric, to examine the Dairy Systems work to determine what
needed to be done to complete the electric retrofit. Following the review by Defendants' own
experts, Mr. Zebe and Mr. Lawson kept the design originated by Dairy Systems and even put
their new Motor Control Cent.er ("MCC") in the same location as designed by Dairy Systems.
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They also kept, and are using to this day, transformers, breaker panels, and wire pulled by Dairy
Systems.
22.

During discussions with Klark Gailey of Dairy Systems related to a threat by the

supplier of the MCC to put a lien on the Cheese Plant, Mr. Zebe did not voice any objection to
the Dairy Systems bills.
23.

On February 19, 2009, Mr. Zebe wrote an email to Klark Gailey telling him that

the funding was in the bank and inviting him to confirm that fact with the broker, Val Pendleton.
Exhibit V. Mr. Zebe admitted sending this email, but offered no explanation. Without some
explanation, this email, which does not voice any objection to the Dairy Systems bills he had
then had for at least four months, can only be interpreted as a communication to a creditor that
the funding is in and he is soon to be paid.
24.

Mr. Zebe and Mr. Lawson represented to lenders from whom they were

successful in borrowing $2 million, that they had paid $225,000 to Dairy Systems. Exhibit I at 6.
They also told Morris Farinella that upon closing they were prepared to absorb most of the debts
incurred by Gaylen Clayson, including specifically the $245K owed to Dairy Systems. Exhibit
S.

25.

After the funding had been obtained and liens on the property could no longer

interfere with financing, Mr. Zebe wrote an email to Klark Gailey in which he acknowledged
that even from his point of view, Dairy Systems was owed more than the $50,000 that Gaylen
Clayson had paid them. Mr. Zebe, however, insisted that he would deduct from amounts owed
to Dairy Systems the $50,000 that Gaylen Clayson had paid. Exhibits Wand X.
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26.

That Defendants agreed to pay at least some of Mr. Clayson's costs incurred in

refurbishing the Cheese Plant cannot be doubted.
27.

Mr. Zebe testified that he had stipulated and stipulated that they would pay any

expenses incurred by Mr. Clayson that were supported by cancelled checks or invoices and with
the additional stipulation that they be for things that the Defendants could use.
28.

Defendants offered no evidence that any expenses incurred by Mr. Clayson were

for things that Defendants could not use. What evidence is in the record indicates that most, if
not all, of Mr. Clayson's efforts were useful to the DefendanJs. In the Business Plan that Mr.
Zebe prepared, Exhibit I at 6, he lists for the banks, the work that had been done to that point in
getting the Cheese Plant ready to reopen. That list included cosmetic and physical renovations,
an electrical retrofit of the plant, resurfacing floors, plastering of walls, cleaning, removal of old
equipment, maintenance, repairs and painting. If the work done was significant enough to merit
a mention to the lenders, it can hardly be argued that it somehow could not be used by
Defendants.
29.

The amount of Mr. Clayson's out of pocket expenses was difficult to ascertain

and consumed more than its share of trial time to sort out. Mr. Clayson prepared a hand written
summary of his expenses that was introduced at the trial as the first page of Exhibit F. That
handwritten summary, which was delivered to defendants at the time they were discussing Mr.
Clayson's withdrawal from the business, was prepared by Mr. Clayson at the Star Valley Cheese
Plant offices from invoices that were kept in the ordinary course of business of the Cheese Plant
by April McMurdo, the company's secretary. Mr. Clayson turned the office and all its contents,
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including the file containing those invoices, over to the Defendants when he left in October
2008. Defendants did not produce that file or any documents relating to the cost of refurbishing
the Cheese Plant.
30.

While Mr. Clayson's legal team tried to support the amounts set out in Exhibit F's

first page with cancelled checks and credit card receipts currently in Plaintiff's possession, it
became clear as foundation was being laid for those documents that only some of them actually
supported the claim.
31.

Adding all the expenses listed in the first page of Exhibit F supported by

admissible evidence produced at trial, the total comes to $47,715.62.
32.

But the evidence also showed that the first page of Exhibit F was delivered by the

Mr. Clayson to the Defendants during the discussions in which the Defendants agreed to pay his
out of pocket expenses in refurbishing the Cheese Plant. That fact, coupled with the failure by
Defendants to produce the supporting documents which they now control, supports a finding that
all the expenses detailed in the first page of Exhibit F should be paid by Defendants to Mr.
Clayson. The total Exhibit F charges is $74,108.00.
33.

Mr. Clayson lived and worked at the Cheese Plant from July I, 2008, through

October 8, 2008. He worked 10 to 12 hours per day, 6 days per week. He testified that he would
not do such work for less than $100,000 but valued his services at $15 per hour.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

I.

In its ruling on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, this Court ruled that

the express terms of the assignment of rights by Mr. Clayson to Defendants precluded him from
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proving that he had benefitted Defendants beyond the value of the Cheese Plant reflected in that
document, namely the $800,000 purchase price that the Defendants assumed and paid. The
Court determined, however, that:
Conflicting evidence in this case demonstrates that the Assignment of Rights
Contract could have possibly been part of a larger agreement, or that there were
other, separate agreements between the parties, thus not precluding the claims of
an implied-in-fact andlor implied-in-Iaw contract.
This trial was held to determine those issues.
2.

The Idaho Supreme Court has stated:

"An implied in fact contract is defined as one where the terms and existence of
the contract are manifested by the conduct of the parties with the request of one
party and the performance by the other often being inferred from the
circumstances attending the performance." Farnworth v. Femling, 125 Idaho 283,
287,869 P.2d 1378, 1382 (1994) (citing Clements v. Jungert, 90 Idaho 143, 153,
408 P.2d 810, 815 (1965)). The implied-in-fact contract is grounded in the parties'
agreement and tacit understanding. Kennedy v. Forest, 129 Idaho 584, 587, 930
P.2d 1026, 1029 (1997). "The general rule is that where the conduct of the parties
allows the dual inferences that one performed at the other's request and that the
requesting party promised payment, then the court may find a contract implied in
fact." Homes by Bell-Hi, Inc. v. Wood, 110 Idaho 319, 321, 715 P.2d 989, 991
(1986) (citing Clements v. Jungert, 90 Idaho 143, 153,408 P.2d 810, 815 (1965);
Bastian v. Gafford, 98 Idaho 324,325,563 P.2d 48,49 (1977».
Fox v. Mountain West BIee., Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 708, 52 P.3d 848, 853 (2002)
3.

Furthermore, the Idaho Supreme Court has declared that:

The doctrine of quantum meruit is a remedy for an implied-in-fact contract and
permits a party to recover the reasonable value of services rendered or material
provided on the basis of an implied promise to pay. See Cheung v. Pena, 143
Idaho 30,35,137 P.3d 417, 422 (2006).
Gray v. Tri-Way Const. Services, Inc., 147 Idaho 378, 387, 210 P.3d 63,72 (2009)
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4.

As to contracts implied-in-Law and unjust enrichment, the Idaho Supreme Court

has stated:
Unjust enrichment, or restitution, is the measure of recovery under a contract
implied in law. Barry v. Pacific West Const., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 834, 103 P.3d
440, 447 (2004). "A contract implied in law ... 'is not a contract at all, but an
obligation imposed by law for the purpose of bringing about justice and equity
without reference to the intent of the agreement of the parties ... .' " Id. The
measure of recovery on an unjust enrichment claim "is not the actual amount of
the enrichment, but the amount of enrichment which, as between two parties it
would be unjust for one party to retain." Beco Constr. Co., Inc. v. Bannock Paving
Co., Inc., 118 Idaho 463, 466, 797 P.2d 863, 866 (1990). The plaintiff has the
burden of proving that the defendant received a benefit and of proving the amount
of the benefit which the defendants unjustly retained. Blaser v. Cameron, 121
Idaho 10 12, 10 17, 829 P.2d 1361, 1366 (Ct.App.1992). "The value of services
rendered can be used as evidence of the value of the benefit bestowed under the
theory of unjust enrichment." /d. "Although damages need not be proven with
mathematical precision, the damages, i.e., the value of any benefit unjustly
received by the defendant in an action based upon unjust enrichment, must be
proven to a reasonable certainty." Gillette v. Storm Circle Ranch, 101 Idaho 663,
667,619 P.2d 1116, 1120 (1980).
Gray v. Tri-Way Const. Services, Inc., 147 Idaho 378, 388-389,210 P.3d 63, 73 - 74 (2009)
5.

The circumstances of this case and the conduct of the Defendants and the Plaintiff

establishes the dual inferences that Plaintiff relinquished his interest in the Plant and the business
that would run the plant based upon the promises of the Defendants to pay the value of his
efforts, reimbursement of his out of pocket expenses, and the $50,000 that he paid to Dairy
Systems.
6.

Plaintiff relinquished his interest in the Cheese Plant after he had spent three

months of his life, over $100,000.00 dollars, and his political capital with Mr. Farinella, the
United States Department of Agriculture, Dairy Systems, a trusted supplier, and others preparing
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the Cheese Plant to be reopened. Defendants' arguments that he agreed to do so without any
expectation of compensation for his efforts or reimbursement for the substantial money he paid
simply is not credible.
7.

Indeed, even Defendants themselves do not believe so absurd a proposition. Mr.

Zebe stipulated and stipulated that they would pay Mr. Clayson his costs of refurbishment if they
were "supported by cancelled checks or invoices" and if "they could use the work." Similarly,
he testified that they would have paid the Dairy Systems bill if they could use the work.
8.

Defendants' supposition that the Plaintiff might have been willing to walk away

from his investment in this project because he was afraid he could not come up with the
$800,000 and might be liable to pay it by December 2008, had Defendants not rescued him is
also wholly without support.
9.

There was no evidence, other than the fact that Mr. Clayson did not have the

$800,000 in his pocket to pay the purchase price, to suggest that fear of that payment was his
motivation to give up this opportunity.
10.

To the contrary, the evidence was that Mr. Farinella, who had in the past financed

Mr. Clayson's businesses connected to this Cheese Plant, and who, with his son Joe, planned to
profit from the brokering of the cheese, offered to finance the purchase for Mr. Clayson.
Moreover, Mr. Clayson had had discussions with the United States Department of Agriculture
who advised him that a lot of people would like to see that plant reopened and he would have no
trouble getting help with the financing.
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1I .

Defendants did not pay the purchase price out of their own pocket. They paid the

$800,000 purchase price with money borrowed from Citizens Community Bank of Idaho and
guaranteed by the United States Department of Agriculture. That loan came about as a result of
the business plan Defendants provided to the bank and the United States Department of
Agriculture that championed the work efforts of the Plaintiff and the $225,000 that supposedly
had been paid to his contractor Dairy Systems. Defendants simply did not prove that Gaylen
Clayson could not have purchased this Cheese Plant on his own.
12.

Something other than the fear of the $800,000 purchase price must have

motivated Mr. Clayson to relinquish his interest in the Cheese Plant.

The evidence is that

motivation came from the promises that Defendants made him.
13.

In its Memorandum Decision on the Motion for Summary Judgment, this court

carved out those promises as one of the equitable claims that were allowed to go forward in this
case:
When Zebe stated an agreement to pay for "most of what was done while Gay\en
was in charge ... to the tune of 245K" or to pay the Dairy Systems debt ... a
question of fact arises as to the extent of that obligation, whether pursuant to an
implied-in-fact contract or by way of unjust enrichment. What the nature of the
agreement was, how much was agreed to be paid, and for what, are questions the
jury must decide. (emphasis added).
Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at p. 21.
14.

Defendants admitted that they agreed to pay Plaintiffs out of pocket expenses to

the extent they were documented and that they could use them. Defendants offered no evidence
as to any improvements made by Mr. Clayson or Dairy Systems that they could not use.
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15.

Likewise, there is no question that Defendants benefited from Mr. Clayson's

refurbishment efforts and expenses. Defendants, in their business plan that they used to obtain
$2 million from the bank and the USDA, referenced this refurbishment work.
The facility has and is undergoing cosmetic and physical renovations. To include
but not limited to; an electrical retrofit of the plant, resurfacing floors, plastering
of walls, cleaning, removal of old equipment, maintenance, repairs and painting.
Exhibit I at 6. This is a reference to the work done and procured by the Plaintiff. Not only is this
an acknowledgement that the Plaintiff's efforts benefited the Defendants in their continued
operation of the Cheese Plant, but their reliance on those efforts also helped them to obtain the
funding to purchase and operate the Cheese Plant and therefore benefitted them in that fashion.
16.

The Court concludes that the Plaintiff is entitled to recover all the amounts set

out on the first page of Exhibit F that was delivered to the Defendants in connection with the
agreement to remove his name from the operating documents of Defendants' LLC.

While

Plaintiff was unable to support all of those charges with receipts, cancelled checks or credit card
receipts, this failure is due in large measure to the fact that the Plaintiff left those receipts with
the Defendants at the time he left the Cheese Plant. Defendants made no attempt to produce
those records or explain at the trial why they could not produc~ those records if they thought they
would show something different from the totals shown in Exhibit F. That total is $74,108.00.
17.

As to the value of the time Mr. Clayson dedicated to the reopening of the Cheese

Plant, the evidence is undisputed that Mr. Clayson spent at least ten hours per day, 6 days per
week for a period of 14 weeks working on the plant, interfacing with people and entities that
could be instrumental in the reopening of the Cheese Plant and supervising workers at the plant.
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Mr. Clayson worked a total of at least 840 hours in those activities. Defendants did not dispute
Plaintiffs evidence that his time was worth $15 per hour. Therefore, the value of Mr. Clayson's
efforts is $12,600.
18.

Mr. Clayson is entitled to be repaid the $50,000 that he paid toward the Dairy

Systems debt. There was an implied-in-fact contract between Defendants and Mr. Clayson that
they would pay the Dairy Systems debt.
19.

On January 14, 2009, Mr. Zebe wrote an email to various recipients with the

urgent request that it be put into the hands of Morris Farinella, the seller of the plant. In that
email he stated "once we close we are prepared to absorb what we have paid in and most of what
was done while Gaylen was in charge, i.e., electrical, plumbing, to the tune of 245k."
20.

Mr. Zebe testified that was a reference to the Dairy Systems debt.

21.

Defendants' conduct toward Dairy Systems after Mr. Clayson withdrew from the

business further establishes that Defendants must have agreed with Mr. Clayson to pay the Dairy
Systems debt.

After having been given copies of the Dairy Systems invoices and having

reviewed them, in numerous emailstoKlarkGaileyofDairySystems.Mr. Zebe discussed the
work that had been done by Dairy Systems and plans to complete the work once funding had
been obtained.
22.

In none of those emails did Mr. Zebe ever suggest that he would not pay the bill

when the funding had been obtained nor even that he would be disputing the amount of the bill.
On January 31, 2009, for instance, after asking for information about what work had been done,
Mr. Zebe stated "I have noticed there is [sic] many parts lying around including wire on rolls,
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conduit ets ... , I just want to be clear on what it is that has been done, and materials used. Would
what is remaining be used for work to be completed?" Exhibit U.
23.

During a discussion with Klark Gailey of Dairy Systems about a lien that the

manufacturer of the Motor Control Center, CEO, had threatelled to put on the Cheese Plant, Mr.
Zebe never suggested that he would not be paying the Dairy Systems debt.
24.

In an email to Klark Gailey of Dairy Systems on February 19,2009, days before

the funding was to be received, Mr. Zebe wrote a simple email to Klark Gailey stating that "Our
funds are in the title companies account waiting for distribution. Once it records we will be
funded." He then invited Mr. Gailey to verify the funds with the broker. Exhibit V.

Without

other explanation that email can only be interpreted by the creditor recipient that he is soon to be
paid.
25.

Further evidencing their having agreed to pay the Dairy Systems debt, after the

funding was obtained and there was no longer any threat that liens would impair the funding, Mr.
Zebe wrote an email to Klark Gailey and for the first time stated that he would not pay the entire
Dairy Systems debt but only that amount he could use. Mr. Zebe then stated "The amounts will
be calculated and subtracted from the Fifty thousand that you have been paid, what is remaining
is what will be paid." Exhibit W. He calculated that amount to be $62,333.55. Exhibit X. He
never paid the $ 12,333.55 to Dairy Systems, and never paid the $50,000 to Mr. Clayson either.
26.

Those communications with Dairy Systems are consistent with an agreement with

Mr. Clayson that Defendants would "absorb" the Dairy Systems debt and not with any other
scenario. Therefore the Court finds that Defendants agreed to pay the Dairy Systems debt.
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27.

As to the amount that Defendants will be required as a part of this action to pay

the Plaintiff toward the Dairy Systems debt, the Court is limiting the recovery to the $50,000 that
Mr. Clayson actually paid. During the trial, the Plaintiff stipulated that there is pending in
Wyoming an action involving Dairy Systems and the Plaintiff and Defendants in this case, and
that in that matter, Dairy Systems has not, as yet, asserted a claim against Mr. Clayson. That
being the case, the Court is limiting Mr. Clayson's recovery to the $50,000 he has actually paid
since any claim beyond that amount has not yet accrued.
28.

Defendants introduced evidence of payments they made to suppliers who were

owed money for goods and services they had supplied to the restaurant before the time when
Defendants took over the running of the restaurant. Defendants testified that they paid those
restaurant bills, not because of any agreement with Mr. Clayson but because those suppliers were
important to the continued operation of the restaurant and they wanted to keep them happy.
Defendants seek to offset those amounts against what they owe to Mr. Clayson.
29.

Such an offset cannot be allowed in this case. First, Defendants failed to show

which of those debts were incurred when Mr. Clayson was running the restaurant versus the
debts incurred when Mr. Farinella was running the restaurant before Mr. Clayson took over on
July 1, 2008. Mr. Lawson's statement that he and Mr. Zebe expected to be reimbursed those
costs upon the closing suggests that the debts may have belonged to Mr. Farinella.
30.

Additionally, Mr. Lawson testified that Defendants inherited from Mr. Clayson

not only some debts but also some unquantified amount oLinventory. Without knowing the
value of the inventory, the Court could not calculate whether or how much Defendants were
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benefited or hurt by what they inherited from Mr. Clayson with regard to the restaurant. There is
not sufficient evidence for the Court to allow any offset to the Defendants.
3 I.

Finally, the law does not allow a party who, without legal obligation to do so,

voluntarily pays a debt to seek to recover the debt from the originally debtor. It is well settled
that a person cannot-by way of set-off, counterclaim or direct action-recover money which he or
she has voluntarily paid with full knowledge of all the facts, and without any fraud, duress or
extortion, although no obligation to make such payment existed. Chinchurreta v. Evergreen
Management, Inc., 790 P.2d 372, 374 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989).
CONCLUSION
The Plaintiff has proven an implied-in-fact contract with the Defendants to pay him
$ I 24, 108.00 in out of pocket expense reimbursement which includes the $74,108.00 shown on
Exhibit F and the $50,000 he paid to Dairy Systems. Mr. Clayson is also entitled to recover
$ I 2,600 for the time he spent preparing the Plant to reopen. Judgment will be entered in the
amount of $ I 36,708.00 in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants.
Dated this

day of December, 2010.
By the Court

Honorable Stephen S. Dunn, District Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
Register#CV -2009-2212-0C
GA YLEEN CLAYSON,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

-v~

)

)

DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, and LAZE, LLC,

)

Defendants.
DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, and LAZE, LLC,

)
)

MEMORANDUM DECISION,
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

)

)

Counterclaim Plaintiffs

)
)

-vs-

)
)

GA YLEN CLAYSON,

)
)

Counterclaim Defendant.

)

This matter is before the Court for decision following a court trial, held on November 4,
5, and 10, 2010. The Court has carefully considered the testimony and exhibits offered and
admitted at trial, the deposition testimony of Morris Farinella, different portions of which were
offered by the parties, and the parties' post-trial briefs and proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law. Defendants' objection to portions of the Farinella deposition designated by
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the Plaintiff is overruled. The Court considers all of tile portions of the deposition designated by
both parties to be relevant to the issues raised in this case. The Court notes that the Defendants'
Counterclaim was dismissed prior to trial. The Court also notes that it had previously granted
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, in part, by order filed on September 15, 2010
("MSJ Decision"), which is incorporated herein by reference, which order limited the issues to
be tried.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

In this case, the Court is charged both with the responsibility of deciding questions of law
and questions of fact. Deciding the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to the
testimony are matters exclusively within the province of the Court, as the trier of fact. Cornish v.
Smith, 97 Idaho 89, 540 P.2d 274 (1975); Pierson v. Sewell, 97 Idaho 38, 539 P.2d 590 (1975).

"When a case has been tried to a court, it is the province of the trial judge to weigh the
conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of witnesses." Magic Valley
Truck Brokers, Inc. v. Meyer, 133 Idaho 110, 114,982 P.2d 945,989 (Ct.App. 1999).
FINDINGS OF FACT

The Court sets forth, in memorandum form, the facts that the Court finds most relevant to
the legal issues to be determined. The facts stated here will constitute the Findings of Fact
required by I.R.C.P. 52(a).

For the most part, the facts are not in dispute.

To the extent

important facts are in dispute, the Court will indicate the basis for its factual determinations.
Since 1975 the Star Valley Cheese Plant located in Thayne, Wyoming ("Plant") was
owned by Morris Farinella ("Farinella"), apparently through a corporation. The Plant closed its
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operations in 2004 or 2005, and ultimately, Farinella's Plant corporation was in bankruptcy.
Farinella was authorized by the bankruptcy court to receive and convey offers, or "bids" to
purchase the Plant.

Sometime in 2007, Farinella contacted the Plaintiff, Gaylen Clayson

("Clayson"), to see if he was interested in buying the Plant. Clayson had some interest but was
not available to do anything personally until sometime in 2008. In approximately February
2008, Clayson made a "bid"\ to purchase the Plant for $800,000.

Sometime in June 2008,

Clayson 2 had Farinella's permission to operate the restaurant which was adjacent to the Plant,
and to clean up and make the Plant operational, as long as his efforts didn't cost Farinella or the
bankruptcy court any money.3 Beginning July 1,2008, Clayson actually moved to and lived on
the premises, where he operated the restaurant and began to clean up the Plant and make it
operational. While Clayson did not yet own the Plant, he was authorized by Farinella to do what
he was doing, the intent being that he would ultimately purchase the Plant. From that point, until
October 8, 2008, Clayson put in considerable time and effort in running the restaurant and
cleaning up the Plant,4 which included hiring various individuals and companies to paint, plaster
and repair the floors, walls and exterior, and to perform plumbing and electrical services on Plant

I The Court infers that this "bid" was not a fonnal offer to purchase, but was part of a process by which interest to
purchase for certain amounts could be shown and "accepted" by the bankruptcy court, thus allowing the person
making the accepted bid to do some authorized activities related to the Plant.
2 Clayson has been a dairy fanner for 38 years in Firth, Idaho, and, at one point, sold milk to the Plant when it was
operational.
3 Farinella Depo., p. 40. This is also confirmed in part by Farinella's letter dated August 28,2008, included in the
record as Farinella Deposition Ex. 5A. There is a conflict in the testimony as to whether Clayson had the authority
to keep and use any funds from the restaurant business in excess of those needed for restaurant operations, including
food, wages, employment taxes, workers compensation payments, etc. Farinella testified that Clayson had no
authority to keep any funds personally, and Clayson testified he could keep any excess funds, and he created a bank
account for that purpose. The Court need not resolve this conflict because it is not relevant to the issues to be
decided here.
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equipment. 5 It is agreed that Defendants never personally requested or authorized any of the
refurbishment work Clayson did or had done. One of the companies hired by Clayson was Dairy
Systems Company, Inc. ("Dairy Systems"), a company who had provided various plumbing,
electrical and maintenance services for Clayson at his dairy for many years. Dairy Systems
provided certain services at the Plant and billed Clayson monthly. Clayson personally paid
Dairy Systems $50,000. 6
Clayson testified to substantial additional refurbishment expenses. Plaintiffs Ex. F is a
handwritten list of his claims, but was admitted only for the purpose of showing what Clayson
claimed and not as proof of what was actually paid. Subparts A through V of Plaintiffs Ex. F
are the supporting documents for Clayson's payments. Certain ofthose exhibits were stricken as
lacking foundation of personal knowledge. The Court finds that Clayson made the following
payments: Subpart A - $1872.00; Subpart B - $10,772.41; Subpart C - $0; Subpart D - $643.99;
Subpart E - $0; Subpart F - $10,621.00; Subpart G - $379.14; Subpart H - $0; Subpart I $3887.02; Subpart J - $5100.06; Subpart K - $3532.00; Subpart L - $0; Subpart M - $0; Subpart
N - $0; Subpart 0 - $0; Subpart P - $1738.00; Subpart Q - $0; Subpart R - $0; Subpart S - $0;
Subpart T - $9100.00; Subpart U - $50,000.00, plus $308.61 (True Value charges). These
payments total $97,954.23, including the $50,000 payment Clayson made to Dairy Systems.

4 Clayson's undisputed testimony is that he worked 6 days a week, 10-12 hours per day, from July I to October 8.
He testified that his opinion of the value of his personal labor is $15 per hour.
5 All the work done or authorized by Clayson shall hereafter be referred to as the "refurbishment work."
6 The testimony is that Clayson also gave Dairy Systems two unfunded checks, each for $50,000, telling Dairy
Systems that Defendants would fund those checks at a later time. He also asserts that Defendants reviewed and
agreed to fund those checks and to pay the entire Dairy Systems debt, totaling something in excess of $250,000 for
services rendered prior to January 1, 2009 (plaintiffs Ex. G). However, per Court rulings prior to and during trial,
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At some point in late July, August and Septemper, 2008, Defendants, Don Zebe and Rick
Lawson, 7 were introduced to Clayson by the mutual friend of all the parties, Jeff Randall
("Randall"). It is undisputed that at the beginning Zebe, who was a real estate developer, was
going to help Clayson prepare a business plan to assist in obtaining financing for the purchase of
the Plant. Lawson, a certified public accountant, was initially involved in the accounting aspects
of the business plan. At some point, but no later than late September by their own testimony,
Defendants became interested in participating in the ownership of the Plant. 8
On October 2, 2008, Clayson, Zebe and Lawson became members of a Wyoming limited
liability company, SVC, LLC ("SVC"),9 with the expectation that they would jointly own and
operate the Plant. However, by October 8, 2008, Clayson did not have any more money to put
into the restaurant or the Plant, and could not pay the restaurant payroll due at that time. A
conversation occurred between Clayson and Lawson. There is a minor conflict in the testimony,
with Lawson testifying that Clayson called him and said he had no more money, that Defendants
should take over the restaurant and Plant, and that Clayson "was through." Clayson's testimony
is that he wanted Defendants to start paying the expenses of the facilities, including the payroll,

the sole issue on the Dairy Systems debt is whether Defendants are required to reimburse Clayson the $50,000 he
paid to Dairy Systems. Therefore, no further discussion is needed about the entire Dairy Systems debt.
7 Collectively referred to as Defendants and individually referred to as "Zebe" and "Lawson".
8 There is a significant dispute in the testimony as to when the Defendants' interest in the project became more
involved. Clayson testified that it was almost immediately, or in mid-August, and Defendants testified that they did
not become interested in ownership participation until late September. The Court need not resolve this conflict
because it is not relevant. The question is whether Defendants ever agreed to reimburse Clayson's refurbishment
expenses or whether it would be unjust to allow them to retain the benefits of those expenses. When they became
interested in participating in the ownership of the plant is not pertinent to those questions.
9 Plaintiff's Ex. J. At or about the same time these same parties, plus Randall, became involved in another limited
liability company, Milk Management, LLC. However, that company was-not involved in the dispute over the
refurbishment expenses.
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but that Lawson told him if Defendants were to do that Clayson was out of the business.
Clayson admitted that he "relinquished" his continued participation in the business at that time.
It is clear that from October 8 forward Clayson left the premises, had no further involvement in
SVC, and did not do any further work on the Plant. The SVC articles were amended to delete
Clayson as a member.

Defendants took over the operation of the restaurant and physical

possessIOn of the Plant, under essentially the same arrangement with Farinella that Clayson

Shortly thereafter, on or about October 10, 2008, Clayson testified that Defendants
agreed to reimburse him all his refurbishment expenses, which he estimated at somewhere
between $100,000 and $150,000. Clayson asserts that he was told "when we get our funding we
will reimburse for you're out of pocket expenses." Defendants adamantly deny that any such
conversation took place. The Court will resolve this dispute below.
On October 17, 2008, Clayson and Randall signed a formal offer to purchase the Plant
from Star Valley Cheese, Inc., for $800,000. The conversations between the parties on that day

10 Over the course of several weeks in October and November, 2008, Defendants paid some expenses related to
restaurant operations which they testified had been incurred, but unpaid by Clayson, totaling $25,986.01.
Defendants' Ex. IIA. Defendants also assert that they paid substantial additional expenses in the ensuing months,
both related to restaurant operations and renovations, as well as Plant refurbishment. The total combined payments
testified to by Defendants was $78,237.79. Defendants' Ex. II. Defendants testified to these payments to
demonstrate that they had dealt with Clayson fairly, but they do not make any claim for reimbursement of these
expenses and dismissed the Counterclaim that may have asserted such a claim. In addition, in an e-mail from Zebe
to Pendleton and others dated January 14,2009, Zebe stated: "From October 8th we (Rick & I) have paid every
invoice and bill that has been incurred with no regret. We have also paid over 35k ofbiIls Gaylen incurred. I know
this is my issue and I accept that, my fault and my mistake ... Once we close we are prepared to absorb what we have
paid in .... " Lawson also testified that it was advantageous enough to keep the restaurant open, that they decided to
pay these bills, and that some of the bills were for inventory that was on the premises when they took it over. Thus,
there would be no legal or factual basis for Defendants to seek reimbursement of these expenses.
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are significantly in dispute. After careful consideration, including evaluation of credibility and
reconciliation of the testimony, the Court finds the following facts.
At the urging of Randall, Defendants determined to make a formal offer to purchase the
Plant for $800,000.

On October 17, 2008, Randall was going to meet with Defendants to

facilitate the offer. He picked up Clayson and the four of them met at the Plant. While Clayson
may have had the intent to participate in the purchase, Defendants were surprised to see him.
Zebe then had a telephone conversation with Val Pendleton, the realtor handling the sale, and
they got into an argument over the sales commission. Zebe hung up and it appeared that no offer
would be made. However, Randall encouraged Defendants to allow him to go to Pendleton to
make an offer himself. Defendants agreed to that procedure if the agreement Randall signed
included the language "and assigns" so the contract could be transferred to Defendants.
Defendants also provided the $10,000 earnest money for the contract. Randall believed
that he was going to be the only person to purchase the Plant that day but when he and Clayson
arrived at Pendleton's the prepared contract had both Randall and Clayson listed as purchasers.
Randall believed that this was because Clayson had prior conversations with Pendleton
expressing an interest in purchasing.

When Randall and Clayson returned with the signed

contract, Zebe was upset because Clayson's name was on the contract and it did not contain the
"assigns" language. I I Randall did not consider that a concern because he had signed the
agreement with the intent to assign it to Defendants. Although Defendants did not intend to have
Clayson be one of the purchasers of the Plant on October 17, the fact is that a contract for the
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sale of the Plant occurred on that date with Clayson as one of the buyers. In fact, Zebe testified
that he was upset enough when the contract was returned to him that he said if Clayson and
Randall wanted to buy it they could.
On November 4, 2008 another meeting took place between the parties, and including
Randall, at Lawson's office in Pocatello, Idaho. It is uncontested that Clayson produced a list of
expenses that he wanted to be reimbursed for

l2

and stated that he was unwilling to sign an

assignment of the sales contract to Defendants without that reimbursement. It is also agreed by
all that Defendants refused to make those reimbursements, asserting that they had already paid
many of Clayson's unpaid billsY Clayson ultimately signed an assignment of the sales contract
without any agreement on that day that he would be reimbursed. 14
The Court also finds the following material facts. At some point in October, Defendants
had a conversation with Clayson where he requested reimbursement of his refurbishment
expenses, among other things, and Zebe stated he would not pay any of those expenses without
invoices or canceled checks and that they would pay for "the work that was done in the design"
only if they could use that work in their design. IS

II

Plaintiffs Ex. D.

12

It may have been Plaintiffs Ex. F, or some form thereof.

Referring to Defendants' Ex. IIA.
The assignment is Plaintiffs Ex. N.
15 Zebe Depo., pp. 112-13.
13

14
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On January 14, 2009, in an e-mail to Pendleton (copied to Lawson), Zebe stated that
"[ 0 ]nce

we close we are prepared to absorb what we have paid in and most of what was done

while Gaylen was in charge, i.e., electrical, plumbing, to the tune of $245k.,,16
In the Business Plan submitted by Defendants to support a bank loan they received,
Defendants stated: "The facility has and is undergoing cosmetic and physical renovations. To
include but not limited to: an electrical retrofit of the plant, resurfacing floors, plastering of
walls, cleaning, removal of old equipment, maintenance, repairs and painting. Ninety percent of
the electrical retrofit has been completed at a cost of $225,000 which has been paid by the
principles of SVC, LLC ... The current restaurant business has been profitable to date, however,
the facility is old and out dated. The structure is sound. However, an exterior and interior
upgrade would benefit the overall appearance and value of the facility."l?
In an e-mail from Zebe to Dairy Systems dated February 19, 2009 (copied to Lawson),
Zebe stated: "Our funds are in the title companies [sic] account waiting for distribution. Once it
records we will be funded.,,18 The Court infers from this that Defendants were stating an intent
to pay Dairy Systems at least some amount.
In an e-mail from Zebe to Dairy Systems dated February 25, 2009 (copied to Lawson),
Zebe stated: "The long and short of it is this, we will pay for work that is accepted. We will pay

Plaintiff's Ex. s.
Plaintiff's Ex. I, p. 5. Zebe acknowledged that this business plan was submitted to the bank after Clayson was no
longer a member of SVC. Thus, the statements contained herein are those ofthe Defendants. Zebe admitted that the
statement relating to having made the payments already was a misrepresentation to the bank.
IS Plaintiff's Ex. V.
16

17
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for material used only ...

amounts will be calculated and subtracted from the Fifty thousand

that you have been paid, what is remaining is what will be paid.,,19
In an e-mail from Zebe to Dairy Systems dated March 7, 2009 (copied to Lawson), where
Zebe identified Defendants' assessment of the Dairy Systems work they found acceptable, Zebe
stated: "I have attached my calculations for materials used, hours worked, expenses. This is all 1
can justify and this is what will be paid. You received $50,000.00 from Gaylen and our amount
total is $62,333.55. We will have a check for you Monday in the amount of $12,335.55 for that
final and absolute payment.,,20

Dairy Systems rejected this compromise and no additional

payment was made.
On February 24,2009, Defendants formally closed on the purchase of the Plant and have
··
.
21
owned It
smce th at tIme.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The legal issues to be resolved in this case are whether the facts support the conclusion
that Clayson is entitled to reimbursement of the refurbishment expenses from Defendants, based
on an implied contract in fact (quantum meruit) and/or an implied contract at law (unjust
enrichment).22 The Idaho Court of Appeals has stated:
There are essentially three types of contractual arrangements: express contracts, impliedin-fact contracts and contracts implied-in-Iaw. Continental Forest Products, Inc. v.
Chandler Supply Co., 95 Idaho 739, 743, 518 P.2d 1201, 1205 (1974); Podolan v. Idaho
Legal Aid Services, Inc., 123 Idaho 937, 942, 854 P.2d 280, 285 (Ct.App.l993). Express
contracts exist where the parties expressly agree regarding a transaction. Id. Contracts
19

20

21

22

Plaintiff's Ex. W.
Plaintiff's Ex. X.
Zebe testified that Laze, LLC owns the Plant and SVC, LLC is the operating entity.
See MSJ Decision.
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implied-in-fact are those where there is no express agreement but the conduct of the
parties implies an agreement from which the contractual obligation arises. Id. To find
such a contract, the facts must be such that the intent to make a contract may be fairly
inferred. Podolan, supra.
Baker v. Boren, 129 Idaho 885, 890-91, 934 P.2d 951, 956-57 (Ct.App.1997).
As to an implied-in-fact contract, the Idaho Supreme Court has also stated:
'An implied in fact contract is defined as one where the terms and existence of the
contract are manifested by the conduct of the parties with the request of one party and the
performance by the other often being inferred from the circumstances attending the
performance.' Farnworth v. Femling, 125 Idaho 283, 287, 869 P.2d 1378, 1382 (1994)
(citing Clements v. Jungert, 90 Idaho 143, 153,408 P.2d 810, 815 (1965)). The impliedin-fact contract is grounded in the parties' agreement and tacit understanding. Kennedy v.
Forest, 129 Idaho 584, 587, 930 P.2d 1026, 1029 (1997). 'The general rule is that where
the conduct of the parties allows the dual inferences that one performed at the other's
request and that the requesting party promised payment, then the court may find a
contract implied in fact.' Homes by Bell-Hi, Inc. v. Wood, 110 Idaho 319, 321, 715 P.2d
989, 991 (1986) (citing Clements v. Jungert, 90 Idaho 143, 153, 408 P.2d 810, 815
(1965); Bastian v. Gafford, 98 Idaho 324, 325, 563 P.2d 48, 49 (1977)).
Fox v. Mountain West Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 708, 52 P.3d 848, 853 (2002). As to the
remedy for an implied-in-fact contract, the Idaho Supreme Court has declared:
The doctrine of quantum meruit is a remedy for an implied-in-fact contract and permits a
party to recover the reasonable value of services rendered or material provided on the
basis of an implied promise to pay. See Cheung v. Pena, 143 Idaho 30, 35,137 P.3d 417,
422 (2006).
Gray v. Tri-Way Const. Services, Inc., 147 Idaho 378, 387, 210 P.3d 63, 72 (2009). Defendants
focus on this additional statement from Gray: "The general rule is that where the conduct of the
parties allows the dual inferences that one performed at the other's request and that the
requesting party promised payment, then the court may find a contract implied in fact." Id.
Defendants contend that because Clayson stipulated to and the evidence showed that Defendants
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did not, at any time prior to October 8, 2008, agree to, authorize, or direct Clayson to perform
any refurbishment services, they cannot be held responsible to reimburse him for them. They
assert that any implied promise to pay must be made "in advance" of the services rendered.
While this is a true statement in the right context, it misses the mark in terms of the
evidence in this case. The Court is not finding a contract implied in fact based on Defendants'
promise to pay Clayson for refurbishment expenses before they were incurred. The Court finds
that an implied-in-fact contract exists because Defendants conduct and statements create an
implied agreement to pay Clayson's refurbishment expenses when he transferred operation of the
Plant and restaurant to Defendants on October 8, 2008. Zebe's own statement, in response to a
question about whether he had agreed to reimburse Clayson's debts and out-of-pocket expenses,
arising out of a conversation with Clayson at or shortly afterOctober 8, 2008, was: "And again,
I answered that question by saying we wanted invoices to prove that the work had been done.
Okay ... And without invoices, without canceled checks, we were not going to reimburse him a
dime. And the other stipulation was, again, is that if we would use the work that was done in the
design that we were going to design, we would pay for those expenses.,,23
Although Defendants refused to confirm this agreement at the meeting on November 4,
2008, Zebe did confirm this implied agreement, including the agreement to pay that part of the
Dairy Systems bill Defendants felt they could use, with his statements on multiple other
occasions. 24 While Defendants denied Clayson's testimony that they agreed to reimburse him in

23

24

Zebe Depo., pp. 112-13.
See facts stated on pp. 8-10, irifra.
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a conversation on October 10, 2008, the Court finds Zebe's deposition testimony more credible,
particularly in light of admissions made in later statements.
As to an implied-in-Iaw contract, claiming unjust enrichment, the Idaho Supreme
Court has stated:
Unjust enrichment, or restitution, is the measure of recovery under a contract implied in
law. Barry v. Pacific West Canst., Inc., 140 Idaho 827, 834, 103 P.3d 440, 447 (2004).
"A contract implied in law ... 'is not a contract at all, but an obligation imposed by law
for the purpose of bringing about justice and equity without reference to the intent of the
agreement of the parties ... .' " Id The measure of recovery on an unjust enrichment claim
"is not the actual amount of the enrichment, but the amount of enrichment which, as
between two parties it would be unjust for one party to retain." Beco Constr. Co., Inc. v.
Bannock Paving Co., Inc., 118 Idaho 463, 466, 797 P.2d 863, 866 (1990). The plaintiff
has the burden of proving that the defendant received.~ benefit and of proving the amount
of the benefit which the defendants unjustly retained. Blaser v. Cameron, 121 Idaho
1012,1017,829 P.2d 1361, 1366 (Ct.App.l992). "The value of services rendered can be
used as evidence of the value of the benefit bestowed under the theory of unjust
enrichment." Id "Although damages need not be proven with mathematical precision, the
damages, i.e., the value of any benefit unjustly received by the defendant in an action
based upon unjust enrichment, must be proven to a reasonable certainty." Gillette v.
Storm Circle Ranch, 101 Idaho 663, 667, 619 P .2d 1116, 1120 (1980).
Gray v. Tri-Way Canst. Services, Inc., 147 Idaho 378, 388-89, 210 P.3d 63,73-74 (2009).
Applying this legal standard to the facts found above, the Court concludes that the
Defendants benefited from Clayson's refurbishment efforts and expenses. When they took over
the Plant and restaurant on October 8, 2008, they received a Plant and restaurant that was better
than it had been before Clayson's efforts and expenses. Defendants admitted that these efforts
improved the Plant and restaurant in their business plan. They clearly accepted those benefits.
Even as to the Dairy Systems bill, which Defendants claim did not benefit them to the full extent
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of the bill, they admit that the value they received exceeds the $50,000.00 Clayson paid?5
Defendants are free to assert, in other litigation, that they did not agree to payor receive a benefit
in excess of $62,333.55. But as between Clayson and Defendants they have agreed that they
received at least a $50,000.00 benefit, for which they must reimburse Clayson.

Based on

Defendants statements and the benefits Defendants received, the Court finds that an implied-inlaw contract exists.

Based on the foregoing analysis, the Court renders the following

Conclusions of Law.
1. The conduct of the parties creates a contract-in-fact whereby Defendants agreed to
reimburse Plaintiff for the expenses shown to have been incurred in refurbishing the Plant.
2. The conduct of the parties also creates an implied-in-Iaw contract whereby Defendants
are obligated to reimburse Plaintiff for benefits they received in his refurbishment efforts.
3. Defendants are obligated to reimburse Plaintiff for the $50,000.00 he paid to Dairy
Systems for work done on the Plant. Defendants both impliedly agreed to reimburse that amount
to Clayson and admitted that they received a benefit of that work in excess of the $50,000.00.
4.

As to additional refurbishment expenses, claimed in Subparts A through V of

Plaintiffs Exhibit F, the Court concludes that Clayson's expenses to attend the Idaho Milk
Producers conference (Subpart D) are not legitimate refurbishment expenses and are not allowed.
All other refurbishment expenses supported by documentation, listed by the Court above, are
legitimate, reflect the benefit Defendants received, and Defendants are obligated to reimburse
Plaintiff for those amounts, totaling $47,310.24.

25

Plaintiffs Ex. X.
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5. While the Court accepts the fact that Clayson did work many hours at the restaurant
and Plant from July 1 through October 8, 2008, the evidence is insufficient to establish how
many hours Clayson worked in operating the restaurant as opposed to working on refurbishment
of the Plant. In the Court's view, only the latter hours would be compensable, but there is no
evidence from which the Court can infer that number.

To the extent Clayson spent time

operating the restaurant, he was receiving the benefit of any net income of that operation and
those hours did not go to improving or refurbishing the restaurant or the Plant. The Court can
infer from Clayson's testimony that much of the refurbishment efforts were undertaken by
employees and contractors, who were supervised by Clayson. While his supervision time would
have been compensable if proven, unless also duplicated by hours he spent running the
restaurant, the evidence is insufficient to determine how much time was spent supervising Plant
refurbishment. The burden of proof on this issue is Plaintiffs,z6 His compensable time must be
shown with reasonable certainty. That has not occurred, and damages based on conjecture or
speculation are not allowed. Therefore, based on a lack of sufficient evidence, the Court declines
to award any amounts for time spent.
J,

CONCLUSION

"

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds in favor of Plaintiff and awards damages totaling
$97,310.94. A Judgment is entered contemporaneously herewith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

26

Horner v. Sani-Top, Inc., J43 Idaho 230, 237, J41 P.3d 1099. 1107 (2006).
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DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, and LAZE, LLC,

)
)
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DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, and LAZE, LLC,

JUDGMENT

)
)
)

Counterclaim Plaintiffs

)
)

-vs-
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)

)

Counterclaim Defendant.

)

Following a Court trial and pursuant to a Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law dated the 6th day of December, 2010;
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the law and pursuant to LR.C.P. 54(a), it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that JUDGMENT be entered in this matter in
favor of the Plaintiff, Gaylen Clayson, and against the Defendants, Don Zebe, Rick Lawson
and Laze, LLC, in the Total Amount of $97,310.94.

Costs and fees, if any, are to be

detennined at a later date pursuant to Idaho law and LR.C.P. 54.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

GAYLEN CLAYSON,
Plaintiff,
vs.
DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, AND
LAZE, LLC.,
Defendants,

CASE NO. CV-2009-0002212-0C
DEFENSE MEMORANDUM ON
DAMAGE CLAIM

INTRODUCTION

The purpose ofthis Memorandum is to provide briefing and evaluation ofthe equitable basis,
if any, for a claim by Plaintiff asserting damages for the entire Dairy Systems' bilI beyond the
$50,000 payment he made on September 16, 2008. To the extent that this Memorandum cites to or
discusses equitable theories beyond the implied-in-fact and implied-in-Iaw/unjust enrichment claims
which are at issue in this litigation, this Memorandum should not be considered express or implied
consent or acquiescence by the Defendants for Plaintiff to expand his theories of recovery.
DISCUSSION OF RELEVANT LAW

A.

PERl1NENT FACTS
Mr. Clayson stipulated that there is no legal claim by Dairy Systems against Clayson to

recover itts daim for work performed and materials provided at the Star Valley Cheese Plant in 2008
- -
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and 2009. Dairy Systems did not bill Clayson, it billed "Star Valley Cheese." Dairy Systems is
pursuing the Defendants to recover its claim, not Clayson, in the lawsuit it filed in Wyoming.
B.

PLAINTIFF CAN ONLY RECOVER TO THE EXTENT HE HAS PAID THE DAIRY
SYSTEMS DEBT

Even under equitable theories, Clayson can only recover from Defendants what he paid. In
a scenario somewhat analogous to this case, where one pays the debt of another, that party may seek
recovery from the party that benefitted under the equitable theory of subrogation.

The Idaho

Supreme Court explained the equitable remedy of subrogation I in Williams v. Johnston, 92 Idaho
292, 298 (Idaho 1968):

"
Its principle is often extended to those who, because of their interest in
the property on which debts of others are a charge, are entitled to pay such debts and
be substituted to the place of the original creditor. Generally speflking it is only in
cases where one advances money to JIIlY the debt of another to protect his own
rigIILs that a court ofequity substitutes him in place ofthe creditor as a matter of
course, without any express agreement to that effect. The doctrine of subrogation is
not administered as a legal right but the principle is applied to subserve the ends of
justice and to do equity." [quoting Houghtelin v. Diehl, 47 Idaho 636, 277 P. 699
(1929)] (emphasis supplied)
The equitable remedy of subrogation is not available to a party2 who has not paid the debt
of the party against whom it seeks recovery for the payment.

In fact, subrogation is not available

to a party who has not discharged the entire debt. Restat 1st ofRestitution, § 162 provides:
c. Where obligation not fully discharged. Where property of one person is used in
partially discharging an obligation owed by another, and the balance of the

ISee also May Trucking Co. v. International Harvester Co., 97 Idaho 319,321 (Idaho
1975)
2Subrogation is also not available to a party who had no obligation to payor had no
interest to. protect by paying. A person who was only a volunteer cannot invoke the aid of
subrogation.
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obligation has not been discharged, the former is not entitled to be subrogated to the
position of the obligee. Until the obligation is fully discharged, the obligee is himself
entitled to enforce the balance of his claim, and the person whose property has been
used in discharging only a part of the claim is not entitled to occupy his position. If
the balance of the claim is subsequently discharged by the obligor, however, the
person whose property was used in discharging a part of the obligation is entitled
then to be subrogated to the claim to the extent that his property was used in
discharging the claim.
See also Labella Winnetka, Inc. v. General Cas. Ins. Co., 259 F.R.D. 143, 147 (N.D. Ill. 2009)
(Equitable subrogation implicates a body of equitable principles, which include a requirement
that "the claim or debt under which the subrogee asserts his rights [be] paid in full.")
There is no equitable remedy which would allow Clayson to recover for a liability he has
not paid. His only payment to Dairy Systems was a $50,000 payment on September 16, 2008
from his personal account and he is limited to attempting to recover the $50,000 from the
Defendants.

C

UNJUST ENRICHMENT IS NOT AVAILABLE FOR HYPOTHETICAL FUTURE
LIABILITIES
The equitable remedy of unjust enrichment does not protect against hypothetical future

liabilities:
The elements for unjust enrichment are that the defendant was enriched,
that such enrichment was at the plaintiffs expense and that the circumstances
were such that in equity and good conscience the defendant should return the
money or property to the plaintiff Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co.,
830 F. Supp. 204, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)~ see also Bank of America, N.A. v.
Moyer, 18 V.I. 220,224 (Terr. Ct. 1982). Hyatt has not alleged that Skopbank has
been enriched at Hyatt's expense. Hyatt simply alleges that ifit should be awarded
judgment against 35 Acres, then Skopbank and GGF will be unjustly enriched
"when the shell entity 35 Acres is left insolvent and unable to satisfY a judgment
rendered in favor of Hyatt. " However, no claim of unjust enrichment lies for
"hypothetical future liabilities." Axel Johnson, 830 F. Supp. at 211-12.

Gov'tGuar. Fund ofFin. v. Hyatt Corp., 955 F. Supp. 441, 460 (D.V.I. 1997)
To salvage the claim, Andersen articulates an entirely different version of
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the claim in its memoranda oflaw, basing the allegation on the "possibility" of
Johnson obtaining a judgment against Andersen in the future, rather than on the
past occurrence of Johnson's purchase ofITI stock. Andersen's present argument
is that if it were to be forced to pay damages to Johnson, then the third party
defendants -- who are the real wrongdoers and accordingly should be the ones
paying damages -- would be unjustly enriched.
As a preliminary matter, such a claim, even if valid, is not alleged in the
complaint. However, even if this version had been properly pleaded, no cause of
action for unjust enrichment lies for hypothetical future liabilities.

Axel Johnson, Inc. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 830 F. Supp. 204,211-212 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
Dairy Systems has not attempted to hold Clayson liable to date for a debt incurred by Star
Valley Cheese in 2008. Dairy Systems has sued the Defendants for that debt. Clayson's liability
is, at best, a

~'hypothetical

future liability" for which no action for unjust enrichment lies.

CONCLUSION
There is no equitable remedy for an obligation which the Plaintiffhas not paid. There is,
therefore, no basis for Clayson to assert damages for the entire Dairy Systems bill. The
Defendants respectfully request that this Court deny Clayson's claim for any amount related to
the Dairy Systems debt which exceeds the $50,000 payment he actually made on September 16,
2008.
DATED this 6th day of November, 2010.
COOPER & LARSEN

/s/ Gary L. Cooper
GARY L. COOPER
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Blake S. Atkin (ISB# 6903)
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Telephone: (208) 747-3414
ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.e.
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Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (801) 533-0300
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380
Attorney for Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
BANNOCK COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO
GA YLEN CLAYSON,
Plaintiff,
v.

DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, and LAZE,
LLC,

PLANTIFF'S TRIAL MEMORANDUM
REGARDING THE ADMISSmllJTY OF
EVIDENCE TBAT DEFENDANTS
ASSUMED OR RATIFIED CLAYSON'S
ENTIRE BILL TO DAIRY SYSTEMS
COMPANY

Defendants.,

Case No: CV-2009-02212-0C
DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, and LAZE,
LLC,
Counterclaim Plaintiffs,
v.

Counterclaim Defendant
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Judge: Stephen S. Dunn

Historically there were two courts. Courts of law and courts of equity. Rules were
developed in the law courts to prevent the skullduggery that unfortunately is often the nature and
disposition of people in their dealings with one another. These concerns give rise to such legal
principles as the statute of frauds that precludes legal enforcement of certain classes of contracts
unless the contract is in writing. But when the facts of the case demonstrate that such legal
principles are being used unscrupulously in order to promote injustice, another court, a court of
equity, would step in and provide a remedy so that justice might be done against the clever use of
legal principles. Thus, familiar equitable maxims such as "the Statute of Frauds cannot be used
to perpetrate a fraud."
Today, in Idaho, as in most jurisdictions, the courts of law and the courts of equity have
been joined in a single court, but equity still has the power to prevent skullduggery and clever
use of the law to injure others. The equitable jurisdiction of this Court has been invoked in this
case because this is one of those instances where, if the equitable jurisdiction of the Court is not
brought to bear, the Defendants' clever use of legal principles will result in great injustice to
Plaintiff Gaylen Clayson and to people with whom he dealt who still believe that a man's word is
his bond, and that a handshake should still be honored.
Mr. Zebe testified that in his view, promises don't mean anything in real estate unless

they are in writing and if Gaylen Clayson does not know that he is stupid. If equity cannot be
relied upon in this case to enforce these Defendants' oral agreement to reimburse Plaintiff for his
out of pocket expenses in refurbishing the Cheese Plant and to pay the workmen who, based on
20 years of trust, went to work for him to get theplant~going as quickly as possible so he would

2
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have a home for his milk, knowing that he was an honest man who would see that they were
paid, then equity has lost its ability to serve the purpose for which it was born.
Under the facts of this case, a court of equity cannot allow these Defendants to not pay
the Dairy Systems debt they promised Clayson they would pay.

Not only do the facts in

evidence, and the facts proffered by the Plaintiff, clearly establish the dual inferences required in
a court of equity to enforce a contract implied in fact, i.e., the existence and terms of a contract to
pay Dairy Systems, Fox v. Mountain West Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 52 P. 3d 848, 853 (2002),
these Defendants misrepresented to a Federally insured Idaho Bank and to the United States
Department of Agriculture that they had paid Dairy Systems for 90% of the electrical retrofit in
the amount of $225,000.

Exhibit I, page 6.

Defendants now admit that was an outright

misrepresentation to the banks, and the evidence is clear that neither Mr. Zebe nor Mr. Lawson
has paid a nickel to Dairy Systems. That Mr. Clayson's $50,000 check of September 16, 2008,
was the only money that had been paid to Dairy Systems and Defendants are now trying to deny
authorizing the other two $50,000 checks that were delivered to Dairy Systems on their behalf.
But having made that representation and having benefited greatly by having induced Citizens
Community Bank of Idaho and the United States Department of Agriculture to loan them $2
Million on the basis of this fraudulent representation, Defendants cannot be allowed in a court of
equity to walk away from the obligation underlying this fraud, i.e., the payment of Dairy
Systems.
Defendants conduct with regard to their agreement to pay the Dairy Systems debt has
been "dishonest, [and] fraudulent and deceitful as to the controversy in issue." See, Ada County

3
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Highway Dist. v. Total Success Investments, LLC, 145 Idaho 360, 370, 179 P.3d 323,
333 (2008), and a court of equity is not without power to now enforce the agreement they made
that is consistent with their fraudulent conduct. l The Defendants are willing to lie regarding this
obligation at the expense of Gaylen Clayson, Dairy Systems, Citizens Community Bank of Idaho
and the United States Department of Agriculture. Defendants cannot be allowed to profit from a
misrepresentation that they have paid the debt and now avoid the obligation.

I.

WHETHER THE DEFENDANTS ASSUMED OR RATIFIED CLAYSON'S
OBLIGATION TO DAIRY SYSTEMS COMPANY BAS ALWAYS BEEN AN
ISSUE IN THIS CASE.
The Complaint in this case alleged that Defendants had assumed Clayson's obligation to

Dairy Systems.
12.
Defendants later offered to buyout Plaintiff's partnership interest for
reimbursement of his out of pocket expenses, assumption of the debt he incurred
in refurbishing The Plant, including the debt to Dairy Systems and payment of
$500,000.00 in cash. As part of this agreement, Defendants also agreed to take all
of Plaintiffs milk supply at class 3 prices, FOB the dairy.
13.
Because Plaintiff s real interests lie in the dairy industry, Plaintiff agreed
to this buyout arrangement. Pursuant to the agreement, Plaintiff transferred to
Defendants his interest in the contract with Farinella and facilitated the purchase
of Morris Farinella's interest by the Defendants.
14.
Defendants have failed and refused to reimburse Plaintiff s out of pocket
expenses, have failed and refused to assume the debt to Dairy Systems, and have
been unable or unwilling to take Plaintiff s production of milk as promised.
See, Amended Complaint on file with the Court, paragraphs 12-14.
In its memorandum decision, this court carved out this obligation as one of the
equitable claims that were allowed to go forward in this case:
1 While the Ada County case involved the equitable doctrine of clean hands that is typically used as a shield, it
nonetheless illustrates the concept that a court in equity should not bend over backwards to help a party avoid
liability for a debt they fraudulently represented to the bank they had paid!
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the trier- of fact could reasonably infer that Zebe, on behalf of SVC, LLC, had
agreed to assume some of the debts owed by Clayson, and it is reasonably
possible that Clayson assigned his rights over to the Defendants to purchase the
Plant in reliance of these payments or assumptions of debt, or that a separate
implied-in-fact agreement had been entered into where SVC, LLC agreed to make
such payments. When Zebe stated an agreement to pay for "most of what was
done while Gaylen was in charge ... to the tune of 245K" or to pay the Dairy
Systems debt . . . a question of fact arises as to the extent of that obligation,
whether pursuant to an implied-in-fact contract or by way of unjust enrichment.
What the nature of the agreement was, how much was agreed to be paid, and for
what, are questions the jury must decide. (emphasis added).
Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment at p. 21.
II.

GAYLEN CLAYSON HAS THE LEGAL OBLIGATION TO CAUSE DAIRY

SYSTEMS TO BE PAID.
Under the facts in this case, Gaylen Clayson clearly has a contractual obligation to pay
Dairy Systems for the work they performed at the Star Valley Cheese Plant. He had a long term
relationship with Dairy Systems under which he would call upon them for service, they would
provide services to him and bill him monthly for the services performed, and he would pay. If he
questioned any of their charges he would bring it up, they would discuss it and it would be either
adjusted or not and he would pay.
In this case, Mr. Clayson called upon Dairy Systems to perform work at the plant. They
performed that work. As was their usual and customary practice, they billed him for the work on
a monthly basis. Mr. Clayson received the bills, and even discussed them with Dairy Systems
and raised no objections. Those facts support not only a contract, but an account stated. When a
statement shows on its face that it is intended to be a final settlement up to date, assent to that
account rendered is implied from a failure to object to the billing within a reasonable period of
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time.

This conduct transforms the account into an account stated. Argonaut Insurance

Companies v. Tri-west Construction company, 107 Idaho 643, 691 P. 2d 1258 (Idaho 1984).
Mr. Clayson not only has the obligation to pay, but at this late date, having had the bills,

having watched the work be performed, having been in control of the premises and able to have
the work inspected as he saw fit, and with all this knowledge having not raised any question to
the bills, the bills are an account stated and he is obligated to pay them as they stand. Id.
Moreover, Mr. Clayson will be under that legal obligation until Dairy Systems is paid or
the statute of limitations has run.

The pendency of an action in Wyoming in which Dairy

Systems is attempting to get paid by Defendants does not change this analysis. The Wyoming
case at this point is completely irrelevant. The fact that Dairy Systems has not asserted a claim
against him yet is irrelevant. The statute of limitations on this account stated is six years. If
Dairy Systems should get thrown out of court in Wyoming, or if Dairy Systems should obtain a
judgment in Wyoming and Defendants file bankruptcy or otherwise fail to pay, Dairy Systems
will still have a claim it can pursue against Mr. Clayson. There is no evidence that Dairy
Systems has made any agreement not to pursue Mr. Clayson if Defendants do not pay. In fact,
Mr. Clayson testified that he was anxious to have Defendants pay Dairy Systems because

otherwise he is "on the hook." When two courts have concurrent jurisdiction over an issue, the
pendency of proceedings in one court can be no affect on the other court until one court reaches a
final judgment.

Erwin v. State, Dept. of Family Services, 237 P.3d 409, 412 (Wyo. 2010)

(Emphasis added) (internal citation omitted). Res judicata bars the relitigation of previously
litigated claims or causes of action. Erwin, 237 P.3d at 412 (Emphasis added) (internal citation
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omitted). Here, there has been no adjudication of any issues in the Wyoming court, and there is
no final judgment in that court.
There is no quasi-estoppel or judicial estoppel applicable to the facts of this case .
... doctrine of quasi-estoppel applies when: (1) the offending party took a different
position than his or her original position, and (2) either (a) the offending party
gained an advantage or caused a disadvantage to the other party; (b) the other
party was induced to change positions; or (c) it would be unconscionable to
permit the offending party to maintain an inconsistent position from one he or she
has already derived a benefit or acquiesced in.
Terrazas v. Blaine County, 147 Idaho 193,200 (Idaho 2009).
In this case, Clayson has not taken a position different in this case than the position he
has taken in Wyoming. In both cases, Clayson takes the position that he contracted with Dairy
Systems to perform the refurbishment work on the Cheese Plant and that Defendants agreed with
him that in exchange for relinquishing his interest in the plant and the limited liability company
that was set up by the parties to refurbish and run the plant, that the Defendants would, among
other

thin~~

assume that Dairy Systems obligation. Nor is there any evidence that Defendants

were disadvantaged, were induced to change positions, or that it would be unconscionable for
Clayson to continue to pursue Defendants for their failure to pay Dairy Systems.
Judicial estoppel is even more remote. Before judicial estoppel is applicable, a party
must, in a prior proceeding "obtain a judgment, advantage, or consideration from one party ... "
Indian Springs, LLC v. Indian Springs Land Inv .• LLC, 147 Idaho 737, 748 (2009). Defendants'
third party complaint in the Wyoming case was filed after this action and has not come to
judgment.

Moreover, even after judgment in the prior proceeding, judicial estoppel only
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prevents a party from taking a position contrary to the position taken in the prior proceeding in
"sworn statements." In this case, Clayson is taking the same position in this case as he took in
the "subsequently" filed third party complaint in Wyoming-namely that he contracted with
Dairy Systems to confer a benefit on himself and his partners Don Zebe and Rick Lawson which
they agreed to satisfy when he agreed to relinquish his interest in the plant and the limited
liability company set up by the parties to refurbish and run the plant. There simply is no
rationale by which this Court can or should defer to proceedings that are merely pending in
Wyoming.
ill.

GAYLEN CLAYSON'S MORAL OBLIGATION TO PAY DAIRY SYSTEMS IS
SUFFICIENT CONSIDERATION TO SUPPORT DEFENDANTS' AGREEMENT
TO PAY DAIRY SYSTEMS ON HIS BEHALF.
A moral obligation, even though legally unenforceable, is sufficient consideration to

support creation of a binding contract. Homefinders v. Lawrence, 80 Idaho 543, 549, 335 P.2d
893, 897 (1959); Woods v. Locke, 49 Id. 486, 289 P. 610, 612 (1930).

Gaylen Clayson,

promised Dairy Systems that they would be paid if they would drop everything, go to a remote
location in Wyoming, and, in rapid fire, bring a cheese plant that had been in moth balls for two
and a half years back online.

It seems obvious that those facts created a legally binding

contract-especially where neither party to the contract are disputing its existence. If that did
not create a legal obligation on Mr. Clayson's part to Dairy Systems, it at least created a moral
obligation to see that they were paid for their work.
In determining whether there is a contract implied in law, the court needs to examine
whether the terms and existence of the contract are manifested by the conduct of the parties. Fox
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V.

Mountain West Elec., Inc., 137 Idaho 703, 708, 52 P.3d 848, 853.

The facts and

circumstances in this case clearly support the inference that the Defendants agreed to assume or
ratify all of Clayson's debt to Dairy Systems and not just the $50,000 check that Clayson funded.
Clayson testified that he was "on the hook" to Dairy Systems and Defendants agreed to
pay that and the other debts he had incurred in the refurbishment of the plant. Defendants, in
their Business Plan, represented to banks and the United States Department of Agriculture that
they had paid Dairy Systems for 90 percent of electrical retrofit in the amount of $225,000.
Exhibit I at p. 6. They further represented to third parties that, upon closing, they would absorb
Dairy System's debt of$245K. Exhibit S.
Contrary to his testimony on cross-examination that he informed contractors hired by
Clayson that be did not know how they would be paid, Mr. Zebe told Dairy Systems that they
would be paid upon closing as suggested by Plaintiff's Exhibit V, which clearly appears to be
assurance to a legitimate creditor, that the money is in and is about to be paid. These facts raise
an inference that there was a contract by Defendants to pay Dairy Systems, and upon closing
they would pay Dairy Systems in full, thus fulfilling Gaylen Clayson's legal and/or moral
obligations to Dairy Systems.
IV.

IF THE COURT RULES THAT GAYLEN CLAYSON HAS A RIGHT TO

ENFORCE DEFENDANTS' AGREEMENT TO PAY DAIRY SYSTEMS
THERE IS STILL NO NEED FOR FURTHER EVIDENCE ON THE AMOUNT
OWING TO DAIRY SYSTEMS BEYOND THE EVIDENCE CONTAINED IN
PLAINTIFF'S EXnmIT L.
In his emails to Klark Gailey, ExhibitsW and X, Mr. Zebe clearly ratifies the contract
between Dairy Systems and Gaylen Clayson. He makes reference to the $50,000 Clayson paid
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Dairy Systems and states that Dairy Systems must deduct that amount from the amount they are
owed, a clear reference to the Clayson contract and a clear adoption of a benefit from that
contract. The only problem is, Defendants want to ratify the contract as to the parts they like, but
not as to the parts they don't. Similarly, Mr. Zebe admitted that when they decided not to pay
Dairy Systems, they did not rip out the wires Dairy Systems had installed.

They kept the

components they liked and those components installed by Dairy Systems are still working in
their plant to this day.
Thus Defendant have ratified the Dairy Systems contract, but are attempting to have that
ratification apply only to the extent of "work we can use." A court of equity should reject the
notion that Defendants were free to pick and choose what parts of the Dairy Systems contract
they would not reimburse. A party cannot ratify only a part of an agreement. Honesty and fair
dealing require him to stand by the contract "in toto." Henry Gold Mining Co v. Henry, 25
Idaho 333, 137 P. 523 (Id. 1913).
Dairy Systems provided Mr. Clayson and the Defendants with monthly statements setting
out the amount of their bill, Mr. Clayson never objected to the bills, and six months went by,
with ongoing discussions about Dairy Systems finishing the work and Defendants manifesting
their intent to make payment once their funding was available.

During that entire time,

Defendants did not make any objection to the Dairy Systems bills. In fact, $150,000 in payments
was made during that period, although only $50,000 of the payment cleared the bank.

A party

.

can ratify a contract by remaining silent about the matter for several months after full knowledge
of all the facts. Henry Gold Mining Co v. Henry, 25 Idaho 333, 137 P. 523 (Id. 1913). Here,
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defendants had the bills from Dairy Systems for several months during which time they had
complete control of the premises and could and did inspect the work Dairy Systems had done.
Mr. Zebe testified that he hired William Sulzer and lP Electric, two of Defendants' designated
experts, to examine the plant to determine what it would take to finish the work started by Dairy
Systems. That work was done prior to the January 14,2009 email to Morris Farinella, Exhibit S,
in which Defendants stated their intention to absorb the Dairy Systems bill upon closing, and
before Mr. Zebe's assurance email to Klark Gailey that funding was imminent on February 19,
2009. Exhibit V.

Yet Mr. Zebe testified that to that point he had not objected to the Dairy

Systems bills, but had only asked for information about the work that had been done because "I
just want to be clear on what it is that has been done ... " Exhibit U. An objection to an
account rendered must be "more than a mental operation on the part of the person receiving the
account, and must be made to the party rendering the account." Argonaut Insurance Companies
v. Tri-West Construction Company, 107 Idaho 643,646,691 P. 2d 1258, 1261 (1984).
Because it would not be equitable for the Court to allow Defendants under the
circumstances of this case to pay only for the parts of the contract that "they can use," and
because Defendants went months without raising any question about the bills, repeatedly
reaffirmed the fact that they would pay once they obtained their funding, all the while having the
ability to examine Dairy Systems' work, they should not now be allowed to question the amount
of the Dairy System bills, therefore the evidence that Defendants would put on relating to what
they deem the value of Dairy Systems work to be is not relevant to any issue in this case.

11
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There is an additional reason Defendants should not be allowed to dispute the amount of
the Dairy Systems debt.

There is a time honored equitable principle called "estoppel" that

prevents a party from disputing certain facts when a person has previously asserted those facts to
his advantage. In this case, Defendants represented to a federally insured bank in the State of
Idaho and to the United States Department of Agriculture that they had paid $225,000.00 to
Dairy Systems for 90 percent of electrical retrofit on the project. On the basis of that
representation, Defendants obtained $2 million from Citizens Community Bank of Idaho that
was guaranteed 80 percent by the United States Department of Agriculture. While Mr. Zebe has
admitted during his testimony that this was an outright misrepresentation to the banks,
Defendants, because of that conduct, should be estopped from now asserting they are not
responsible to pay in full what they represented that they had paid.
Dated this

day of November, 2010.

ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.e.

Blake S. Atkin
Attorney for the Plaintiff/Counterclaim Defendant
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BJake S. Atkin (ISB# 6903)
7579 North Westside Highway
Clifton, fdaho 83228
TeJephone: (208) 747-3414
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ATKIN LAW OFFICES. P.C.
837 South 500 West, SuIte 200
Bountiful, Utah 84010
Telephone: (801) 533-0300
Facsimile: (801) 533-0380
Attorney fot Plaintiff/Counterclaim Dt4fendant

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
BANNOCKCOUNTY STATEOFIDABO
GA YLEN CLAYSON,
Plaintiff,

v.
DON ZEBE, ruCK LA WSON~ and LAZB~ LLC,

REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO
RECONSIDER DAMAGE ASPECTS
or DECISION DATED

SEP1ME)(8Eltt5,2010

Defendants,
DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, and LAZE, LLC,
Counterclaim Plaintiffs,

Case No: CV-2009-022J2·0C
Judge: Stephen S. DUllU

v.
GA YLEN CLAYSON,

Counterclaim Defendant.

Plaintift: by and through undersigned counsel, hereby subtnits this Reply Memorandum
in Support of its Motion to Reconsider Damage Aspects of .Decision Dated September 15, 2010.

ARGUMENT
I.

PLAINTIFF HAS ADMlSSIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE VALUE or mE
CBEES1i! PLANT AT THE nME IT WAS CONVEYED TO THE
DEFENDANTS.
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Shortly after joining Gaylen Clayson i.n the SVC. LLC venture to refurbish and bring the :
Cheese plant on line, Defendants prepared a business plan for the purpose of soliciting money to
purch~e

the cheese plant and to bring it on line. Zebe Deposition transcript at pp. 6-11,21-22.

As Par: of that ef'fol1, Defendants commissioned two appraisals on the property. One was an
appraisal of the plant equipment by William Sulzer, and the other was an appraisal of the rea]
I

estate :by the broker Val Pendleton. Mr. Sulzer appraised the equipment at $2,760,100.00 and
Mr. Pendlcton appraised the plant, restaurant, and acreage at $2,100,000.00. These appraisals

were appended to the busilless plan and referred to in the business pJan under the title of
"funding." The busincss plan also included financial statements of SVC, LLC whioh represented
the value of the equipment at $1,150,000. Defendants then. uaed the business plan with its
financials and appraisals to obtain loans from the bank of at least $1.6 mOtion. See. Deposition
transcript of Don Zebe, p. 38. The business plan with its opinions of value and the loan
documentc; is not hearsay and even if it were the p1an would be admissible as exceptions to the

hearsay rule.
The fact that tbe bank loaned substantial amounts on the plant and equipment on the basis
of the ~usiness plan with its representations as to the value of the property is admissible evidence
of the value of the property. See, U.S. v. Licavoli, 604 F. 2d 613 (9th Cir. 1979) em denied. 446
U.S. 935 (1980)(fact that insw-er relied on appraisal before any litigation made appraisaJ
l·eliable).

A.

The values of the plaDt and ill eqbipmeat are admiss.ble under Idaho
Rule of EvideDQ 801(d)(2)(B) as beinl adopted by the Delead. .t
whe. it relied on tlaose nunaber wheD It s"bmitted its busm... pl811 to
obtam tinanebag.
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Don Zebe wrote the business p]an, Zebe deposition transcript at p. 5. On the page of the
business plan entitled "Funding," Mr. Zebe specifically states that '<the appraisal of this
equipment was done by Bill Sulzer of Stateo in the amount of $2,760,100.00." lobe deposition
!

transcript at p. 39.
i By definition,
,

this statement by Mr. Zebe, a party opponent, is not hearsay. Rule

,

801 (d)( 1)(2) (A) provides that "A statement is not hearsay if. . . The statement is offered against
a party and is (A) the party's own statement, in either an individual or representative capacity, ..

The statements as to value in the business plan are not hea.i'say and are thus admissible as
evidence of the value of the property.
Even though the broker's opinion of the value of the real estate is 110t specifically
mentioned in the body of the business plan, it i.s appended thereto as a "supporting document."

TIlUS, evidencing Mr. Zebe's adoption of that appraisal and making it not hearsay under rule
80 1(d)(2)(B). That rule provides that "A statement i.s not hearsay if .•.. The statement is
offered against a party and is a statement of which the party has manifested an adoption ...."
.When

Do~

Zebe relied on the apPl'aisai values of the Cbeese Plant and its equipment

given to him by William Sulzer and Val Pendelton by including them in his business plan, his
actions manifested an ado,ption of those 1lumbers. As a result. those appraisal numbers are not
hearsay and are admissible as

all.

adn1ission of a party opponent under Idaho Rule of Eviden.¢e

80 1(d)(2)(B). White Industries, Inc. v. CeS§l!a Aircraft Company, 611 F.Supp 1049 (W.O. Mo.
1985), discusses wh,en a party's use of a document supplied by another in fact represents that
party's intended assertion of the truth of the information contained in that document and
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i

therefore an adoptive admission can be found. While the ~ case relied on the Federal Rules
of Evidence, Rule 801 (d)(2)(B) of the Idaho Rules is the same as the correspondin.g federal rule.
I

!
,

Don Zebe,
who prepared the business plan which was submitted to the bank for the
,

purpose
of obtaining financing,. included in that business plan appraisals by both William Sulzel' .I
,
and Val Pendelton as to the value of the plant, restaurant, equipment and the acreage on. whiclt .
the cheese plant i$ located. As a result of the business pJan, Defendahts ultimately received loans :
from Citizens Community Bank totaling at least $1.6 million.

Se~

Zebe deposition transcript at

p.38.

According to White. in order to find an "adoptive" admission
the mere fact that the party bas acted (or fajled to act, in the case of an admission
by silence) in some wa.y in reference to the statement or information (as by
! repeating it or retaining it) is not sufficient, stImding alone, to justifY a finding that
I there has been an adoption. Instead, the surrounding cliCumstances. incJuding the
. circumstances and nature of the underlying statement itself, must be examined to
: determine whether an intent to adopt the statement is fairly reflected by the act or
failure to act which is in question.
Whi~,' 611 F.Supp. at 1062

(Internal citations omitted). Zebe's inclusion of the Sulzet· and

Pendelton numbers in his business plan evidences an intent to adopt! those numbers. The ~
court goes on to state tbat while it may be difficult to find adoption when c'the document (or
,

infonnation fTom it) is merely used in some internal fashion by the party", Id. at 1063, "there is
no doubt that where a party's use of a document supplied by another in fact represents the party's
intended assertion of the truthlhood in. the information therein, an adoptive admission. ean be
found."

M!: at 1063.
Don Zebe prepared the business plan. Zebe deposition transcrIpt at p. 5. As part of the

business plan, in 'the seotion entitled "Funding," Mr. Zebe states that, with regard. to the loan

4

765

being sought, it would "be secured by all fixtures,

ftuniture~

equipmellt, treatment pJan~ water

treatlnent facility. excluding the restaurant equipment. The appraisal of this equipment was done
by Bill Sulzor of Statco in the amount of $2,760,100." Zebe deposipon transcript at p. 39. ntat

appraisal was done by Mr. Sulzer at the request of Mr. Zebe. Zebe deposition transcript at pp. .
3940~

Mr. Zebe also hlcluded in the business plan an estimated opinion of value based on

nonnBI market conditions of the Star Valley Cheese Plant, Restaurant, and Acreage, in the
amount of $2,100,000.00. lebe deposition transcript, Exhibit 1. One of the purposes of writing
a business plan is to convince lending institutions to lend you money. Zebe deposition transcript
at p. 21. Mr. Zebe provided the business plan to the lending _institutions tbat Defendants were
seeking to borrow the money from, including Citizens Community Bank. Zebe deposition
trans~ipt at p. 11·12. Defendants ultimately borrowed at least $1.6 million fTOm Citizens

Community Bank as a result of the business plan submitted previously. Zebe deposition
transcript at p. 38.
.By using tbe appraisal values of Sulzer and Pende1ton in the business plan and submitting
that business plan to the bank for the purpose of obtaining t'irumeing. which they did obtain. in the
amount of at least $1.6 million, Zebe deposition transcript at p. 38, Defendants can not now
I

claim that these numbers are hearsay and eannot be admitted. This information is admissible as
. an exception to the hearsay rule under Idaho Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(2)(B).
.B.

EVEN IF HEARSAY, THE APPRAISALS ATTACHED TO THE
BUSINESS PLAN ARE EXCEPTIONS TO TIlE HEARSAY RULE

Even W01'ethe appraisals still considered hearsay despite Mr. Zebe's adoption of them,
it is not true that appraisals and the like must be excluded as hearsay. The business plan with its
attached financials and appraisals are business records and thus ex~ons to the hearsay rule.
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I

TIllS business plan and the appraisals were prepared in the course ofSVC's attempts to obtain the

'fillancing necessaty to purchase the cheese plant and was in fact used for that purpose. Zebe;
deposition transcript at pp. 11-12,21,39-46. The copy of the apPPlisal we have today was kept
by Syc, LLC and is the only coPY of the business plan that was ever created. Zebe deposition
tran~ipt

at pp.l 0-] 1. The business plan was assembled using information provided to Mr.

!

Zebe by Gaylen ~layson, Val Pendleton. and William Sul7..er, with the best information they had ;
at the time. zebe deposition transcript at pp. 24, 39-46. It was prepared by the Defendants at a
tim.e When they were still working with the Plaintiff, [plaintiff relinquished his interest in SVC.
LLC on October 2, 2008 and entered into the contract to purchase the Cheese Plant and

Restaurant on October 17, 2008 and assigned that contract to Defendants on November 4,2008]
and not for the purpose of litigation, was submitted to banks. financial institutions, and

governm.ent agencies who guarantee loans, and loans were a.ctually obtained from those

institutioac; to purcbase the Plant and restaurant. Zebe deposition transeript at pp. 8-9, 1.1-14, 37.
Appraisals, even when standing alone and not as part of a business record and even when offered
without the presence of the appraiser, arc often admitted under the busin.ess records exception to
the hearsay rule, Rule 803(6), or the general exception, Rule 803(24). hI fact, rule 803(6) ,
specifically allows admission of "opinions" if found within a business record, such as
Defen~ants

business pJan. Both exceptions apply in this case. U.S.

V.

Licaygli, 604 F. 2d 613,

(9th cir. 1979) eert. denied 446 U.S. 935 (1980); Selig v. U~, 740 F. 2d 572 (61i1 cir. 1984); Aero
Union Com. v. U.S. 1981 WL 30814 (ct. c1. 1981). As the analysis of these cases show, the
,

locus is

on the circumstances surrounding the creation and use of the
, documents that indicate

trustworthiness. ~~ Cl1ri$nsen v. .Rice, l14 Id. 929, 763 P. 2d 302 (Ct. App. 1988)(Certain ~
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types of hearsay evidence are admissibJe because the circumstan.ces behind their creation impHes

a high degree of veracity). The fact that an appraisal was not created for purposes of litigation i.s
I

one such
compelling fact that supports admissibility of the document.
,
I

~,Mo

Union Coll'. v..,

,

U.S" :1981
WL 30814 (Ct. 01. 1981). SimilarJy, the fact that persons other than the proponent of·
,
,

,

the document reJied on the appraisal before the litigation began is strong support for its reliability
and tberefore its admissibility. U.s. v. Licavoli, 604 F. 2d 613, (9th cir. 1979). In this case~

Defendants relied on the app1-aisals in the business plan that they submitted to the bank that
provided their purchase money fOl'the cheese plant.

, In addition to the business record exception, the business ptan with its fmancials and

appraisals fit cleanly in the "other exceptio11s" of Rule 803(24). A document is admissible under
this rule if (A) it is offered as evidence of a material f~ (B) the statement is m.ore probative on
the point for which it Is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable' efforts; and (C) the general purpose of the rules of evidence and the interests
of justice will best be served by admission of the statement.
: The values of the business that Gaylen Clayson relinquished and conveyed to Defendants
is a materi.al que$tion in this case and the busin.ess plan, its financials and its appraisals offer
cogent' and reliable evidence of that material fact. The values that Defendants assigned to the

0pp0rf:1:mity they obtained from Gaylcn Clayson before the litigation was commen.ced is more
probative of those values than any hired gun expert could poovide,

and because this document

was created before the litigation, indeed before the falling out between the parties, was relied
upon by the Defendants in attemptillg to procure fmancing, and was relied upon by the lenders in
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I

loaning at least $1,600~OOO.OO to the Defendants, the business plan and its values serve the.
purpdse of the rules of evidence and the interests of justice.
CONCLUSION
Since Defendants' opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider and anow Plaintiff to

I

show'the tinder of fact the true value of the business opportunity Plaintiff relinquished to the
Defe"dants is limited to argument that Plaintiff cannot prove that value, and because, as shown
I

above~
,

i

i

'

admissible non hearsay admissions of the Defendants establish that value at over $4 :
"

I

million, the Court should grant Plaintiff's motion and allow the Plaintiff to show the value of the
business through the business plan Don Zebe wrote.
. DATED THIS 21 s1 day of October, 2010.
ATKIN LAW OFFICES, P.C.

~~•.
Blak.e S. Atkin
Attorney for the Piaintiff/Cmlnterciaim Defendant
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STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
Register#CV -2009-2212-0C
GA YLEEN CLAYSON,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

-vs-

)
)

DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, and LAZE, LLC,
Defendants.
DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, and LAZE, LLC,

)
)
)
)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
ON MOTIONS FOR ATTORNEY
FEES AND COSTS

)

Counterclaim Plaintiffs

)
)

-vs-

)
)

GA YLEN CLAYSON,

)
)
)

Counterclaim Defendant.

This matter is before the Court on Motions by both parties for costs and attorney fees. The
Court has considered all written submissions of both parties, as well as the arguments of counsel,
\.

i'

together with applicable rules and legal authority, and now renders this Memorandum Decision.

i

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
This matter involved a dispute over a claim for reimbursement of expenses incurred by
the Plaintiff in partial refurbishment the Star Valley Cheese Plant in 2008, prior to the time the

Case No. CV-2009-2212-0C
JUDGMENT
Page 1
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Defendants obtain control over and ultimately purcI:l.ased the cheese plant. I In summary, the
Decision, filed December 6, 2010, awarded some, but not all of the damages sought by Plaintiff,
in the total amount of $97,310.94. The MSJ, filed September 15,2010, found that no contract
existed between the parties, determined that several other claims should be dismissed, but
allowed the case to go forward on equitable theories of quantum meruit and unjust enrichment
for certain damages. At trial the Plaintiff s damage claims were further limited, with Plaintiff
being allowed to seek reimbursement of amounts paid to Dairy Systems directly, but not any
additional amounts sought by Dairy Systems.
80th parties now file requests for costs and fees, asserting that they were the prevailing
party.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

In any determination of an award of costs and fees, the threshold question is which party
prevailed. LR.C.P. 54(e)(l) states: "In any civil action the court may award reasonable attorney
fees, which at the discretion of the court may include paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or
parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(l)(8), when provided for by any statute or contract." [Emphasis
added]. LRC.P. 54(d)(l)(8) governs the prevailing party issue:
In determining which party to an action is a prevailing party and entitled to costs, the trial
court shall in its sound discretion consider the final judgment or result of the action in
relation to the relief sought by the respective parties. The trial court in its sound
discretion may determine that a party to an action prevailed in part and did not prevail in
part, and upon so finding may apportion the costs between and among the parties in a fair
I The Court's Trial Decision ("Decision"), filed December 6, 2010, sets forth the facts found by the Court in this
case, and are incorporated herein by reference. Also incorporated herein is the Court's Memorandum Decision
("MSJ"), filed September 15,2010, which granted summary judgment to Defendants on several issues raised by
Plaintiff in this case.
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and equitable manner after considering all of the issues and claims involved in the action
and the resultant judgment or judgments obtained.
The determination of who is the prevailing party is committed to the sound discretion of the trial
court. Rockefeller v.Grabow, 139 Idaho 538, 82 P.3d 450 (2003).
The legal basis for an award of costs is LR.C.P. 54(d)(l). Some costs are awarded to a
prevailing party as a matter of right and some costs can be awarded in the discretion of the Court.
Discretionary costs are allowed "upon a showing that said costs were necessary and exceptional
costs reasonably incurred, and should in the interest of justice be assessed against the adverse
party." When objections to discretionary costs are made the Court "shall make express findings
as to why such specific item of discretionary cost should or should not be allowed." Such costs
may also be disallowed without objection, in the discretion of the Court and upon express
findings. The determination of whether a cost is "exceptional" involves an evaluation both of the
cost itself, i.e., whether it is the kind of cost commonly incurred in the type of litigation at issue,
and whether the case itself is exceptional. City of McCall v. Seubert, 142 Idaho 580, 130 P.3d
1118 (2006); Hayden Lake Fire Protection Dist. v. Alcorn, 141 Idaho 307, 109 P.3d 161 (2005);

Fish v. Smith, 131 Idaho 492, 960 P.2d 175 (1998).
The award of attorney fees is governed by LR.C.P. 54(e)(1), which provides that such an
award is discretionary, to the prevailing party, "when provided for by any statute or contract."
Whether to award fees and the amount of the fees awarded are matters of discretion, unless it
involves a specific determination of a statute which allows for attorney fees.
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Grover v.

Wadsworth, 147 Idaho 60, 205 P.3d 1196 (2009); Taylor v. Maile, 146 Idaho 705,201 P.3d 1282
(2009); Contreras v. Rubley, 142 Idaho 573, 130 P.3d 1111 (2006).

If fees are awarded, the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, must consider the
factors set forth in LR.C.P. 54(e)(3). Sanders v. Lankford, 135 Idaho 322, 1 P.3d 823
(Ct.App.2000); Boe! v. Stewart Title Co., 137 Idaho 9, 16,43 P.3d 768, 775 (2002); Brinkman v.
Aids Insurance Co., 115 Idaho 346, 351, 766 P.2d 1227, 1232 (1988). The district court must, at

a minimum, provide a record which establishes that the court considered these factors. Building
Concepts, Ltd. v. Pickering, 114 Idaho 640, 645, 759 P.2d 931, 936 (Ct.App.1988). A trial court

need not specifically address all of the factors contained in LR.C.P. 54(e)(3) in writing, so long
as the record clearly indicates that the court considered them all. Brinkman, 115 Idaho at 351,
766 P.2d at 1232. In addition, a court need not blindly accept those attorney fees requested by a
party, and may disallow those fees that were incurred unnecessarily or unreasonably. Craft Wall
of Idaho, Inc. v. Stonebraker, 108 Idaho 704, 706, 701 P.2d 324,326 (Ct.App.1985).

Plaintiff seeks recovery of attorney fees pursuant to I.C. § 12-120(3), claiming that this
matter involves a commercial transaction. Defendants do not identify any particular basis for
their claim for attorney fees. Idaho Code § 12-120(3) provides:
In any civil action to recoyer on an open account, account stated, note, bill,
negotiable instrument, guaranty, or contract relating to the purchase or sale of
goods, wares, merchandise, or services and in any commercial transaction unless
otherwise provided by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable
attorney fee to be set by the court, to be taxed and collected as costs.
The term "commercial transaction" is defined to mean all transactions except
transactions for personal or household purposes.
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"A court is not required to award reasonable attorney fees every time a commercial
transaction is connected with a case. The critical test is whether the commercial transaction
comprises the gravamen of the lawsuit; the commercial transaction must be integral to the claim
and constitute a basis on which the party is attempting to recover." Bingham v. Montane
Resources Assoc., 133 Idaho 420, 426, 987 P.2d 1035, 1041 (1999). The award of attorney fees

is warranted when the commercial transaction comprises the crux of the lawsuit. Broods v.
Gigray Ranches, Inc., 910 P.2d 744,750 (1996). There is a two-part test in determining whether

attorney fees are appropriate in a commercial transaction. "First, the commercial transaction
must be integral to the claim, and second, the commercial transaction must provide the actual
basis for recovery." Iron Eagle Development, LLC v. Qualify Design Systems, Inc., 65 P.3d 509,
515 (2003). If the complaint asserts a claim under a contract that qualifies as a commercial
transaction under I.C. § 12-120(3), this statute must be applied even if no liability under the
contract is established. Lexington Heights Develop. LLC v.Crandlemire, 140 Idaho 276, 287, 92
P.3d 526, 537 (2004); Peterson v. Shore, 146 Idaho 476, 197 P.3d 789 (Ct.App.2008). Even
when allowed under this statute, the amount of the award is within the discretion of the court.
Johanneson v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423,196 P.3d 341 (2008); Lettunich v. Lettunich, 141 Idaho

425, 111 P.3d 110 (2005).
ANALYSIS AND DECISION

The Court's first determination is whether there is a prevailing party. Both parties claim
that they are the prevailing party. In determining the prevailing party, the Court is required to
consider the issues and claims involved and the resulting judgment. Each party offers its own
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analysis of why they believe they prevailed. Rather than focus on what the parties have stated,
the Court makes its own analysis of that issue.
There were several important issues raised in this case. First, Plaintiff asserted that a
contract existed between the parties which provided, among other things, that he would sell milk
to the Defendants over three years and receive $500,000 for those sales, and that Defendants
would assume all debts Plaintiff incurred in refurbishing the cheese plant, including the entire
debt owed to Dairy Systems, arguably something in the neighborhood of $250,000. In the MSJ
the Court found that no contract existed and that Plaintiff could not recover damages in either of
these instances, except for the amounts paid directly by Plaintiff to Diary Systems, totaling
$50,000. 2
Secondly, Plaintiffs complaint sought damages for extortion, duress, slander and
defamation, but those claims were also dismissed in the MSJ, this Court concluding that no
factual basis for these claims existed.
Thirdly, Plaintiff was allowed to seek, on equitable theories, reimbursement of expenses
he incurred in refurbishing the cheese plant. He also sought payment for his personal labor in
that effort. His claims totaled $136,708, including $12,600 for his labor. In the Decision the
Court found that there was insufficient evidence to support all of Plaintiff s claims but did award
$97,310.94 in damages. Defendants claimed that they owed nothing to Plaintiff but, as found in
the Decision, there was substantial evidence to support their reimbursement obligation on an
equitable basis.
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At best, the Court concludes that the results of this case are mixed, with either side
prevailing in part.

The Idaho appellate courts have held that mixed results, including recovery

of less than the amount sought, can support an award of attorney fees. 3 However, the Court, in
its discretionary consideration of "the final jUdgment or result of the action in relation to the
relief sought by the respective parties," determines that both parties "prevailed in part and did not
prevail in part," and further determines that careful consideration of the outcomes in this case
leads to the conclusion that no fees or costs should be awarded to either party.
Secondarily, the Court also concludes that even if a determination had been made that the
Plaintiff prevailed, no fees would be awarded because this case, in the final analysis, did not
invo lve a commercial transaction.

Recovery under I. C. § 12-120(3) requires a contractual

foundation of some kind. In this case the Court found that there is no contract and that any
recovery was on an equitable basis. This is insufficient to find a commercial transaction. 4
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the Court denies both Motions for Attorney Fees and Costs. The
Judgment will not be amended.

2 At trial Plaintiff continued to claim that he could be reimbursed for the total Dairy Systems bill, but that claim was
not allowed.
3 Bates v. Seldin, 146 Idaho 772, 203 P.3d 702 (2009) (attorney fee award upheld even though prevailing party
recovered substantially less than the relief sought); Eighteen Mile Ranch, LLC v. Nord Excavating & Paving, Inc.,
141 Idaho 716, 117 P.3d 130 (2005) (award offees upheld although recovery on counterclaim was less than ten
percent of amount sought); Nguyen v. Bui, 146 Idaho 187, 191 P.3d 1107 (Ct.App.2008); Chadderdon v. King, 104
Idaho 406,659 P.2d 160 (Ct.App.1983). Based on these cases, the question of whether Plaintiff has prevailed is a
close one.
4 See Hausam v. Schnable, 126 Idaho 569, 887 P.2d 1076 (Ct.App.1994). The Court notes that the successful
defense against a contract can, in certain circumstances, be held to support a claim for fees. See Lawrence v. Jones,
124 Idaho 748, 864 P.2d 194 (Ct.App.l993). However, in this case, Defendants successful defense of the contract
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)

GA YLEN CLAYSON,
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NOTICE OF HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The above named Appellants, Don Zebe, Rick Lawson and Laze, LLC, appeal against

the above named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Decision, Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated December 6, 2010, and Judgment dated December 6, 2010,
which rulings were entered in the above entitled action on the dates stated above by the Honorable
Stephen S. Dunn, District Judge, presiding.
2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the judgments

or orders described in Paragraph 1 above are appealable orders under and pursuant to Rule 11 (a)( 1)
and/or II(a)(7), I.A.R.
3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellants then intend to

assert in the appeal; provided, any such list of issues on appeal shall not prevent the Appellants from
asserting other issues on appeal, including the following:
A.

The Court improperly applied the law governing implied-in-fact contracts and
quantum merit.

B.

The Court improperly concluded that Defendants were unjustly enriched
despite Defendants having purchased the plant and equipment for its fair
market value.

4.

Has an order been entered sealing all or any portion of the record? NO.

5.

(a)

Is a reporter's transcript requested?

(b)

The Appellants request the preparation of the fo llowing portions of the

YES.

reporter's transcript:

NOVEMBER 4, 5 and 10,2010 COURT TRIAL
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6.

The Appellants request the following documents to be included in the Clerk's record

in addition to those automatically included under Rule 28, LA.R.:
A.

02-03-2010

B.

02-03-2010

C.

03-23-2010

D.

03-23-2010

E.
F.
G.

03-23-2010
03-23-2010
07-26-2010

H.

08-05-2010

I.

08-09-2010

J.
K.

08-09-2010
09-15-2010

L.

R.
S.

10-04-2010
10-04-2010
10-04-2010
10-05-2010
10-07-2010
10-12-2010
10-12-2010
10-18-2010

T.
U.
V.
W.
X.
Y.
Z.
AA.
BB.
Cc.
DD.
EE.
FF.

10-21-2010
10-29-2010
11-01-2010
11-03-2010
11-08-2010
11-08-2010
11-16-2010
11-16-2010
11-16-2010
11-16-2010
11-16-2010
11-16-2010
11-22-2010

M.
N.
O.
P.

Q.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Summary
Judgment;
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss and/or
Motion for Summary Judgment;
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and/or
Motion for Summary Judgment;
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Plaintiffs First
Amended Complaint to Assert a Claim for Punitive Damages;
Motion to Continue Pursuant to IRCP 56f;
Minute Entry and Order on Motion to Dismiss;
Defendants Lawson and Zebe Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion to DismisslMotion for Summary Judgment;
Affidavit of Blake S. Atkin in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss or for Summary Judgment;
Affidavit of Blake S. Atkin in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to
Dismiss or for Summary Judgment;
Hearing result for Motion for S~ummary Judgment held 08-09-2010
Memorandum Decision and Order on Defendants' Motion for
Summary Judgment;
Motion to Reconsider Damage Aspects of Decision dated 9-15-10;
Memorandum in Support of Defense Motion in Limine;
Second Affidavit of Gary L. Cooper;
Defense Motion in Limine;
Motion to Dismiss Counterclaim;
Joint Pre-Trial Stipulation;
Motion to Reconsider Damage Aspects of Decision dated 9-15-10;
Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff s Motion for Reconsideration
Re Damage Aspects of Decision Dated September 15,2010;
Memorandum in Opposition to Defense Motion in Limine;
Hearing result for Motion held on 10-25-2010;
Trial Brief;
Designation of Testimony from the Deposition of Morris A. Farinella
Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference 11/08/2010);
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 1111012010);
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 01111/2011;
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 11/04/2010;
Court hearing held Court Reporter;
Hearing result for Jury Trial held on 1111012010;
Hearing result for Status Conference held on 11/08/2010;
Minute Entry and Order; Court Trial held;
Plaintiff's Designation of Portions of Deposition of Morris Farinella;
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GG.

11-24-2010

HH.

11-24-2010

II.
JJ.
KK.
LL.

11-26-2010
11-29-2010
12-08-2010
12-08-2010

MM.

12-08-2010

NN.

01-04-2011

7.

I certify:
(a)

Defense Objection to Plaintiff's Designation of Deposition Excerpts
from the Deposition of Morris Farinella;
Defense Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Argument;
Plaintiff's Post Trial Brief;
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law;
Defense Memorandum on Damage Claim;
Plaintiff's Trial Memorandum Regarding the Admissibility of Bill to
Dairy Systems Company;
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider Damage
Aspects of Decision Dated September 15,2010;
Memorandum Decision on Motion for Attorney Fees and Costs.

That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on each reporter of
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the address set out
below:
Sheila Fish, Court Reporter

clo District Court Clerk
624 E Center, Room 218
Pocatello, ID 83201
(b)( 1) That the Clerk of the District Court has been paid the estimated fee for
preparation ofthe reporter's transcript.
(c)(l) That the estimated fee for preparation of the Clerk's record has been paid.
(d)(1) That the Appellants filing fee has been paid.

(e)

That service has been made upon all p(lrties required to be served pursuant
to Rule 20.
II

DATED this _11-..:.-_ day of January, 20~;r.,\

OOfER & LARSEN
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IN THE DISfRlCT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK;
)
)
Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Respondent, )
)
vs,
)
)
DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, LAZE, LLC, )
)
Defendant-Counterclaimant-~Appellant
)
)

GAYLEN CLAYSON,

Supreme Court No. 38471-2011
CLERK'S CERTIACATE
OF
APPEAL

------------------------,)
Appealed from: Sixth JudiCial District, Bannock County
Honorable Judge Stephen S. Dunn presiding
Bannock County Case No: CV-2009-2212-OC
Order of Judgment Appealed from: Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law filed the 6th day of December, 2010 and Judgment filed the
7th day of December, 2010.
Attorney for Appellant: Gary L. Cooper, COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED,
Pocatello, Idaho.
Attorney for Respondent: Blake S. Atkin, ATKIN LAW OFFICES, Clifton, Idaho.
Appealed by: Don Zebe, Rick Lawson, and Laze, LLC.,
Appealed against: Gaylen Clayson
Notice of Appeal filed: January 14, 2011

FILED - ORIGINAL

Notice of Cross-Appeal filed: No
Appellate fee paid: Yes

FEB - 12011

Request for additional records filed: No
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Request for additional reporter's transcript filed: No
Name of Reporter: Sheila Fish
Was District Court Reporter's transcript requested? Yes
Estimated Number of Pages: More than 500

Dated~~OL\,2D\1
DALE HATCH, ..
Clerk of the District Court

786

IN THE DISTRICT OF THE .s,IXTH JUllJtlC'lAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE' COUNTY OF BANNOCK
STATE OF IDAHO
NOTICE
VS.

OF
LODGING

DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, AND LAZE, LLC.,

SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 38471-2011
DISTRICT COURT CASE NO. 2009-2212

The transcript in the above entit le d matte r
consisting of 516 pages was lodged with the District
Court Clerk at the Bannock County Courthouse in
Pocate llo , Idaho, on th e 29th day of March, 2011.
The following hearings were lodged:
Nov emb er 4 , 2011, Court Trial; November 5, 2011, Court
Trial; November 10, 2011, Court Trial.
DATED this 29th day of March, 2011.
Via:
(XX) Hand-Delivery
( ) U.S. Mail
(XX) Electronic Copy to ISC/COA; BCCO; AG; SAPO
(Signature of Reporter)
SHEILA T. FISH, RPR, CSR
(Typed name of Reporter)

Cc:
Diane Cano, Bannock Co. Appellate Clerk
ISC/COA-Klondy L.
ISC/COA-Karel L.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

GAYLEN CLAYSON,

)
)
Pia intiff-Cou nterdefenda nt-Respondent, )
)
vs.
)

Supreme Court No. 38471-2011

CLERK'S CERTIFICATE

)

DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, LAZE, LLC,

)
)

Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellant, )
------------)
I, DALE HATCH, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock, do hereby certify that the
above and foregoing record in the above-entitled cause was compiled and bound
under my direction as, and is a true, full, and correct record of the pleadings and
documents as are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho appellate
Rules.
I do further certify that all exhibits, offered or admitted in the aboveentitled cause, will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the Supreme Court along
with the court reporteris transcript and the clerk's record as required by Rule 31
of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
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IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal
of said Court at Pocatello, Idaho, this _-'--_ day

(Seal)

789

2011.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK

GAYLEN CLAYSON,

)
)
Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Respondent, )
)
vs.
)
)
DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, LAZE, LLC, )
)
Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellant, )

Supreme Court No. 38471-2011

CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

I, DALE HATCH, the duly elected, qualified and acting Clerk of the District
Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of
Bannock, do hereby certify that the following are the original exhibits marked for
identification and introduced in evidence at trial of the above and foregoing
cause, to wit:

DEFENDANT'S EXHIBITS

1.

Exhibit SA

Ferinella Desposition.

2.

Exhibit 11

IRE 1006, Summary of Clayson Invoices paid by SVc.

3.

Exhibit 11-A Bills paid through Nov. 25, 2008.

PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBITS

1.

Exhibit D

Contract to Buy Real Estate.

2.

Exhibit G

Pages 1-4 of Invoices and Statements of Dairy Systems.
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3.

Exhibit I

Star Valley Cheese business plan.

4.

Exhibit J

Article of Organization.

5.

Exhibit K

Annual Report from Milk Market Management.

6.

Exhibit N

Addendum A1 Assignment.

7.

Exhibit

8.

Exhibit S

Email from Don Zebe date 2/25/09.

9.

Exhibit U

Email from Don Zebe dated 1/31/09.

10.

Exhibit V

Email from Don Zebe dated 2/19/09.

11.

Exhibit W

Email from Don Zebe dated 2/25/09.

12.

Exhibit X

Email form Don Zebe dated 3/7/09.

13.

Exhibit CC

Affidavit of Jeff Randall.

Q

Financial from 12/31/08 to 6/30/09, pages 7 and 8, and
last two pages.

I FURTHER CERTIFY that the above exhibits are attached to, and made a
part of, the original transcript on appeal in said cause.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal
of said Court, this the _ _ day of ~~t=--:~~--, 2011.

(Seal)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
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)
vs.
)
)
DON ZEBE, RICK LAWSON, LAZE, LLC, )
)
Defendant-Counterclai mant-Appellant. )

Supreme Court No. 38471-2011

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

--------------------------)
I, DALE HATCH, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock, do hereby certify that I
have personally served or mailed, by United States mail, one copy of the
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT and CLERK'S RECORD to each of the Attorneys of
Record in this cause as follows:
Gary L. Cooper
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED
Post Office Box 4229
Pocatello, Idaho 83205-4229

Blake S. Atkin
ATKIN LAW OFFICES
7579 North Westside Hwy
Clifton, Idaho 83228

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal
r

of said Court at Pocatello, Idaho, this ----"""--- day ofC2~,~2011.
'1

(Seal)
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